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Abstract
These three essays are concerned with macroeconomic and monetary policy issues
relating to the housing market and inflation-targeting. The essays can be character-
ized as applied macroeconomics in nature as they use insights from theory to construct
macroeconomic models, which are then taken to the data.
The first chapter in this study utilizes microeconomic evidence that nominal loss
aversion plays a role in the pricing of housing services and explores the extent to which
this phenomenon in the housing sector affects the macroeconomy as a whole. A two-
sector Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model of housing and consumption
goods with downward nominal price rigidity in the housing sector is constructed to
examine how asymmetries in the nominal pricing of housing services affects monetary
policy in stabilizing the economy in response to shocks. A calibration exercise is also
performed to gain insight to what degree pricing dynamics in the housing sector are
driven by the tendency of sellers to be nominally loss averse.
The second chapter explores the disparities in the success rate in hitting an
explicit inflation target among OECD and Emerging Market inflation targeters. The
study proposes a framework to try to circumvent the “good luck”/“good policy” forces
as drivers of better inflation-targeting outcomes by estimating a measure of central
bank credibility in targeting regimes. Two main findings are that Emerging Market
targeting banks are less successful than their OECD counterparts in establishing
credibility in targeting inflation and that credible regimes last on the order of five to
ten times as long as the relatively short-lived incredible regimes for the two groups of
targeting countries.
The third chapter, co-authored with Scott Schuh of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston, takes a preliminary empirical step to model inflation outcomes for infla-
tion band-targeting countries which allows us to isolate the empirical determinants
of inflation escaping from the targeted band. We also use our framework to deter-
mine whether US inflation is consistent with inflation under an explicit targeting
regime. Our model generates the result that US inflation during the last decade is
well predicted by a model of inflation-targeting countries.
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Part I
My House is Worth What! :The
Asymmetric Effects of Nominal
Loss Aversion in the Housing
Market
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Abstract
Utilizing microeconomic evidence that nominal loss aversion plays a role in the pricing
of housing services, this study explores the extent to which this phenomenon in the
housing sector affects the macroeconomy as a whole. A two-sector Dynamic Stochas-
tic General Equilibrium model of housing and consumption goods with downward
nominal price rigidity in the housing sector is constructed to examine how asymme-
tries in the nominal pricing of housing services affects monetary policy in stabilizing
the economy in response to shocks. A calibration exercise is also performed to gain
insight to what degree pricing dynamics in the housing sector are driven by the ten-
dency of sellers to be nominally loss averse.
Keywords : Housing, Loss Aversion, Asymmetric Price Rigidity, Monetary Policy,
Two-Sector Model.
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1.1 Introduction
Clearly, housing is an important component of the US economy. In recent years, the
stock of housing has been approaching a valuation of 150% of yearly US GDP and
the annual flow of housing services plus residential investment, comprises roughly
15% of GDP1. Housing is often a large portion of household wealth and consumers
have increasingly borrowed against the equity in their homes to finance renovations to
those homes along with other consumption and durable good purchases. The lumpy
and differentiable nature of housing assets also affects individuals’ abilities to move
to different jobs in new locales and thus, impacts the overall employment rate. For all
of these factors, it is reasonable to believe that price dynamics and any frictions that
may be present in the housing sector can have broader effects on the macroeconomy.
Using microeconomic insights that nominal loss aversion plays a role in the pricing
of housing services, this study explores the extent to which such asymmetries affect the
macroeconomy as a whole, including whether monetary policy induces asymmetries
with expansionary and contractionary shocks to the economy. In cases of downturns,
the slow adjustment of house prices to reflect the economic reality is particularly
pertinent given the impact that housing sales have on durable good investment, job
mobility, and employment2 3.
1The flow of housing services for owner-occupied residences is an imputed value in NIPA data
that households receive from residing in their homes. Since the owner does not explicitly pay rent
to himself/herself, it is imputed based on comparable rental rates for the property.
2See Engelhardt [22] for more on the effect that nominal loss aversion in housing has on job
mobility. See Oswald [71] for the effect that investment in housing has on the unemployment rate
in Italy, France, Sweden, the UK, and the US. Oswald finds that a ten percent increase in home-
ownership is associated with a two percent increase in unemployment.
3Also consider this excerpt from a recent New York Times [99] article: “With homes changing
hands easily in a booming market, interstate migration reached 2.2 million people in 2006, excluding
the effects of Hurricane Katrina. As the economy and home prices began to unravel in 2007, however,
interstate migration plunged to 1.6 million people.” The article makes the explicit point that it is not
just the abundance (or lack thereof) of jobs across the country that solely drives migration. Instead,
the ability (or inability) to sell one’s home is also an important determining factor of migration.
3
Figure 1.1 overlays the federal funds rate series on the annualized log-differenced
growth rates of housing prices culled from the S&P/Case-Shillerr home price index of
ten major metropolitan areas from January 2000 to December 2007. Looking at the
federal funds series, we see a monetary expansion after 9/11, a contraction starting
in mid-2004 and finally the recent expansion in response to the current sub-prime
mortgage and credit crises4. The housing price growth series displays strong positive
annualized growth until the beginning of 2006, with a descent into negative territory
starting to occur in 2007. It is clear that Federal Reserve policy is broad-based and
has not been primarily concerned with housing prices over this time period. However,
as a large component of both household wealth and GDP, the housing market has
been receiving a great deal of media attention lately as prices dip into negative growth
territory. The natural question that arises at this point is whether monetary policy
is asymmetric in both its implementation and in its effects with respect to recoveries
and recessions in this asset market.
This paper fits into a larger debate on business cycle and monetary policy asym-
metries. Romer & Romer [78] find support for asymmetry in post-WWII US monetary
policy in that policy was on the order of two to three times as loose in recessions as it
was tight in recoveries. Weise [101] finds that monetary policy has asymmetric effects
on output and prices depending on the state of the business cycle in a non-linear
VAR model. Using a two-state regime-switching approach, Piger & Lo [59] find that
monetary policy has larger effects on output when enacted in recessions, opposed to
recoveries.
Generating such asymmetries in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
4Many, including Shiller [85] and Taylor [97], feel that the monetary contraction was too late
and contributed to the housing bubble that seems to be deflating currently. Unfortunately for the
purposes of this study, it will take a couple of years to see the how housing prices and monetary
policy fully play out.
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model requires modifying the standard model with respect to agents’ objectives
and/or the underlying structure of the economy. This study will explore an econ-
omy where there is a strong aversion on the part of the sellers of housing structures
to realize a loss in nominal terms, but no such aversion to realizing gains. This asym-
metry in the pricing of housing services introduces different implications for output
and prices compared to the standard two-sector DSGE model.
Consider negative and positive demand shocks to the housing sector, for example.
In the case of a positive demand shock, the effects should manifest themselves more
so in prices, reflecting the lack of aversion to realizing gains in the housing market.
In the presence of a negative demand shock to housing, the effects should largely be
seen in quantities of housing sold, largely due to the reluctance of sellers to cut their
prices.
Asymmetries in pricing behavior may also provide a basis for why monetary
policy is unduly asymmetric in times of economic expansions and contractions. For
example, in the case of an inflationary shock, a policy of monetary easing may be
a little less expansionary due to the reluctance of the central bank to let inflation
go unchecked. If the economy is hit by a deflationary shock, however, the same
monetary action could be expected to be more expansionary if pricing behavior is
asymmetrically rigid in certain asset classes5.
5With respect to the housing market, monetary policy can be asymmetric due to asymmetries
in housing price-setting behavior combined with an explicit-targeting of housing prices on behalf of
the central bank or from spill-over effects such as borrowing tied to rising or falling housing asset
values.
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1.1.1 Asymmetric Nominal Rigidities
Genovese & Mayer [30] examine housing prices in the Boston condominium market
in the 1990s and find that sellers who face the prospect of nominal losses list their
properties for 25-35% over the difference between the market price and the original
purchase price. They also find that these loss-averse sellers have a harder time selling
their property as evidenced by time on the market. The tendency to price and sell
housing goods based on a reference point (i.e. the price at which one originally paid
for housing) is apparent even in the cases where the real estate asset was bought for
investment purposes rather than to be a primary residence.
Genovese & Mayer’s findings suggest that housing may not behave like other
asset classes. The seller of the housing asset often has a strong emotional tie to the
home, a feature that may provide a rationale for Genovese & Mayer’s finding of an
asymmetric nominal price rigidity in this asset class6. An asymmetry in nominal
rigidities is consistent with the evidence of a procyclical nature of housing prices
and housing investment: when housing prices fall, so does the volume of sales and
vice-versa.
The decision to accept/reject a buyer’s offer on the part of the seller of real-estate
can be rationalized by prospect theory which was developed by Tversky & Kahneman
[98]. Prospect theory motivated the field of behavioral finance and explained among
other phenomena why individual investors were less averse to selling stocks that ex-
perienced nominal gains, opposed to those that had nominal losses7. Prospect theory
6Despite not having the same emotional tie to the property as a live-in resident, emotion may
also play a role for housing investors in their pricing behavior, but with respect to the issue of a
“fair” price as discussed in Kahneman et al. [47].
7Of course, there are differences between the stock market and housing. A single stock is largely
an undifferentiated good held by many and priced on continual basis. However, an individual 3
bedroom/2 bath home (as an example) is highly differentiable and held by a single household who
6
also offers a framework to characterize the seller’s behavior when facing uncertainty
in the real estate market. The salient characteristics of prospect theory deal with a
relative utility function referenced to the nominal price at which the seller originally
paid for the asset and the feature of the absolute value of the disutility of realiz-
ing a nominal loss being larger than the utility from a nominal gain. Genovese &
Mayer’s findings are well explained by prospect theory and indicate that the seller’s
characteristics play a role in determining the price of real estate. Even in the seem-
ingly undifferentiated goods market of Boston condominiums, this lends support to
a monopolistically competitive setup for housing8 in which nominal pricing dynamics
behave asymmetrically9.
The discussion of asymmetric nominal rigidities in a macroeconomic setting has
been limited primarily to labor markets, where nominal wages may be downwardly
rigid due to the bargaining power of unions in negotiating wages or to an aversion to
cut nominal wages on behalf of the employer because of the potential loss of employee
morale that may result, to mention a couple of examples. Up until very recently, such
asymmetries have been difficult to model in DSGE setups due to the non-linearities
tends to be much more uncertain about the valuation of their asset due to the infrequency of sales.
See Odean [67] for more on prospect theory and the stock market.
8In most cases however, housing is a highly differentiated good, which in theory, gives the seller
monopolistic pricing power. Combined with some form of inertia in the ability to change prices,
perhaps in the behavioral form of loss aversion or in the more traditional form of menu costs, these
two forces produce monetary non-neutrality.
9I am relying primarily on a psychological basis for asymmetric nominal rigidities in the housing
market. However, for some homeowners, the constraint of having to pay back the outstanding
mortgage in nominal terms after the sale of a home is a very important concern. In the event that
an offer is made on a home that is below the outstanding mortgage amount, the seller simply cannot
afford to sell the home despite the market pressures in some cases. This example serves as another
rationale for why nominal rigidities, if they exist in the housing market, may be downwardly rigid.
In addition, I should mention that Genovese & Mayer included the outstanding mortgage amount in
their regressions explaining listing prices, selling prices, and time on the market. They found that
although the outstanding mortgage amount significantly affected the dependent variable in question,
once one included a dummy indicator for nominal losses, the effect of the outstanding mortgage
amount diminished by half. They also found that the nominal loss dummy had a considerably larger
effect on the dependent variable.
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and potential non-differentiabilities that such asymmetries introduce. This paper
follows the strategy taken by Kim & Ruge-Murcia [52] in their recent paper on the
optimal level of inflation needed to remove the social costs of downward wage rigidities
in the presence of negative shocks that necessitate a decrease in the real wage, albeit
with respect to housing prices rather than wages. This paper also explores the effects
that asymmetries in housing price-setting behavior induce on the business cycle very
much like those in the case of wages10.
To be sure, an assumption of asymmetric nominal rigidities in housing prices
is based on Genovese & Mayer’s microeconomic evidence. Before embarking on an
examination of this assumption in a more formal macroeconomic setting, the reader
perhaps may want to see more convincing macroeconomic evidence that housing prices
indeed behave in this manner. However, one should keep in mind that the motivation
for the standard inertial pricing component a´ la Calvo [15] or Rotemberg [79] in
DSGE models is similarly based on microeconomic evidence. In addition, the model
presented in this paper is as much a theoretical contribution of a two-sector setup
where one or both sectors are allowed to have nominal prices that behave in an
asymmetrically rigid fashion. Finally, this contribution allows one to determine the
degree to which housing prices are indeed downwardly rigid.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents the two-sector model
of housing and consumption goods. Section 1.3 showcases the calibration exercise,
which utilizes a rough grid search method by matching features of the model to those
of the data. In this setup, one can roughly determine the extent to which pricing
behavior in the housing sector is asymmetrically rigid. It also examines the model
dynamics from the calibrated model. Finally, Section 1.4 concludes with some brief
10See Fehr & Goette [25] for a treatment of the real effects of asymmetric wage rigidities.
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policy prescriptions that flow from this analysis.
1.2 The Model
Genovese & Mayer posit that there are two main differences between the housing
market and other asset classes: loss aversion in nominal terms and an equity or down-
payment constraint. Due to the facts that the minimum down-payment requirement
to secure a house has diminished virtually to zero in the years after the end of Genovese
& Mayer’s dataset (1997) and since Genovese & Mayer find that, when accounting for
nominal loss aversion, liquidity constraints are less significant in regressions explaining
listing prices, selling prices, and time on the market for real estate, I abstract away
from the down-payment requirement. The model consists of consumption and housing
good sectors that allow for downward nominal price rigidities based on seller loss
aversion to be present in the housing sector. The pricing specification is similar in
the consumption goods sector, and it should be noted that a more standard symmetric
price rigidity formulation is nested as a special case. Therefore, the model departs
from Iacoviello & Neri’s [41] two-sector model of housing and consumption goods or
the more general durable, non-durable model of Barsky et al. [6] in that the housing
good sector is not assumed to have fully flexible prices. As is common, a model is
often an approximation of reality and therefore, I abstract away from such issues
as including a rental market for housing11 and including land as an input to the
11Including a rental market is difficult add-on, since the binary decision to rent or own is not easily
handled in a DSGE setup. In addition, the setup is at a business-cycle frequency and including a
rental market would require a no-arbitrage condition between the two markets. However, in the
short-run, there is evidence that rents and housing prices often become decoupled. See Gallin [28]
for more on the relationship between housing prices and rents.
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production of housing12.
To explore the link between credit-constrained agents in the economy borrowing
against the housing stock (an increasingly more common phenomenon in the years
since Genovese & Mayer) and the macroeconomy as a whole, I include a real estate-
based financial accelerator in the fashion of Kiyotaki & Moore [53] and Iacoviello
[40]. Two representative households (one of which is credit-constrained) are needed
to motivate the financial accelerator mechanism. To close out the model, a central
bank that conducts monetary policy and rebates seignorage revenues to the patient
household is present.
1.2.1 Patient Household
There is a representative patient household of unit mass that derives utility from
consumption goods, Ct, and the stock of housing goods, HSt
13. The stock of housing
goods depreciate at a rate governed by δ and the flow of housing investment is rep-
resented by Ht
14. The patient household experiences disutility from labor, Nt, which
12One idea advanced for why housing prices have increased so dramatically in recent years is that
the land on which homes are situated has become much more valuable due to increased scarcity and
regulation. However, with the rapid growth of “exurbs” due to the greater willingness of workers to
commute long distances to their employment in city-centers, this explanation perhaps can go only
so far in explaining the increase in housing prices in all areas of the country. See Glaeser et. al. [35]
for more on how regulation and the scarcity of land affects home prices in some locales. In addition,
Iacoviello & Neri include land in the production function for housing in a DSGE setup and estimate
that the fixity of land plays a minimal role in the appreciation in housing prices in the past forty
years.
13The assumption here is that the per-period utility derived by the household from housing in the
form of housing services is proportional to the entire stock HSt, governed by Ψh in Equation (3.3).
Note that Ψh is not time-varying, which is in line with a close-to-constant housing services/GDP
ratio over time as seen in NIPA data.
14Per-period housing investment is interpreted to be the addition of new housing construction
and renovations to existing housing structures in this model. The simplifying assumption is that
these two components enter in additively into Ht based on the real-world observation that the
cost of renovations should not be too different from the cost of new housing investment in the
marketplace. In addition, when taking the model to the data, the residential investment series in
NIPA data that maps to Ht includes both new construction of single and multi-family homes, along
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receives the nominal wage, Wt. The patient household also lends bonds in real terms,
Bt
Pc,t
, to the impatient household that puts up his/her housing stock as collateral in
borrowing and receives the gross interest, Rt, on the lent bond the next period. As in
Iacoviello & Neri, only the patient household has access to capital, Kt, as a consump-
tion good or as a rental good at the nominal interest rate, Qt, supplied to housing
and consumption good-producing firms. The patient household owns the firms and is
rebated the monopoly profits, Ft. Finally, the patient household receives seignorage
revenues from the government in the form of lump-sum transfers, Tt. More formally,
the maximization problem for the representative patient household can be expressed
as:
max
Bt
Pc,t
,Nt,HSt,Kt,
Mt
Pc,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[(
Ψc ln(Ct) + Ψh ln(HSt)
)
− 1
η
(Nt)
η + χ ln
(
Mt
Pc,t
)]
(1.1)
subject to the following nominal budget constraint:
Pc,tCt + Ph,tHt +Bt−1Rt−1 + Pc,tIt + Pc,tADJK,t +Mt = (1.2)
Bt +WtNt +QtKt−1 +Mt−1 + Tt + Ft
the housing good accumulation equation15:
HSt = Ht + (1− δ)HSt−1 (1.3)
with improvements to existing homes.
15Note that this specification implicitly assumes that the asset price of the existing housing stock,
HSt, is equal to the price for housing investment, Ht. This assumption is reconciled with the
data when considering that existing houses are directly priced very infrequently, rather than on a
quarterly basis for example. Indeed, some estimates of housing prices treat houses as a bundle of
attributes (location, size, number of bedrooms, etc.) and due to infrequent sales or assessments of
existing homes, each housing component is priced based on its current replacement value.
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and the capital good accumulation equation:
Kt = (1− ζ)Kt−1 + It (1.4)
where Pc,t and Ph,t are consumption and housing good prices. It is per-period (non-
residential) investment subject to a capital adjustment cost, ADJK,t, specified as
follows16:
ADJK,t =
φK
2
(
Kt
Kt−1
− 1
)2
Kt−1 (1.5)
Consumption and the flow of housing investment, Ct and Ht, are aggregates of dif-
ferentiated consumption and housing goods produced by the firms and indexed by
j :
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
(Cjt )
1
µdj
)µ
(1.6)
Ht =
(∫ 1
0
(Hjt )
1
µdj
)µ
(1.7)
I assume a cash-less economy (χ→0) a la’ Woodford [102]. The marginal utility of
consumption for the patient household is defined as follows:
Λt =
Ψc
Ct
(1.8)
16Capital adjustment costs are introduced to the model mainly for the purpose of matching features
of the data to the model. As discussed in Smets & Wouters [87], if capital were perfectly mobile
across firms, the firms would be more willing to change their prices in the presence of demand shocks
since they could adjust their capital input to production costlessly. Due to the fact that a main task
of this paper is to determine the nature of price rigidities in the housing market, including capital
adjustment costs insures against obtaining a downwardly-biased result.
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The maximization problem in Equation (3.3) leads to the following first-order condi-
tions for the patient household:
Λt = βEt
[
RtΛt+1
Πc,t+1
]
(1.9)
Λt
Wt
Pc,t
= (Nt)
η−1 (1.10)
Λt =
Ψh
HSt
Pc,t
Ph,t
+ β(1− δ)Et
[
Λt+1
Πh,t+1
Πc,t+1
]
(1.11)
Λt
[
1 + φk
(
Kt
Kt−1
− 1
)]
= (1.12)
βEt
[
Λt+1
(
(1− ζ) + Qt+1
Pc,t+1
+ φk
(
Kt+1
Kt
− 1
)
Kt+1
Kt
− φk
2
(
Kt+1
Kt
− 1
)2)]
Equations (1.9), (1.10), (1.11) and (1.12) are the standard Euler equation for con-
sumption, the labor supply equation, demand for housing goods, and the Euler equa-
tion for capital. The optimal quantities of consumption and housing goods j de-
manded by the patient household are as follows:
Cjt =
(
P jc,t
Pc,t
)− µ
µ−1
Ct (1.13)
Hjt =
(
P jh,t
Ph,t
)− µ
µ−1
Ht (1.14)
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1.2.2 Impatient Household
Like the patient household, there is a representative impatient household of unit mass
that derives utility from leisure, consumption and housing goods17. The impatient
household discounts the future more heavily than the patient household (γ < β)
and thus is credit constrained. Therefore, in all periods, the impatient borrows from
the patient household to finance consumption. Similar to Kiyotaki & Moore and Ia-
coviello, if the impatient household (or equivalently, the borrower) reneges on his/her
debt, the patient household (the lender) can summon the impatient household’s assets
at a cost that is proportional to the collateral amount. More specifically, the impa-
tient household can nominally borrow, B
′
t, up to an amount of mEt[Ph,t+1HS
′
t/Rt],
the quantity of which is the expected value of the housing stock in the next period,
multiplied by m which is the loan-to-value ratio for the impatient household. The
impatient household does not have access to capital markets and thus does not ob-
tain rental income from the firms18. The maximization problem for the impatient
household is as follows:
max
B
′
t
Pc,t
,N
′
t ,HS
′
t ,
M
′
t
Pc,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
γt
[(
Ψc ln(C
′
t) + Ψh ln(HS
′
t)
)
− 1
η
(N
′
t )
η + χ ln
(
M
′
t
Pc,t
)]
(1.15)
17The impatient household chooses nominal variables denoted with a superscript ′ in a similar
fashion as the patient household.
18This is purely a modeling assumption and the results do not change if allowing for both house-
holds to have access to capital markets since the non-negativity constraint for capital always binds
for the impatient household.
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subject to the following nominal budget constraint:
Pc,tC
′
t + Ph,tH
′
t +B
′
t−1Rt−1 +M
′
t = B
′
t +WtN
′
t +M
′
t−1 (1.16)
the housing good accumulation equation:
HS
′
t = H
′
t + (1− δ)HS
′
t−1 (1.17)
and the borrowing constraint:
B
′
t
Pc,t
≤ mEt
[
Πh,t+1HS
′
t
Rt
Ph,t
Pc,t
]
(1.18)
Note that λ
′
t is the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint in Equation
(1.18) and is equivalently the shadow value of the borrowing constraint at time t.
Consumption and housing investment, C
′
t and H
′
t , are aggregates of differentiated
consumption and housing goods produced by the firms and indexed by j :
C
′
t =
(∫ 1
0
(Cj
′
t )
1
µdj
)µ
(1.19)
H
′
t =
(∫ 1
0
(Hj
′
t )
1
µdj
)µ
(1.20)
Maximizing the per-period utility function in Equation (1.15) subject to the con-
straints results in the following first-order conditions for the impatient household:
Λ
′
t = γEt
[
RtΛ
′
t+1
Πc,t+1
]
+ λ
′
tRt (1.21)
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Λ
′
t
Wt
Pc,t
= (N
′
t )
η−1 (1.22)
Λ
′
t =
Ψh
HS
′
t
Pc,t
Ph,t
+ γ(1− δ)Et
[
Πh,t+1Λ
′
t+1
Πc,t+1
]
+ λ
′
tmEt
[
Πh,t+1
]
(1.23)
Equations (1.21), (1.22) and (1.23) are the standard Euler equation for consumption,
the labor supply equation, and demand for housing goods. The optimal quantities
of consumption and housing goods j demanded by the impatient household are as
follows:
Cj
′
t =
(
P jc,t
Pc,t
)− µ
µ−1
C
′
t (1.24)
Hj
′
t =
(
P jh,t
Ph,t
)− µ
µ−1
H
′
t (1.25)
1.2.3 Firms
Product differentiation gives both housing and consumption good firms monopolistic
pricing power. Price, therefore is a choice variable for firms. However, adjustment of
nominal prices of the goods in the two sectors is assumed to be costly. Both sectors
have an adjustment cost function for pricing that is very flexible in its specification19,
which allows for either a nominal price rigidity of a downward fashion or can follow a
more traditional price rigidity specification. There are an infinite number of housing
and consumption good firms on the unit interval, each indexed by j. Combined profits,
Ft, from both sectors are rebated to the patient household in a lump-sum fashion since
the patient household owns the firms20. Both patient and impatient household labor
supply, along with capital are mobile across the two sectors and receive the same
19Flexible as in easily adaptable or versatile.
20Due to the fact that the patient household owns the firms, dividends from the firms are dis-
counted with the marginal utility of consumption of the patient household, Λt.
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nominal rental price in both sectors.
Housing Good Sector
The profit maximization problem for each housing good firm j ∈ [0, 1] is:
max
Njh,t,K
j
h,t−1,P
j
h,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtΛt
[
P jh,tH
Sj
t (1− Φjh,t)−WtN jh,t −QtKjh,t−1 − Ph,tADJ jNh,t
Ph,t
]
(1.26)
subject to:
HSjt = Ah,t(K
j
h,t−1)
α(N jh,t)
1−α ≥
(
P jh,t
Ph,t
)− µ
µ−1(
Ht +H
′
t
)
(1.27)
along with the market-clearing condition for housing goods. The adjustment cost
term ADJ jNh,t in Equation (1.26) corresponds to the housing sector labor adjustment
costs21 and is specified as:
ADJ jNh,t =
φn
2
(
N jh,t
N jh,t−1
− 1
)2
N jh,t−1 (1.28)
Note that each housing good firm j chooses the nominal price, P jh,t, as well as labor
and capital inputs to production, N jh,t, and K
j
h,t−1. Since the patient household owns
both housing and consumption good firms, the firms discount the profits with the
21Labor adjustment costs are introduced as a technique to clamp down on excessively volatile labor
inflows/outflows across the consumption and housing good sectors. This is a common technique in
two-sector models when trying to reconcile features of the model to the data. Alternatively, one
could have the households pay the labor adjustment costs although the dynamics of the model would
remain similar. Finally, one should note that since the patient household is the owner of the firms
and is rebated their profits, households indirectly pay the labor adjustment costs in any case.
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marginal utility of consumption of the patient household, Λt. Ht + H
′
t in Equation
(1.27) is the flow of total housing good demand and is equal to housing good demand
from both households. Likewise, HSjt is the flow of the total amount of the housing
good supplied by housing good firm j. Note that MCh,t is the real marginal cost of
producing the housing good and serves as the Lagrange multiplier in the constraint
in Equation (1.27)22. Ah,t is the parameter governing technology in the housing good
production function and is allowed to be different from the technology process in
the consumption good sector as specified in the next section. More specifically, the
technology process follows the following autoregressive (in logs) formulation:
lnAh,t = ρh lnAh,t−1 + σAhAh,t (1.29)
where Ah,t is assumed to be a standard normal shock. The asymmetric cost of
adjustment function for housing good prices, Φjh,t, is specified using a linex functional
form, is defined as a function of housing good inflation Πjh,t =
P jh,t
P jh,t−1
, and is formulated
as follows23:
Φjh,t = Φ
(
P jh,t
P jh,t−1
)
=
φh
ψ2h
[
exp
(
− ψh
(
P jh,t
P jh,t−1
− 1
))
+ ψh
(
P jh,t
P jh,t−1
− 1
)
− 1
]
(1.30)
This asymmetric cost of adjustment function follows from Kim & Ruge-Murcia, who
embed the linex function into a DSGE model to characterize the existence of asymmet-
22There is no superscript of j on the real marginal cost since the nominal wage Wt, along with
the rental cost of capital Qt are the same for all firms.
23Note that I have not included trend inflation as a possibility in this formulation. As will become
apparent when trying to match the implications of the model to the data, housing and consumption
good prices have grown at different rates in the past forty years. To address this feature of the data, I
experimented with including trend inflation in both housing and consumption sectors. Incorporating
trend inflation introduced more problems than I was trying to solve in the sense that it impacted
the dynamics of the real variables to shocks to the model. See Ascari [4] for more details on why
including trend inflation impacts DSGE model dynamics in a one-sector framework.
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ric nominal wage rigidities24. Note that ψh > 0 (ψh < 0) corresponds to downwardly
(upwardly) rigid nominal prices, whereas when ψh → 0, the linex adjustment cost
function in Equation (1.30) converges to the quadratic adjustment cost specification
as in Rotemberg25. The limiting case of ψh → 0 implies a price stickiness that is
symmetrically (downwardly and upwardly) rigid.
Figure 1.2 contains a depiction of the pricing cost of adjustment function in
the symmetric and asymmetric cases. Note that the loss in the asymmetric case is
higher (lower) than the loss in the symmetric case when a good’s price decreases
(increases)26. Also note that the adjustment cost in the asymmetric case is closer to
a flexible price model of housing when dealing with nominal gains. The asymmetric
functional form squares with the behavioral explanation that loss aversion governs
price setting behavior in the housing market: due to a strong emotional tie to the
property or regarding it as an issue of fairness, the seller may be especially averse to
selling their house below what he/she originally paid for it but not as averse to selling
it for more.
A simulation exercise is also performed to gain insight on the effects that asym-
metric nominal housing price rigidities have on the distributional form of house price
changes in the model. A comparison is performed between the two cases of symmet-
rically rigid (φh > 0 and ψh → 0) and downwardly rigid (φh, ψh > 0) adjustment
cost functions for nominal price changes in the housing good sector27. Looking at the
two histograms of simulated data in Figure 1.3, the assumption of symmetric nominal
24Varian [100] is the first, to my knowledge, to formulate this linex function in an economic setting.
25As Kim & Ruge-Murcia note, one can use l’Hoˆpital’s rule twice to verify that the limiting case
ψh→ 0 corresponds to the standard quadratic adjustment cost function.
26The losses are specified as a proportion of the supply of the good.
27For the simulated quarterly series of housing good inflation, fifty time-series of two-hundred pe-
riods each are constructed from this paper’s calibrated model by drawing productivity and monetary
policy shocks from normal distributions with zero means and the calibrated standard deviations as
seen in Table 1.1.
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price rigidities produces an inflation series that is more symmetric than the downward
nominally rigid pricing series. The long right tail of price changes in the lower panel
reflects the close-to-flexible (or, close-to-costless) price adjustment cost specification
in the case of nominal housing gains. In the case of shocks to the economy that neces-
sitate price decreases, it seems that firms may simply wait to lower their prices until
it becomes too costly not to. The relationship between a higher frequency of price
changes that are deflationary and the corresponding increasing higher adjustment
costs paid by the firms in these cases is also seen.
The introduction of this highly non-linear element to the model precludes the use
of a log-linearization strategy around the non-stochastic steady-state to explore local
dynamics when the system is subjected to small shocks, since the size and sign of
the shocks induce asymmetric effects on the model. However, since the adjustment
cost function is continuous and differentiable at all points, a second-order expansion
around the non-stochastic steady-state solution will be able to be solved for.
Returning to the housing good firm’s problem in Equation (1.26), the first-order
conditions for each housing good firm j are as follows:
Λt
[
Wt
Ph,t
+ φn
(
N jh,t
N jh,t−1
− 1
)]
= (1.31)
(1− α)H
Sj
t
N jh,t
MCh,t + βEt
[
Λt+1
(
φn
(
N jh,t+1
N jh,t
− 1
)
N jh,t+1
N jh,t
− φn
2
(
N jh,t+1
N jh,t
− 1
)2)]
Λt
Qt
Ph,t
= α
HSjt
Kjh,t−1
MCh,t (1.32)
Λt
Ph,t
(
µ
µ− 1H
Sj
t (1− Φjh,t) +
P jh,t
P jh,t−1
HSjt (Φ
j
h,t)
′
)
= (1.33)
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ΛtH
Sj
t
Ph,t
(1− Φjh,t) +
µ
µ− 1MCh,t
HSjt
P jh,t
+ βEt
[
Λt+1
(
P jh,t+1
P jh,t
)2 HSjt+1
Ph,t+1
(Φjh,t+1)
′
]
Equation (1.31) relates the real wage (denominated in terms of the price of the housing
good) of housing good labor supply to its marginal product, incorporating the adjust-
ment costs paid when labor demanded in the housing sector changes from period-to-
period. Equation (1.32) relates the rental cost of capital with its marginal product,
whereas the complicated expression in Equation (1.33) simply equates the marginal
costs and benefits of increasing the price of the housing good, P jh,t. Note that, in
steady-state, the marginal cost will be a constant and equal to the patient house-
hold’s marginal utility divided by the elasticity of substitution between the infinite
number (of unit mass) of housing goods: MCh =
Λ
µ
.
Consumption Good Sector
Consumption good firms are structured in a fairly similar manner as housing good
firms. The profit maximization problem for each consumption good firm j ∈ [0, 1] is:
max
Njc,t,K
j
c,t−1,P
j
c,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtΛt
[
P jc,tC
Sj
t (1− Φjc,t)−WtN jc,t −QtKjc,t−1 − Pc,tADJ jNc,t
Pc,t
]
(1.34)
subject to:
CSjt = Ac,t(K
j
c,t−1)
α(N jc,t)
1−α ≥
(
P jc,t
Pc,t
)− µ
µ−1(
Ct + C
′
t + It
)
(1.35)
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along with the market-clearing condition for consumption goods. The adjustment
cost term ADJ jNc,t in Equation (3.6) corresponds to the consumption sector labor
adjustment costs and is specified as:
ADJ jNc,t =
φn
2
(
N jc,t
N jc,t−1
− 1
)2
N jc,t−1 (1.36)
Note that each consumption good firm j chooses the nominal price, P jc,t, as well as
labor and capital inputs to production, N jc,t, and K
j
c,t−1. Ct+C
′
t+It in Equation (1.35)
is total consumption good demand plus non-residential investment good demand from
both households. Likewise, CSjt is the total amount of the consumption good supplied
by consumption firm j. As in the housing good sector, MCc,t is the real marginal cost
of producing the consumption good and serves as the Lagrange multiplier in the
constraint in Equation (1.35). The technology process in the consumption sector
follows the following autoregressive (in logs) formulation:
lnAc,t = ρc lnAc,t−1 + σAcAc,t (1.37)
where Ac,t is assumed to be a standard normal shock. The cost of adjustment function
for consumption good prices is defined as follows:
Φjc,t = Φ
(
P jc,t
P jc,t−1
)
=
φc
ψ2c
[
exp
(
− ψc
(
P jc,t
P jc,t−1
− 1
))
+ ψc
(
P jc,t
P jc,t−1
− 1
)
− 1
]
(1.38)
Note that the adjustment cost function for consumption good prices in Equation
(1.38) is specified in the same manner as the housing pricing adjustment cost function
in Equation (1.30). A priori, there is no reason to believe that consumption pricing
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dynamics are asymmetric28. However this setup allows for that possibility, while
nesting the symmetrically rigid pricing specification in a limiting case (ψc→ 0 )29.
Returning to the consumption good firm’s problem in Equation (3.6), the first-order
conditions for each consumption good firm j can be expressed as follows:
Λt
[
Wt
Pc,t
+ φn
(
N jc,t
N jc,t−1
− 1
)]
= (1.39)
(1− α)C
Sj
t
N jc,t
MCc,t + βEt
[
Λt+1
(
φn
(
N jc,t+1
N jc,t
− 1
)
N jc,t+1
N jc,t
− φn
2
(
N jc,t+1
N jc,t
− 1
)2)]
Λt
Qt
Pc,t
= α
CSjt
Kjc,t−1
MCc,t (1.40)
Λt
Pc,t
(
µ
µ− 1C
Sj
t (1− Φjc,t) +
P jc,t
P jc,t−1
CSjt (Φ
j
c,t)
′
)
= (1.41)
ΛtC
Sj
t
Pc,t
(1− Φjc,t) +
µ
µ− 1MCc,t
CSjt
P jc,t
+ βEt
[
Λt+1
(
P jc,t+1
P jc,t
)2 CSjt+1
Pc,t+1
(Φjc,t+1)
′
]
The first-order conditions are similar to those of the housing good firms. Equation
(1.39) relates the real wage (denominated in terms of the price of the consumption
good) of the consumption good sector labor supply to its marginal product, account-
ing for labor adjustment costs paid in the consumption sector. Equation (1.40) relates
the rental cost of capital with its marginal product in the consumption good sector
and Equation (1.41) equates the marginal costs and benefits of increasing the price
of the consumption good, P jc,t. Finally, in steady-state, the marginal cost will be a
constant and equal to the patient household’s marginal utility divided by the elastic-
ity of substitution between the infinite number (of unit mass) of consumption goods:
28That is, before calibrating the model and running the grid search routine.
29The reader should note that in a subsequent section, I will calibrate the model and employ a
grid search method to see if symmetrically rigid consumption good prices (ψc = 0) in the model are
consistent with the data.
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MCc =
Λ
µ
.
1.2.4 Central Bank Policy
The Central Bank sets monetary policy and rebates seigniorage revenues, Tt, back
to the patient household. Monetary policy is specified as an interest rate rule of the
following form:
Rt = (Rt−1)rR
[(
Πc,t
)1+rpi(Yt−1
Y ss
)rY
r¯r
]1−rR
σRR,t (1.42)
where:
Πc,t =
Pc,t
Pc,t−1
(1.43)
Πh,t =
Ph,t
Ph,t−1
(1.44)
are the specifications for consumption and housing good price inflation30. R,t is a
standard normal shock and note that there is an interest rate smoothing element
governed by rR in Equation (1.42). Real GDP is the second argument in the Taylor
Rule and is specified as:
Yt = P
ss
c (Ct + C
′
t + It) + P
ss
h (Ht +H
′
t) (1.45)
30Note that Πh,t is not in the Taylor Rule, which is consistent with the data in the sense that the
Fed is not explicitly targeting housing prices. However, the price of housing services in the form of
imputed rents is a sizable component (roughly 1/3) of the core measures of inflation that the Fed
pays attention to, whether it be the PCE or CPI. Since there is a lack of a rental market in the
model, I do not include the price of housing as a proxy for rents in the Taylor Rule since this would
be akin to the Fed targeting the price of housing. In addition, the volatility in rents is minimal in
the data, which implies monetary policy in practice reacts very little to fluctuations in rental prices.
This would not be the case in the model if one included housing prices in the Taylor Rule. Finally,
one may note that housing investment is in the model’s definition of GDP, which is also consistent
with the data.
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where P ssc and P
ss
h are the steady-state prices of the consumption and housing goods
31.
Finally, Y ss is the steady-state level of real GDP.
1.2.5 Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, all individual housing and consumption good firms are
identical ex-post. This allows one to drop all j superscripts for both groups of firms.
Combining the budget constraints of the representative patient and impatient house-
holds, along with substituting the profits of the firms, produces the economy-wide
resource constraints for both housing and consumption goods:
Ht +H
′
t = H
S
t ∗ (1− Φh,t)− ADJNh,t (1.46)
Ct + C
′
t + It = C
S
t ∗ (1− Φc,t)− ADJNc,t − ADJK,t (1.47)
where the production functions of housing and consumption goods are specified as:
HSt = Ah,tK
α
h,t−1N
1−α
h,t (1.48)
CSt = Ac,tK
α
c,t−1N
1−α
c,t (1.49)
The non-stochastic steady-state equilibrium is comprised of a unique vector of allo-
cations and values:
{Yt, Ct, C ′t , CSt , HSt, HS ′t, Ht, H ′t , HSt , Bt, B′t, Nt, N ′t , Nc,t, Nh,t, It, Kt, Kc,t, Kh,t}∞t=0 and
{Ac,t, Ah,t,MCc,t,MCh,t, λt′ , Rt,Wt, Qt, Pc,t, Ph,t,Πc,t,Πh,t,Φc,t,Φh,t}∞t=0 satisfying Equa-
tions (3.5), (3.9), (1.9) to (1.12), (1.16) to (1.18), (1.21) to (1.23), (1.29) to (1.33),
31Real GDP is constructed with the steady-state prices of the two goods in the same fashion as
in Barsky et al. and Iacoviello & Neri.
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(1.37) to (1.45), (1.48), (1.49) and the following market-clearing conditions at all
times t for housing and consumption goods, capital, labor, and nominal bonds:
Ht +H
′
t =
[
Ah,tK
α
h,t−1N
1−α
h,t
]
∗ (1− Φh,t)− ADJNh,t (1.50)
Ct + C
′
t + It =
[
Ac,tK
α
c,t−1N
1−α
c,t
]
∗ (1− Φc,t)− ADJNc,t − ADJK,t (1.51)
Kt = Kc,t +Kh,t (1.52)
Nt +N
′
t = Nc,t +Nh,t (1.53)
Bt +B
′
t = 0 (1.54)
A MATLAB program that utilizes the Symbolic Math Toolbox is used to solve for
the unique steady-state solution in the system of thirty-three equations and unknowns
based on the calibrated parameter values of the model.
1.3 Calibration Exercise
The calibration strategy taken in this paper will involve calibrating most of the pa-
rameters of the model to values estimated in the literature and then performing a
rough grid search for the pertinent parameters governing the adjustment of prices
in the consumption and housing good sectors. Due to the heavy computational cost
needed to solve and simulate the non-linear model, a full-scale estimation exercise is
prohibitively expensive and finding a convincing global minimum/maximum becomes
a concern. Instead, I employ the more feasible approach of a grid search method over
the parameters governing the adjustment costs of prices in both the consumption and
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housing good sectors to try to match features of the data to the model.
The criterion function to be minimized in the grid search method is a quadratic
and is formulated as:
Q(θ,Υd,Υs) =
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
M(Υdt )−
1
S
S∑
s=1
M(Υst(θ))
]]′
Ωˆ−1
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
M(Υdt )−
1
S
S∑
s=1
M(Υst(θ))
]]
(1.55)
Υd and Υs are the vectors of the actual and simulated data series whereas M(Υdt )
and M(Υst) are the corresponding constructed moments from those vectors. Ωˆ is com-
puted via the Newey-West [66] HAC estimator and efficiently estimates the covariance
matrix of 1√
T
∑T
t=1 M(Υ
d
t ) and is defined as:
Ωˆ = Γˆ0 +
K∑
k=1
(
1− k
K + 1
)(
Γˆk + Γˆ
′
k
)
(1.56)
where
Γˆk =
1
T
T∑
t=k+1
[
M(Υdt−k)
][
M(Υdt )
]′
(1.57)
The number of lags, K, are chosen according to the rule of thumb proposed by Newey
& West: K = T 1/3.
1.3.1 Data and Moment Selection
The simulated data vector, Υs, is a two-dimesional vector comprised of the consump-
tion and housing inflation series from the model and is formally defined as follows:
Υs = {Πh,Πc} (1.58)
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The simulated moments, M(Υs), are second- and third-order moments constructed
from Υs. More specifically, M(Υs) is comprised of the variance and skewness of both
inflation series for a total of four simulated data moments32:
M(Υs) = {variance(Πc), variance(Πh), skewness(Πc), skewness(Πh)} (1.59)
The intuition for the selection of moments to match generally followed examining the
degree of asymmetry induced by asymmetric nominal rigidities on the variables of
the model, which indicated that the moments constructed from the inflation series
were highly sensitive to changes in parameters governing the price adjustment cost
formulations.
The analogous four actual data moments, M(Υd), are formed from two con-
structed time series that comprise the actual data vector Υd: non-farm business
sector inflation and housing price inflation from the Office of Federal Housing Enter-
prise Oversight (OFHEO) repeat sales housing price index33. Both consumption and
housing inflation series are demeaned before running the grid search method. The
data is for the US at a quarterly frequency, ranges from 1984:Q1 to 2007:Q434, and
32See the first column in Table 1.5 for the selected moments. The asymmetry induced on the
model’s variables from the asymmetric nominal rigidities is seen in the third-order moments. The
reader may note that, aside from a couple of clear cases of moments that the econometrician may
want to match, selecting other moments often is as much of an art as it is a science. In this regard, I
did a decent amount of experimenting with the Jacobian matrix to see which variables and moments
of the model were affected most by varying the parameters governing the price adjustment cost
functions.
33I use a repeat sales index for housing prices since the main motivation for asymmetric nominal
rigidities in this paper is the existence of nominal loss aversion in the housing market with respect
to the price that the home seller originally paid for the home. This rules out using housing price
series based exclusively on new construction. See Rappaport [72] for more on the various housing
price series available and their differing methodologies.
34I originally performed the grid search with data from 1975 onwards. However, preliminary
results displayed asymmetries in pricing in both housing and consumption good sectors. To examine
whether the high and variable inflation period of the late 1970s and early 1980s in the dataset was
driving this result, I chose 1984:Q1 as the starting date of the data. Note that the high inflation
period of the late 1970s and early 1980s affects the nature of the two sectors’ price distributions, more
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was compiled from the BLS and OFHEO. See Figure 1.4 for a depiction of the original
series used as well as Table 1.2 for more information on the data construction.
1.3.2 Grid Search Method
The parameter vector to be determined in the grid search method, θ, will consist of
the parameters governing the pricing adjustment cost functions in the housing and
consumption good sectors:
θ = {φc, φh, ψc, ψh} (1.60)
My model calibration and simulation strategy is as follows: I first discretize a wide
parameter space over the parameters in Equation (1.60) into fifteen equally-spaced
gridpoints per parameter, producing a 154 grid. For each unique point of a total of
50,625 points on the grid35, I simulate fifty time-series of the same length of time as the
actual data (96 quarters of data)36 by drawing calibrated productivity and monetary
policy shocks as seen in Table 1.1. Since the model has a steady-state inflation rate of
zero in both goods sectors, I do not de-mean the two inflation series to better match
the moments that use those variables with those of the data. See Appendix 1.5 for
more details on the grid search methodology, including the considerations that went
into the selection of the number of points and the grid bounds.
specifically the variance about the mean, which is also an input to the sample skewness. Recall that
I am matching second- and third-order moments of the model to the data. The 1984:Q1 start-date
is in line with the beginning of the Great Moderation, as discussed in Kim & Nelson [49], Blanchard
& Simon [14], Stock & Watson [89], and Ahmed, Levin & Wilson [1], who all use or find 1984:Q1 as
a break point for the beginning of the Great Moderation.
35Equivalently, for each draw of the parameter vector, θ, in Equation (1.60).
36For each draw, I actually simulate two-hundred more periods of data than this, but discard
the first two-hundred periods of the simulated data to remove the effects of initial conditions of
simulation.
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1.3.3 Model Calibration
With the exception of the two sectors’ adjustment cost pricing terms, which will
be determined in the gird search method, the rest of the model’s parameters are
calibrated. Table 1.1 contains a description of the calibrated parameters at a quarterly
frequency. The capital share α is set at 0.30. Patient and impatient households have
discount factors of β = 0.99 and γ = 0.95. Ψc and Ψh are chosen to give the
consumption good roughly a 90% steady-state share of output, which is consistent
with NIPA data. The labor supply elasticity, η, reflects a close-to-flat labor supply
curve and is set at 1.05. Capital and housing goods depreciate at a 10% and 5%
annual rate, respectively. The adjustment cost parameters for capital and labor, φk
and φn, are chosen to be equal to 32 and 11, respectively, and are based on the studies
of Ireland [44] and Chang et al. [18]. µ is chosen to generate a 5% markup in both
the consumption and housing good sectors.
The loan-to-value ratio, m, in borrowing and the parameters in the central bank’s
policy function in Equation (1.42) follow from Iacoviello and Iacoviello & Neri. The
monetary policy shock, R,t, and both technology shocks, Ac,t and Ah,t, are i.i.d.
N(0, 1). The standard deviation terms for all three shocks seen in Equations (1.29),
(1.37) and (1.42) (i.e. σAc , σAh , and σR) are chosen to be 0.0083, 0.0140, and 0.0015,
which were estimated by Iacoviello & Neri from 1989:Q1 to 2006:Q4. Finally, the
autoregressive parameters in the consumption and housing technology process are set
to ρc = 0.90 and ρh = 0.995, also estimated by Iacoviello & Neri over the same time
period, which imply fairly persistent technology processes.
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1.3.4 Results
Table 1.3 displays the results from the calibration exercise for the period from 1984:Q1
- 2007:Q4 with the criterion function specified in Equation (1.55) listed as the last
row in the table. In the rough grid search method, I find preliminary evidence for
consumption good prices that are quadratic as well as evidence of asymmetry in
housing price adjustment costs. Note that the scale parameters for both sectors are
roughly the same. In the third column, I include the value of the criterion function
for the model with both parameters governing the asymmetry in the price adjustment
cost functions constrained to zero. This is done to see the improvement of allowing
for asymmetry has on matching features of the model to the data. Allowing for such
asymmetries improves the fit by roughly forty percent.
Since the parameters found in the grid search method in Table 1.3 have little
intuitive meaning, Figure 1.5 contains a more descriptive examination of the costs
in percentage of the good’s output associated with housing and consumption price
appreciation and depreciation. It displays the pricing adjustment cost formulations
as a function of price changes for both consumption and housing sectors using the
parameters listed in Table 1.3. In addition, Table 1.4 contains the costs in a tabular
form. Note that the costs of adjusting consumption good prices are symmetric, with
price changes of 1% and 2% corresponding to losses of consumption output of 3.3%
and 13.0%, respectively. The costs of housing price deflation are prohibitively high,
while it is substantially less costly to increase housing prices. Note that a housing
price deflation of 1% and 2% is associated with a reduction of 22.1% and 1731.4%
of housing output. A corresponding inflation of housing prices of 1% and 2% is
associated with a much smaller reduction of 1.1% and 2.5% of housing output.
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Table 1.5 contains a detailed look at the data moments and compares them to the
simulated model moments. Although I match the variances of both inflation series, I
include the standard deviations in the table for easier reading. Note that the standard
deviation terms are well matched in magnitude, whereas the moments dealing with
the skewness of the selected variables are well matched in sign but matched to a
less precise degree in magnitude. The third column in the table contains the model
moments simulated using the scale parameters found in the grid search method with
the constraint that the asymmetric parameters are set to zero. This is done to see
the improvement (if any) that allowing for asymmetry in price adjustment has on
matching the moments to the data. It seems that in the rough grid search method,
allowing for asymmetries improves matching the variance of the housing inflation
series, but matching the skewness of the inflation series suffers somewhat37.
1.3.5 Model Dynamics
Since the model contains a highly non-linear element in the housing good price ad-
justment cost function, the pruned solution of the second-order expansion around the
non-stochastic steady-state as suggested by Kim et al. [51] is needed to deliver stable
and non-explosive impulse responses38. The idea is to use the first-order solution for
37It should be said that the criterion function is a weighted average of the difference of all four
moments from the data and the simulated model. Since the grid search method is not a full scale
estimation routine, I have not found a global minimum, which would have reduced each element
of the criterion function by as much as possible. In addition, I have no prior about whether the
skewness or variance terms would have been reduced by allowing for asymmetries since the skewness
includes the variance term in the denominator of its calculation. Therefore, there is a tradeoff
between minimizing the variance and skewness; once again a full-scale estimation routine would
have minimized this trade-off.
38Consider the following second-order solution for the exogenous vector of variables xt+1: xt+1 =
hxxt + 12
(
Inx⊗x
′
t
)
hxxx
′
t +
1
2hσσσ
2 + σt+1. Since xt+1 contains quadratic terms in xt, xt+2 will
contain quartic terms in xt. In any recursive formulation such as the preceding one, these higher-
order terms will accumulate and will not contribute to making the solution more accurate. In fact,
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the predetermined or exogenous vector of variables of the model, x1,t+1, in Equation
(1.61) to produce stable second-order impulse responses for both the exogenous and
endogenous variables, x2,t+1 and y2,t in Equations (1.62) and (1.63), of the model for
all time t39.
x1,t+1 = hxx1,t + σt+1 (1.61)
x2,t+1 = hxx2,t +
1
2
(
Inx⊗x
′
1,t
)
hxxx
′
1,t +
1
2
hσσσ
2 + σt+1 (1.62)
y2,t = gxx2,t +
1
2
(
Iny⊗x
′
1,t
)
gxxx
′
1,t +
1
2
gσσσ
2 (1.63)
The pruned solution is obtained after solving for the second-order decision rules
via DYNARE40, which implements a perturbation approach from Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Ur´ıbe [83]41.
Figures 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8 display the model dynamics in response to monetary
policy and technology shocks of varying signs and sizes using the calibrated price
adjustment cost parameters as matched in the grid search method in the previous
section. In a traditional symmetric DSGE model, such an exercise would be redundant
these “garbage” terms (Kim et al’s language) will be the source of impulse response functions that
are explosive.
39hx and gx are vectors, hxx, gxx, hσσ, and gσσ are matrices, and Inx and Iny are identity matrices.
See Kim et al. for more information on the pruning algorithm.
40At the onset of this project, I programed the pruning algorithm using DYNARE’s output for
the second-order solution to the model. However, in the process of writing this paper, a user-written
add-on to DYNARE has been made available to be able to prune the solution of a DSGE model.
Needless to say, the user-written code is much faster computationally than mine and the interested
reader is encouraged to use that code, which can be obtained from the DYNARE website forum.
41The reader may ask why not use a higher-order expansion to produce asymmetric responses in
the model. It is the interactions of the second-order terms of the variables of the model that induce
asymmetry rather than third- or higher-order terms since, in many cases, the higher-order terms are
so small in magnitude that a second-order approximation is sufficient to describe the solution of the
model. A second-order solution also is preferable due to the increased computational time that is
required to compute third- and higher-order solutions.
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since the response of the model to a shock of two standard deviations would display
the same dynamics as the response to a one-standard deviation shock, albeit amplified
by two, and a negative shock would induce the mirror image of a positive shock in the
responses. However, allowing for an asymmetric adjustment cost function component
governing goods prices creates some interesting asymmetries.
When the system is subjected to monetary policy shocks in Figure 1.6, the effects
are seen more so in output in the case of monetary contraction and more so in prices
when monetary policy is expansionary. Note the asymmetry in housing demand and in
prices when comparing the effects of the different signed and sized monetary shocks.
A surprise monetary shock is seen to be more effective in impacting real variables
when it is contractionary rather than expansionary. An expansionary shock, on the
other hand, causes monetary policy to be less expansionary than otherwise would be
due to the increased demand for housing.
In a contractionary monetary policy environment, housing demand is dispropor-
tionately affected due to the downward rigidity in housing prices. Recall that the
results from Table 1.4 indicate that prices are very rigid on the downward side: price
decreases of more than 1.5% are associated with adjustment costs of more than two
hundred percent of housing output. In addition, it seems that a shift in demand from
consumption to housing goods occurs with a monetary contraction. The counter-
intutive impulse responses for housing demand flow from the fact that, since each
sector has a very different cost structure for adjusting prices up and down, there is
a tremendous amount of volatility in demand shifting from one sector to the other
sector within each household42. Consumption demand is affected due to two forces:
42More specifically, the counter-intuitive impulse responses are due to the highly substitutable
nature of the consumption and housing good in each household’s utility function, combined with the
adjustment cost formulations (found via the grid search) in each sector. The parameter vector found
in the grid search produces the result that demand for each good becomes very sensitive within each
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the quadratic rigidity in consumption prices as well as the decrease in borrowing,
which is driven by the declining value of the housing asset and the increased cost of
borrowing via the increase in the nominal interest rate.
Although this paper contains a specification of asymmetric price rigidities in the
housing sector, Barsky et al. also find counter-intuitive impulse responses to mone-
tary policy shocks in a durable, non-durable two sector model43 where the durable
sector has flexible prices. Carlstrom & Fuerst [16] introduce features to the Barsky et
al. setup to reverse this finding to make it consistent with the VAR evidence that a
monetary contraction induces declines in investment in both durable and non-durable
sectors. Carlstrom & Fuerst explain that, in response to a monetary policy shock, the
volatility of residential investment is excessively high relative to the non-residential
sector. To remedy this and produce the result of a contraction of residential in-
vestment with a monetary tightening, they introduce three features: nominal wage
rigidities, adjustment costs to both the level and change in levels of residential invest-
ment, and allow for a very high degree of complementarity in demand for residential
and non-residential investment goods44.
As mentioned, my setup does not include flexible prices for the housing sector.
However, the parameters that are found in the grid search method produce a cost
structure for adjusting prices of the two goods that induce a large amount of volatility
of residential investment, very much in the same fashion as in Barsky et al. This
suggests that asymmetries in price rigidities in a two-sector model also can produce
counter-intuitive responses in residential investment in the presence of a monetary
household. Appendix 1.5 contains a discussion on the grid search methodology.
43The durable, non-durable setup of Barsky et al. is analogous to my housing, consumption
two-sector model.
44Carlstrom & Fuerst also introduce habit formation in consumption, although this is not a nec-
essary feature to induce intuitive impulse responses for residential investment in the presence of a
monetary policy shock.
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policy shock.
Figures 1.7 and 1.8 contain the responses to consumption and housing technology
shocks. One immediately notices that the housing technology shocks generally induce
much more symmetric responses than the consumption technology shocks. Differences
in the asymmetric and symmetric responses due to consumption and housing tech-
nology shocks flow from the fact that housing demand is calibrated to be roughly
ten percent of consumption demand in both households’ utility functions. Therefore,
a negative consumption technology shock induces a sizable shift in demand to the
housing sector, whereas a negative housing technology shock impacts demand for
consumption goods to a much smaller and less noticeable degree.
In Figure 1.7, most of the real variables, with the exception of housing demand,
display slight asymmetries in response to negative and positive shocks. In the case of
a negative technology shock to the consumption good sector, consumption demand
drops more precipitously than in the case of a positive shock, with increased demand
shifting to the housing good sector, which is the cause of the large degree of asymmetry
in housing demand. For reasons discussed before, housing prices display a strong
tendency to avoid declines and a slight aversion to increase.
There is very little, if any, asymmetry in the impulse responses of the system’s
real variables to the housing technology shock in Figure 1.845. The only asymmetry
in impulse responses due to the housing technology shocks is seen in housing prices,
due to the high adjustment costs to be paid in the case of price decreases and to a
close-to-flexible specification for price increases. It seems that a housing technology
45It should be noted that if one increased the magnitude of the housing technology shock that was
calibrated to the data in Table 1.1, this asymmetry can become more pronounced. However, one
cannot increase the magnitude of the housing technology shock too much since the possibility of the
system not returning to the steady-state in the presence of the shock becomes more of a concern.
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shock changes the relative price of the two goods in the two-sector model in a very
persistent fashion, with households simply shifting away from the housing good to
the consumption good in the presence of a negative technology shock and away from
the consumption good to the housing good in the presence of a positive shock.
1.4 Concluding Remarks
The standard workhorse macroeconomic model does not account for the non-normal
distribution of aggregate prices. In this study, I modify a standard DSGE model to
be able to determine the degree to which housing and consumption good prices are
adjusted in an asymmetric fashion, where the primary motivation for asymmetries
in the housing market is loss aversion in nominal terms. When incorporating an
adjustment cost function that allows for such asymmetries in price adjustments, there
can be important implications for the response of real variables to aggregate shocks
of different signs and sizes. Asymmetries in adjusting prices also can serve as another
channel for why asymmetries are seen in the business cycle.
I find preliminary evidence for pricing asymmetries in the housing sector when
taking the model to US data of the past twenty-five years by using a rough grid
search methodology. I also find that monetary policy is more effective in impacting
real variables when tightening rather than loosening in the calibrated model. For any
sector, including housing, the policy prescriptions of thinking about asymmetric price
rigidities are largely two-fold. The first deals with understanding that shocks to an
economy induce different responses based on the magnitude of the shocks and whether
they affect prices in an upward or downward manner. The second policy prescription
flows from the first and acknowledges that, in the presence of asymmetric pricing
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rigidities, policy itself can induce asymmetry on the real variables of the economy.
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1.5 Grid Search Appendix
The grid search algorithm uses a 154 sized grid (for a total of 50,625 unique grid
points) of equally spaced grid points over the four price adjustment cost parameters.
Since the grid search routine solves, prunes, and simulates the non-linear model fifty
times for 296 periods46 for each unique point on the grid, running the routine will
take from a week and a half to a month, depending on the speed of your computer.
The reader may ask why I used 15 grid points, instead of 10 or 30 grid points for
example. Of course, this seems completely arbitrary, but since the size of the grid
increases exponentially, I tried to make the grid as fine as possible, while balancing
the amount of time needed to run the routine47. An extension to this paper would
be to further explore finer sub-areas of the grid, perhaps via an even more intensive
full-scale simulated or generalized method of moments estimation routine. I initially
explored this option, but scrapped the approach since I was not confident that any
minimum that I was finding was indeed, without a doubt, a global minimum. This
was entirely due to the fact of the heavy computational time needed to evaluate even
one unique parameter vector.
The selection of the bounds of the grid was driven by a couple of considerations.
The first dealt with reading the Kim & Ruge-Murcia paper where they estimate a
similarly specified linex formulation for adjustment costs in both wages and consump-
tion good prices in a one-sector good model. They estimated the scale parameters for
wage and price adjustment costs to be approximately 33 and 35, respectively. They
constrain the consumption good price asymmetry parameter to be 0 (i.e. to have
46Recall that I simulate two hundred more periods of data than the actual data and then discard
the first two hundred periods to get rid of the initial conditions of simulation.
47Note that 204 and a 304 grid have 160,000 and 810,000 grid points, respectively, which would
increase the computational time by 3 and 16 times, respectively.
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symmetric adjustment costs) since preliminary results did not lead them to think
that the adjustment of consumption good prices behaved asymmetrically. Given this
assumption, they estimated the asymmetry in wage adjustment costs to be approxi-
mately 901. These results gave me a preliminary idea of the correct magnitude of the
parameters governing consumption and housing good price adjustment to explore in
my model.
The second consideration for the selection of grid bounds dealt with insights
I gained from originally trying to use a simulated method of moments estimation
routine. In this approach, I was estimating the price adjustment cost terms as well
as standard deviations of the three shocks in the model to try to match substantially
more moments48. Running these routines gave me a good idea of the magnitude of
the parameters needed to provide the best possible fit to the data. In preliminary
tests, I found that most of the scale parameters (φc and φh) were on the order of 0 to
200, whereas the parameters governing asymmetry (ψc and ψh) were on the order of
0 to 1500. Both sets of numbers for the scale and asymmetric parameters accorded
well with looking at the adjustment costs paid in price decreases and increases.
Regarding the lower bounds of the grid, I found that allowing for negative scale
parameters in the adjustment cost functions (i.e. φc < 0 and φh < 0 in Φc and Φh)
corresponded to subsidies in changing prices, which did not accord well with theory.
Negative values of the asymmetric parameters, on the other hand, corresponded to
increasing rigidities in increasing the firm’s price and to decreasing rigidities in de-
creasing the firm’s price. This option was not as at odds with theory49, as in the case
of the negative scale parameters, however when I explored the possibility of using
negative values for the scale and/or asymmetric parameters, either option produced
48I tried to match as many as thirteen moments in preliminary tests.
49Although, one should note that it is at odds with my story of housing price rigidities.
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extremely large values of the criterion function, Q(θ,Υd,Υs).
Therefore, with all of the considerations listed, I settled on a grid with bounds of:
Parameter Lower Bound Upper Bound
φc 0 650
φh 0 650
ψc 0 2000
ψh 0 2000
which, coupled with 15 equally-spaced grid points, produced the following grid points
for each parameter:
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φc φh ψc ψh
0 0 0 0
46.4 46.4 142.9 142.9
92.9 92.9 285.7 285.7
139.3 139.3 428.6 428.6
185.7 185.7 571.4 571.4
232.1 232.1 714.3 714.3
278.6 278.6 857.1 857.1
325.0 325.0 1000.0 1000.0
371.4 371.4 1142.9 1142.9
417.9 417.9 1285.7 1285.7
464.3 464.3 1428.6 1428.6
510.7 510.7 1571.4 1571.4
557.1 557.1 1714.3 1714.3
603.6 603.6 1857.1 1857.1
650.0 650.0 2000.0 2000.0
Note that the scale parameters found in the grid search method in Table 1.3 are
near or at the grid bounds. I should stress that since the grid search method is a
rough method, it is entirely likely that a global minimum for the consumption good
price adjustment cost scale parameter is within the grid that I use, rather than at
the upper bound. I should also stress that the higher the scale parameters and/or
the higher the asymmetric parameters, the higher adjustment costs would be for
price declines. The parameters found in the grid search method in Table 1.4 already
indicate that large adjustment costs are to be paid in the case of even small price
declines (over 200% and 1700% of housing output for a 1.5% and 2% price deflation).
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As the scale parameters found in the grid search method are far larger than what
I was originally using (values under 100) to test the model50, the volatility in the
demand for the consumption good relative to the housing good increases to the point
where expansionary/contractionary monetary policy produces the counter-intuitive
result of an decrease/increase in housing demand51. See Section 1.3.5 for a further
discussion on the impulse responses in the calibrated model.
I think finding a global minimum with a parameter vector consisting of even
higher scale parameters is an unlikely scenario and if I had enough computational
power and time, I would focus my efforts on searching within a grid of much smaller
scale parameters (less than 200) and roughly the same magnitude for the asymmetric
parameters. Finally, one alternate reason mentioned to me for why such high ad-
justment costs are paid with price declines is that it is entirely possible that a much
larger scale or asymmetric parameter for consumption and/or housing price adjust-
ment costs is needed since the data does not show many price declines in either sector.
For this reason, the model may be trying to match this feature.
50That is, before I ran the grid search.
51One should note that Kim & Ruge-Murcia do not encounter this problem since they have a
one-sector model.
43
Table 1.1: Calibrated (Quarterly) Parameters
Parameter Meaning Value
α Capital Share 0.3
β Patient Household’s Discount Factor 0.99
γ Impatient Household’s Discount Factor 0.95
δ Housing Depreciation Rate 0.0125
η Labor Supply Elasticity 1.05
Ψc Consumption Good Weight in Households’ Utility Function 1
Ψh Housing Good Weight in Households’ Utility Function 0.1
m Loan-to-Value Ratio 0.925
µ Elasticities of Subs. for Varieties of Housing and Cons. Goods 1.05
ζ Capital Depreciation Rate 0.025
φk Capital Adjustment Cost 32
φn Labor Adjustment Cost 11
ρc Consumption Good Technology Autoregressive Parameter 0.90
ρh Housing Good Technology Autoregressive Parameter 0.995
rR Taylor Rule: Interest Rate Smoothing Weight 0.73
rpi Taylor Rule: Combined Inflation Weight 0.27
rY Taylor Rule: Output Gap Weight 0
σAc Standard Deviation of Consumption Good Technology Shock 0.0083
σAh Standard Deviation of Housing Good Technology Shock 0.0140
σR Standard Deviation of Monetary Policy Shock 0.0015
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Table 1.2: Data
Υd Description
Πc Non-Farm Business Sector Inflation
Πh OFHEO Housing Price Index Inflation
Note: All variables correspond to the actual data series from which the vector Υd is comprised. Both
consumption and housing inflation series are demeaned and are expressed at a quarterly frequency.
The data is for the US, ranges from 1984:Q1 to 2007:Q4, and was compiled from the BLS and the
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).
Table 1.3: Grid Search Results
Parameter Meaning Results Symmetric Specification
φc Consumption Price Scale 650.0 650.0
φh Housing Price Scale 603.6 603.6
ψc Consumption Price Asymmetry 0
∗ 0∗
ψh Housing Price Asymmetry 428.6 0
∗
Q(θ,Υd,Υs) Criterion Function 0.21 0.29
* Note that ψc was set in the grid to a very small non-zero value (1e-3) rather than zero since
the linex function is undefined at zero. Recall that a very small non-zero value for the asymmetry
parameter (ψc or ψh) induces quadratic price adjustment costs.
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Table 1.4: Cost of Adjusting Prices in % of Good Output
Price Change Consumption Output Cost Housing Output Cost
-2.0% 13.0% 1731.4%
-1.5% 7.3% 201.1%
-1.0% 3.3% 22.1%
-0.5% 0.8% 1.8%
+0.5% 0.8% 0.4%
+1.0% 3.3% 1.1%
+1.5% 7.3% 1.8%
+2.0% 13.0% 2.5%
Table 1.5: Data and Model Moments
Moment Data Model Model (Symmetric)
std. deviation(Πc) 0.0028 0.0033 0.0033
std. deviation(Πh) 0.0076 0.0073 0.0042
skewness(Πc) 0.31 1.2 1.2
skewness(Πh) 0.38 1.8 1.3
Note: Although I match the variances of both inflation series, I include the standard deviations in
the table for easier reading.
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Figure 1.1: Housing Price Growth and the Federal Funds Rate
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Note: The S&P/Case-Shillerr Index is comprised of home prices from ten major metropolitan
areas as is represented by the solid line in the figure. The federal funds rate series is represented by
the dashed line.
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Figure 1.2: Pricing Cost of Adjustment Functions
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Figure 1.3: Simulated Housing Good Inflation Histograms
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Note: For the simulated quarterly series of housing good inflation, fifty time-series of two-hundred
periods each are constructed from this paper’s calibrated model by drawing productivity and mone-
tary policy shocks from normal distributions with zero means and the calibrated standard deviations
as seen in Table 1.1.
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Figure 1.4: Data Series Used (1984:Q1 - 2007:Q4)
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Note: Both non-farm business sector inflation and OFHEO housing price inflation series are ex-
pressed in the first row in time-series form and in the second row in a histogram format to better
depict the distributional nature of both inflation rates over the time period of interest.
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Figure 1.5: Housing and Consumption Pricing Cost of Adjustment Functions:
1984:Q1-2007:Q4
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Note: The y-axis is the output loss as a proportion of housing (consumption) good supply.
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Figure 1.6: IRFs: Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 1.7: IRFs: Consumption Technology Shock
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Figure 1.8: IRFs: Housing Technology Shock
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Part II
Success in Hitting the Inflation
Target: Good Luck or Good
Policy?
55
Abstract
Disparities exist in the success rate in hitting an explicit inflation target among OECD
and Emerging Market inflation targeters. This study proposes a framework to try
to circumvent the “good luck”/“good policy” forces as drivers of better inflation-
targeting outcomes by estimating a measure of central bank credibility in targeting
regimes. Two main findings are that Emerging Market targeting banks are less suc-
cessful than their OECD counterparts in establishing credibility in targeting inflation
and that credible regimes last on the order of five to ten times as long as the relatively
short-lived incredible regimes for the two groups of targeting countries.
Keywords : Inflation-Targeting, Markov-Switching, Regime Changes, Monetary Pol-
icy, Bayesian Estimation, Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
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2.1 Introduction
Various studies examine real and nominal variable performance in explicit inflation-
targeting regimes52. There exist fewer papers, however, that evaluate central bank
performance in targeting regimes. One commonly-used measure of how well cen-
tral banks perform in inflation-targeting regimes is how often the inflation target is
achieved. For example, Roger & Stone [77] document that OECD inflation targeters
hit their target roughly two-thirds of the time, whereas Emerging Market countries
hit their target one-third of the time. Lostumbo & Schuh [60] find similar results
in the ability of inflation-targeting central banks to stay “on target” with respect to
their target band.
It is a definite possibility that OECD targeting central banks are simply better
at conducting monetary policy and thus, hit their respective targets more frequently.
However, a percentage measure of how often targeters hit their target ignores dif-
ferences in uncertainty across countries and obscures to a considerable degree how
well central banks perform with regard to their inflation objectives. As an example,
an OECD central bank may outperform an Emerging Market central bank in hitting
their target strictly because the Emerging Market country has an increased frequency
of adverse supply shocks. To what extent the shocks are a result of bad policies on the
part of the central bank or are simply unexpected by all economic agents, including
the central bank, is one issue that this study tries to resolve.
This study proposes a framework that exploits inflation persistence to try to cir-
cumvent the “good luck”/“good policy” forces as causes of better inflation-targeting
outcomes by estimating a measure of central bank credibility in targeting regimes
52See Ball & Sheridan [5] and Levin, Natalucci & Piger [58].
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as a performance indicator of success for central banks. The paper is organized as
follows: Section 2.2 discusses the literature that motivated this paper and Section 2.3
showcases the Markov-Switching model. Section 2.4 presents the Maximum Likeli-
hood and Bayesian estimation strategies along with the data. Section 2.5 contains
the results from estimation along with a discussion of the inferred regimes across
targeting countries. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Motivating Literature
The question of whether good policy or factors beyond the control of policy-makers
are at the root of a superior explicit inflation-targeting performance on the part
of OECD inflation targeters is not unlike the debate over the origins of the Great
Moderation for the US. Good luck, a better understanding of the capabilities and
effects of monetary policy, and structural changes in such forms as better inventory
management and various improvements in financial markets have all been advanced
as explanations for the decline in macroeconomic volatility in the US in the past
twenty years53 54.
The difference in the level of macroeconomic volatility in the two decades before
and after the mid-1980s for several industrial countries has been well documented.
Blanchard & Simon [14] report that the standard deviations of real output growth
and inflation for the US have declined by one-half and two-thirds, respectively, since
53The opposite could also be said about the Great Inflation of the 1970s. In the case of the Great
Inflation, potential causes include the inclination of the policy-maker to exploit the inflation-output
gap tradeoff (see Sargent [82]) or difficulties in measurement of macroeconomic aggregates, more
specifically the output gap (see Orphanides [68]), which presumably was not entirely the fault of
Federal Reserve policy-makers during that time period.
54See Kim & Nelson [49], McConnell & Perez-Quiros [63], Blanchard & Simon [14], Stock &
Watson [89] and Ahmed, Levin & Wilson [1] for more on the Great Moderation.
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the mid-1980s. A similar observation exists for explicit inflation targeters, but in this
case, across the two groups of Industrial and Emerging Market countries rather than
across time. Table 2.1 displays the standard deviations of inflation and a measure
of the output gap for inflation-targeting OECD and Emerging Market countries after
the introduction of an explicit target55. Note that the volatilities reported for the
Emerging Market targeters are roughly on the order of two times bigger than their
OECD counterparts.
This study will focus on inflation persistence to try to sift out the contributions of
good luck vs. good policy in hitting the target in explicit inflation-targeting regimes.
There is good reason to believe that inflation persistence can tell us a great deal about
the effectiveness of policy among explicit inflation targeters.
Benati [8] and Levin, Natalucci & Piger [58] evaluate the extent to which the
introduction of inflation-targeting influences expectation formation and inflation dy-
namics. Levin, Natalucci & Piger find that, in targeting regimes, expectations of
inflation are uncorrelated with past realizations of inflation and that inflation ex-
hibits less persistence relative to comparable non-targeting regimes. The rationale
the authors give is that in a targeting regime, agents will form expectations of infla-
tion based on the target whereas in a non-targeting regime, agents form expectations
based on past realizations of inflation. Levin, Natalucci & Piger state that this find-
ing is consistent with an expectations-augmented Phillips Curve where, in the regime
where expectations are anchored, the forward-looking inflation component is simply
the inflation target (i.e. the agents in the economy expect next period’s inflation to
be at or near the target). In the regime where expectations are not anchored, last
55I also include a row for the explicit-targeting OECD countries combined with the non-targeting
US and the quasi-targeting ECB. See Section 2.4.3 for more information on the data construction,
the countries and time periods included in the analysis.
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period’s inflation stands in for expected inflation.
Amano & Murchison [2] also explore the issue of inflation persistence and find
that after the adoption of explicit inflation-targeting in Canada, inflation persistence
fell without a corresponding fall in output gap persistence. Possibly motivating an ex-
ploration of regime switching, Kozicki & Tinsley [55] report for the explicit-targeting
Bank of Canada and the non-targeting Federal Reserve, credibility and monetary pol-
icy regime shifts were important determinants of inflation persistence. While it is true
that factors unrelated to explicit inflation-targeting could lead to decreased inflation
persistence, for the remainder of this study I will make the hopefully not-too-strong
assumption that a firm anchoring of inflation expectations via the introduction of
inflation-targeting is the main driver of decreased inflation persistence.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Motivation
Below is an expectations-augmented Phillips Curve and two modified Phillips Curves
describing inflation behavior in two sets of countries with differences in anchored
expectations as proposed by Levin, Natalucci & Piger:
pit = ρEtpit+1 + φyt + t (2.1)
Expectations are Anchored:
pi1t = ρ1pi
∗ + φ1yt + 1t (2.2)
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Expectations are Not Anchored:
pi2t = ρ2pit−1 + φ2yt + 2t (2.3)
Levin, Natalucci & Piger propose this specification for inflation across countries
where expectations are anchored or not. Note that in Equation (3.4), agents will form
their expectations for inflation based on the target whereas in Equation (3.5), agents
form expectations based on past realizations of inflation. However, there is no reason
to believe that within an inflation-targeting country, no switching occurs between
these two regimes over time. Making the assumptions that (i.) regime switching
is state-dependent rather than history-dependent, (ii.) the error terms in (3.4) and
(3.5) are Normally distributed with/without the same means and variances,56 and
(iii.) there exists an additional corresponding state for each regime with a larger
variance in the error term,57 allows one to set up a Markov-Switching model where
one can obtain estimates for all the state-dependent Phillips Curve coefficients along
with the switching probabilities from state to state.
A simple four-state specification for inflation where switching occurs between
and within the expectations-anchored and non-anchored regimes lends its way to
interpretation of the switching probabilities as measures of central bank credibil-
ity/incredibility in targeting regimes. As an example, suppose an economy is in the
expectations-anchored, low-volatility state, which we will call state 1. p11 is the prob-
ability that, given the economy is in the anchored and low uncertainty state, it stays
in the same state the next period. Let state 3 be the expectations-anchored, high-
56As an example, 1t∼N(0, σ21) and 2t∼N(0, σ22).
57More specifically, pi3t = ρ1pi∗ + φ1yt + 3t where 3t∼N(0, σ23), σ23 > σ21 and pi4t = ρ2pit−1 +
φ2yt + 4t where 4t∼N(0, σ24), σ24 > σ22
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volatility state. Then p13 would be the probability that the economy transitions from
the anchored, low-uncertainty state to the anchored, high-uncertainty state. If the
estimated probabilities p11 and p13 are large (and close to one), then expectations can
be seen to be reasonably anchored in this economy, conditional on being in state 1.
Furthermore, one can construct estimates for the amount of the time that an econ-
omy spends in each regime, which can give an indication about the credibility of the
policy-maker to keep inflation at or near the inflation target.
Using this framework, one can discern whether satisfactory central bank perfor-
mance in hitting the inflation target is driven by an environment of low uncertainty
(good luck), anchored expectations (good policy) or both58. This paper is not the
first to interpret the estimated switching probabilities as measures of the credibility
of the central bank’s monetary policy59, but it is the first (to my knowledge) that uses
Markov-Switching to disentangle the effects of uncertainty and anchored expectations
on central bank performance across inflation-targeting central banks for comparison.
2.3.2 Markov-Switching
Following Hamilton [38], there has been a large literature on regime switching driven
by Markov Chains. To cite a few studies60, Sims & Zha [86] explore regime switching
for Federal Reserve monetary policy in a Markov-Switching VAR, Davig & Leeper [20]
look at the effects that monetary policy regime switches (via switching coefficients in
the Taylor Rule) have on the Taylor Principle, and Favero & Monacelli [23] explore
regime switching in fiscal policy for the US. However, a clarification is in order before
58In the present study, a volatile economic environment consisting of large price shocks are pre-
sumed to be the driver of the inability of the policy maker to stay “on target.”
59See Ruge-Murcia [80], Demers [21] and Ricketts & Rose [74].
60This, of course, is a non-exhaustive list and the interested reader is encouraged to do a simple
search for other applications of Markov-Switching.
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proceeding. As in Davig & Leeper [19], I will not explore or model what causes the
economy to switch between credible and incredible states. This question is difficult,
perhaps motivates a more micro-founded exploration of agents behavior and expecta-
tions over central bank performance, and is left to further research61. In addition, the
Markov-Switching system characterizing inflation dynamics is assumed not to be used
by economic agents in forecasting inflation behavior. Therefore, the setup postulated
is consistent with bounded rationality on the part of economic agents.
Following the discussion in the previous section, an n-state Markov-Switching
model of the Phillips Curve can be expressed as:
pit(st) = c(st) + ρ(st)pit−1(st−1) + φ(st)yt + (st) (2.4)
with (st)∼N(0, σ2st) and st following a first-order Markov process. c(st), ρ(st) and
φ(st) are all state-dependent coefficients to be estimated. The output gap yt is speci-
fied in terms of the percent-deviation from steady-state, whereas pit is inflation indexed
to the inflation target pi∗t , which itself can vary over time (as in Ireland [45] and Koz-
icki & Tinsley). This assumption will be necessary to take into account differences
in target levels across countries. Note that since inflation is expressed as the percent
deviation from target, the estimated coefficients from the Markov-Switching Phillips
Curve above will be different from those estimated in the standard specification where
all variables, including inflation, are deviations from their steady-state values.
The transition probability matrix for the n-state Markov-Switching system can
61As will become apparent, if one explicitly tried to model the switching behavior in a Threshold-
Switching model for example, at least one more parameter will need to be estimated. Due to the
small sample size of the data for each inflation-targeting country and the fact that the parameter
vector to be estimated will be already quite large, adding another parameter causes the possible
inability to identify all the parameters to become a concern.
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be expressed as:
P =

p11 p21 . . pn1
p12 p22 . . pn2
. . . . .
. . . . .
p1n p2n . . pnn

(2.5)
with pij = Pr{st = j|st−1 = i} for i, j ∈ {1, 2, .., n}. Since the sample size is small
for most of the countries and the parameters to be estimated increase linearly in the
number of states in the Phillips Curve and quadratically in the number of states in
the transition probability matrix, I impose some constraints on the system for iden-
tification purposes62. Instead of having two incredible states, along with two credible
states, differing in volatility terms, I impose just one incredible state, interpreting it
as an amalgamation of the high and low-volatility incredible states. This reduces the
number of parameters to estimate and makes identification feasible63. Due to the fact
that I have no priors over the two credible states differing in the inflation persistence,
output gap coefficient, and constant terms, I constrain the credible states to have
the same coefficients with the exception of the variance of the cost-push shock. This
reduces the number of parameters to estimate by three.
Therefore, the system to be estimated will consist of three states: st ∈ {1, 2, 3}
where state 1 is the credible, low-volatility state, state 2 is the incredible state and
state 3 is the credible, high-volatility state. The three equations of the system are as
62However, one should note that despite the constraints, I will still be able to sift out the good
luck/good policy components of central bank performance.
63In the case that you’re counting, this assumption reduces the number of parameters to estimate
by four parameters in the Phillips Curve and six parameters in the transition probability matrix for
a total of ten.
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follows:
pit(st = 1) = c1 + ρ1pit−1(st−1) + φ1yt + 1t
pit(st = 2) = c2 + ρ2pit−1(st−1) + φ2yt + 2t
pit(st = 3) = c1 + ρ1pit−1(st−1) + φ1yt + 3t (2.6)
with i∼N(0, σ2i ) for i=1,2,3. Note that the two credible states have a lagged
inflation term with an autocorrelation coefficient (ρ1) to be estimated. Although the
specification for inflation introduced in Section 2.3.1 does not contain such a term, the
assumption of no inflation persistence in an expectations-anchored state is perhaps
too strong for estimation purposes64. Therefore, I insert a persistence term for the
credible regimes and let the data tell me what it is for each country. The transition
probability matrix for the three-state system in (3.11) can be expressed as:
P =

p11 p21 p31
p12 p22 p32
p13 p23 p33
 =

p11 p21 p31
p12 p22 p32
1− p11 − p12 1− p21 − p22 1− p31 − p32
 (2.7)
with pij = Pr{st = j|st−1 = i} for i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and the last row not directly
estimated since the transition probability estimates must sum to one across states.
The vector to be estimated consists of two constant terms (c1 = c3, c2), two out-
put gap terms (φ1 = φ3, φ2), two autocorrelation terms for inflation (ρ1 = ρ3, ρ2),
three cost-push shocks which are mean-zero, i.i.d. Normally distributed with dif-
64I initially experimented with no lagged inflation term in the credible states and estimated the
amount of time that each explicit inflation-targeting country spent in the credible and incredible
regimes. Unfortunately, the estimates for all targeting countries were uniform in that almost all the
time was spent in the incredible regime, which is a highly unlikely occurrence for all the explicit
targeters. The more likely explanation is that no persistence in inflation in credible regimes is too
strong of an assumption for the model in trying to fit the data.
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fering variances ((st)∼N(0, σ2st), st ∈ {1, 2, 3}) and six transition probability terms
(p11, p12, p21, p22, p31, p32) for a total of fifteen parameters:
θ = {c1, c2, φ1, φ2, ρ1, ρ2, σ1, σ2, σ3, p11, p12, p21, p22, p31, p32} (2.8)
After constructing the marginal density from the conditional densities of the data,
I calculate the log-likelihood function using Hamilton’s [39] filtering algorithm. The
log-likelihood function for each country in the three-state system is given by:
l(θ) =
T∑
t=1
ln{
3∑
st=1
3∑
st−1=1
f(pit|St, St−1,Ψt−1)Pr[St, St−1|Ψt−1]} (2.9)
where
f(pit|St, St−1,Ψt−1) = 1√
2piσ2st
exp
{
−(pit(st)− c(st)− ρ(st)pit−1(st−1)− φ(st)yt)
2σ2st
}
(2.10)
is the conditional density of pit and Ψt−1 is all the information in the system up until
time t-1. The interested reader is referred to Hamilton on how to run the algorithm.
2.4 Model Estimation
After using Hamilton’s “statistical approach” to construct the likelihood function,
I use a Monte-Carlo Markov-Chain (MCMC) method65 to find both the Maximum
Likelihood and Bayesian estimates. For the Bayesian estimation, I construct the
posterior density function by combining the parameter priors with the likelihood
function and solve it via a Random-Walk Metropolis-Hastings (RWM) algorithm.
65See Robert & Casella [76] for more on MCMC.
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Due to the fact that the transition probabilities must sum to one, not all the
draws will be “usable”. The algorithm runs one long chain until there are 700,000
total usable draws for each country. The Maximum Likelihood estimates are obtained
by simply storing the parameter vector with the highest likelihood over the 700,000
draws from the RWM algorithm66. For the Bayesian estimation, I drop the first
200,000 draws as “burn-in” draws, resulting in 500,000 usable draws per country.
2.4.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
I initially experimented with Newton-Raphson methods to optimize the likelihood
function, but obtained fairly large standard errors due to ridges in the likelihood
function, a common recurrence in derivative-based optimization methods. Therefore,
I employ the RWM method to search for the parameter vector that maximizes the
likelihood function. An issue with this approach is that one needs to resort to simula-
tion or perturbation methods to obtain standard errors for the parameter estimates.
I run a simulation procedure to obtain the standard errors of the Maximum
Likelihood estimates. The procedure is as follows: After obtaining the Maximum
Likelihood estimates from the RWM algorithm, I simulate one-hundred different time-
series for each country, each for the same amount of periods that the country was an
explicit inflation targeter, by drawing cost-push shocks from mean-zero i.i.d. Normal
distributions with the estimated Maximum Likelihood variances. A random draw
from the ergodic probability distribution dictates the starting state for each country
and the estimated transition probabilities dictate the transition from state-to-state
in the simulation. Each of the resulting one-hundred time series is then run through
66One concern here is that the Maximum Likelihood estimates are sensitive to the starting values.
I experimented with a multitude of over-dispersed chains and verified that this was not the case.
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another RWM algorithm to obtain Maximum Likelihood estimates. Finally, I take
the standard deviation of the estimates from the one-hundred time-series for each
country to obtain the simulated standard errors.
2.4.2 Bayesian Estimation
There has been a large literature on Bayesian estimation in recent years as the com-
puting power necessary to solve medium-to-large scale macroeconomic models using
Bayesian techniques has increased and become more available. See An & Schorfheide
[3] and Smets & Wouters [87] [88] for applications to DSGE models. However, as
in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde & Rubio-Ramı´rez [27] and Schorfheide [84], I use Bayesian
estimation techniques in this paper for a couple of reasons. One deals with taking
advantage of prior information over the parameters. The prior information provides
some stability to the small-sample, nonlinear estimation problem which makes iden-
tification of several of the parameters feasible. More specifically, identification of the
transition probabilities benefit greatly from applying Bayesian techniques, especially
since I am dealing with relatively short periods of explicit inflation-targeting67. Fi-
nally, comparison of the posterior means with the Maximum Likelihood estimates
allows one to gauge the influence of the priors on the estimates.
Bayesian estimation involves sampling from the posterior distribution below.
P (θ|XT ) = l(θ)p(θ)∫
Θ
l(θ)p(θ)dθ
(2.11)
l(θ) is the likelihood function evaluated at the parameter vector θ, XT is the data
67The improved small-sample performance of Bayesian estimation over Classical estimation has
been documented. See Ferna´ndez-Villaverde & Rubio-Ramı´rez [27] and the references therein.
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up until time T, Θ is the parameter vector space, and p(θ) is the prior distribution
of the parameter vector. The marginal likelihood is computed using Geweke’s [34]
modification to Gelfand & Dey [29]:
1
N
N∑
i=1
l(θ(i))p(θ(i)) (2.12)
where N = 500,000 is the number of total usable draws minus the burn-in draws.
Priors
The priors are listed in Table 2.3. The constant terms of the Phillips Curve speci-
fications are given Uniform priors on the [-2,2] interval. The output gap coefficients
and the autocorrelation coefficients for inflation are also given Uniform priors, al-
beit on the [0,1] interval. For the cost-push shock volatility terms, as in Smets &
Wouters, I assign priors of an Inverse Gamma distribution, which ensures a positive
standard deviation. The means of the Inverse Gamma distributions for the standard
deviations from the credible, high-volatility (σ3) and the incredible (σ2) states are
chosen to be equal to each other and greater than that of the credible, low-volatility
state (σ1). All standard deviation terms are assigned one degree of freedom in the
Inverse Gamma distribution. The priors for the transition probabilities are all Beta
distributions with means of 1/2 and variances of 1/8. This particular specification
for the Beta distribution, with most of the probability density weight on the edges
of the [0,1] interval, is chosen because of the few expected transitions from one state
to a different state, especially for the short periods of time that most countries have
been explicitly targeting inflation.
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2.4.3 Data
For each of the explicit inflation targeters, inflation is measured quarterly, year-over-
year, indexed to the explicit inflation target: pit = 100×ln(Πt/Π∗t ) where Πt is the
gross annualized inflation rate and Π∗t is the gross inflation target. The output gap
is constructed as yt = 100×ln(Yt/Y Tt ) where Yt is real GDP and Y Tt is trend GDP
obtained by running real GDP through a Hodrick-Prescott filter with λ = 1600. For
the non-targeting Federal Reserve and ECB, I use a constant 2% and 1% nominal
inflation target for the duration of the sample68 69.
Ten OECD inflation-targeting countries are included in the analysis (Australia,
Canada, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the
UK) and eight Emerging Market inflation-targeting countries are included (Brazil,
Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, South Africa and Korea). The
ECB, which Roger & Stone believes is a quasi-inflation targeter, along with the US
are also included70. Data availability dictated the inclusion of countries71. Adoption
periods of an explicit inflation-targeting regime vary across countries, however there
are no missing values for any of the years in which a country is in an inflation-targeting
regime. The data is at a quarterly frequency, ranges from 1990:Q2 to 2007:Q1 and was
compiled from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) from the IMF. An explicit
nominal target for inflation was adopted primarily by several Industrial countries’
68A 2% target for Core CPI inflation (CPI-U excluding food and energy) is used for the US after
1996:Q4 which is consistent with the informal discussion on inflation targets at the July 2-3, 1996
FOMC meetings. See the July 2-3, 1996 FOMC transcript [24].
69The ECB has an explicit 2% inflation ceiling as a condition of the Maastricht Treaty but does
not officially consider itself an inflation targeter since it also designates money growth as one of its
objectives. Therefore, I use a 1% target for the ECB which is interpreted as the “center” of a 0-2%
band. See Bernanke [9].
70See previous footnote along with Goodfriend [36] and Mankiw [62] for discussions of an informal
target for the FOMC.
71The only remaining explicit inflation-targeting countries that are left out are Columbia, Israel,
Japan, Peru, Philippines and Thailand.
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central banks in the early 1990s (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK), whereas the
Emerging Market countries largely adopted inflation-targeting in the late 1990s and
early 2000s. For more specific information concerning the countries included in the
analysis, consult Table 2.2. Note that Finland and Spain are included as separate
countries until 1998 and then join the ECB’s targeting regime beginning in 1999.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Estimation
Tables 2.4 - 2.13 present Maximum Likelihood and Bayesian estimates for all the
Industrial and Emerging Market targeters as well as the two non-targeting central
banks. The Maximum Likelihood estimates and the computed standard errors are
reported along with the value of the log-likelihood function evaluated at the Maximum
Likelihood estimates. The posterior means, medians, the 90% probability interval,
and the log-marginal likelihood are listed for the Bayesian estimation procedure. The
similarity of the means and medians over all parameters indicate that the posterior
distribution is fairly symmetric. Figure 2.1 presents the empirical histograms of the
parameters for the US to give one an idea of what the posterior distribution looks
like72. A cursory look through Tables 2.4 - 2.13 leads one to believe that, due to the
similarity of the Maximum Likelihood and Bayesian estimates, the parameter priors
do not exert a large influence on the Bayesian estimates.
The Maximum Likelihood parameter estimates, most noticeably the transition
probability estimates, sometimes suffer from not being statistically significant. Due
72Other countries’ histograms are similar. They are available from the author upon request.
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to the fact that I initially encountered similar issues when using derivative-based
maximization methods, the simulation method employed to compute the standard
errors does not seem to be the cause of the insignificance. Instead, the more likely
explanation in this case is that Maximum Likelihood methods are having some trouble
in identifying certain parameters due to a small sample size.
Transition Probabilities
Tables 2.14 and 2.15 list the durations of each regime for all inflation-targeting coun-
tries computed from the ergodic Maximum Likelihood and Bayesian posterior mean
transition probability estimates. Similar to Kim & Nelson [50], the estimated du-
ration of regime i is: Di = 1/(1 − Ei) where Ei is the ergodic probability of state
i and i ∈ {1, 2, 3} corresponds to each of the three possible regimes73. One can
immediately compare the average duration estimates for the Emerging Market and
Industrial targeters. The Maximum Likelihood average estimates are quite large due
to several countries having estimated transition probability estimates very close to
one. This fact, combined with the better small-sample identification performance of
Bayesian techniques, suggests that it may be prudent to place more weight on the
Bayesian estimates in determining the average duration of the credible and incredible
regimes. According to the Bayesian estimates, the duration of the incredible regimes
are approximately the same (roughly one quarter) across the two groups of countries,
but the combined credible regimes lasts longer for the Industrial targeters: an average
73Since, by construction, the ergodic probability estimates sum to one over the three regimes, they
are used to construct the duration estimates. Therefore, the estimated duration of the combined
credible regimes is Dcredible = 1/(1− (E1 +E3)) and the estimated duration of the incredible regime
is simply Dincredible = 1/(1 − E2). If one used the transition probabilities directly to compute the
duration estimates, a very difficult closed-form solution for the duration for the combined credible
state would need to be obtained incorporating the switching probabilities across the two credible
states: p13 and p31 rather than just within the two states: p11 and p33.
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of three years (12.5 quarters) opposed to a bit less than two years (7.5 quarters) for
the Emerging Market countries.
The two facts of the credible regimes lasting longer than the incredible regimes for
both groups of countries and that the incredible regimes are relatively short-lived gives
us some insights into the credibility of monetary policy for explicit inflation-targeting
countries. Once agents in the economy have lost faith in the central bank’s ability to
credibly-commit to keep inflation at or near the target, it seems to take a short time
to re-establish anchored expectations, after which, the expectations-anchored regime
will be fairly long-lived.
Another interesting finding with regard to the duration estimates is that the
Emerging Market targeters spend more time in the credible, high-volatility regime
than their Industrial counterparts. This is what one would expect if making the
argument that monetary policy is just as good in Emerging Market inflation-targeting
economies despite the larger macroeconomic volatility. However, the difference in the
duration of the credible, high-volatility regime between the Emerging Market and
Industrial targeters listed in Table 2.15 (1.4 - 1.1 = 0.3 quarters) does not seem large
enough to indicate that this is a main driver of why there are disparities in hitting
the inflation target among the two groups of countries.
The Phillips Curve
Table 2.16 lists the means of the estimated Phillips Curve parameters across the
two groups of countries74. Both Bayesian and Maximum Likelihood estimates are
74Note that the means of the constant terms, which are shift parameters in the Phillips Curve,
are not reported since the averages across countries have little intuitive meaning. However, one may
note that the averages of c1 and c2 would not be zero. This may not accord well with the fact that,
if the industrial inflation-targeting countries hit their targets on average, both c1 and c2 should be
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reported. Most countries have a fairly persistent inflationary component in the in-
credible regime (as measured by ρ2). The inflation persistence term in the credible
regimes, ρ1, is smaller than ρ2 for both groups of countries by construction. The
Bayesian posterior means for ρ1 (ρ2) are 0.54 (0.82) for the Industrial countries and
0.64 (0.83) for the Emerging Market countries75. Despite the fact that the posterior
means are roughly the same for the two groups of countries in the incredible regime,
the persistence term for inflation is a bit less than twenty percent higher for the
Emerging Market countries in the credible regimes. This seems to tip the balance
on the side of the Emerging Market targeters regarding anchoring expectations in
the fact that credibility is largely based on inflation persistence in this study. Since
Emerging Market targeters have a higher level of persistence in the credible state, a
comparison of the credible states across the two groups of targeters may not be an
entirely accurate comparison. However, since the duration of the credible regimes
for the Emerging Market countries is estimated to be roughly half of that of their
Industrial counterparts, this finding causes one to interpret the duration estimates for
the credible regimes in the case of the Emerging Market targeters as upper bounds,
further strengthening the result that better policy is a main driver of superior central
bank performances for the Industrial targeters.
Both groups of countries also display a larger output gap coefficient in the incredi-
ble regimes compared to the credible regimes. Therefore, it seems that an environment
of high demand shocks (via the output gap term in the Phillips Curve) accompanies
higher inflation persistence in the incredible regimes. It would be instructive to de-
termine if regime switching is also occurring in a corresponding aggregate demand
zero. In response to this, one should note that most of the intercept terms in the Phillips Curve are
not estimated to be different from zero. In addition, constraining these terms to zero may provide
a better fit to the data. Thanks to Peter Ireland for bringing this to my attention.
75Very similar averages are seen in Table 2.16 for the Maximum Likelihood estimates.
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specification. However, it should be noted that the current exercise is a reduced form
approach due to the fact that small sample issues prevent me from simultaneously
identifying any more parameters than I am at the moment.
Finally, as expected, the standard deviation of the cost-push shock is estimated
to be larger for the Emerging Market targeters in all three regimes. The standard
deviations of the cost-push shock in both the incredible and credible, high-volatility
regimes are roughly the same in both estimation strategies and the credible, low-
volatility regime has, on average, a cost-push shock with a standard deviation two to
three times smaller than the other two regimes.
2.5.2 Convergence of MCMC
One issue in MCMC algorithms is convergence. Essentially, we are interested in the
empirical average of each parameter j in the fifteen-dimensional vector in (2.8):
1
N
N∑
i=1
θ
(i)
j (2.13)
To test convergence and to determine that the initial conditions are not driving the
results, I resort to a couple of convergence diagnostics. The first is a graphical,
recursive-mean method. This method is useful to determine how new draws are af-
fecting the mean of the posterior distribution. If the recursive mean flattens out, then
it is an indication that convergence has been achieved. Figure 2.2 gives the graphical,
recursive-mean calculation for the US for all the parameters as an example76.
76Other countries’ graphs are similar. They are available from the author upon request.
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A more formal method of convergence is Geweke’s [33] diagnostic:
√
N(θˆAj − θˆBj )√
ˆSAj (0)
ηA
+
ˆSBj (0)
ηB
(2.14)
which, asymptotically (N→ ∞), is a Standard Normal variable. To implement the
diagnostic, I take the first 10% (ηA = .1) and the last 50% (ηB = .5) of the 500,000
usable draws and compute the partial means (θˆAj , θˆ
B
j ) and the spectral density es-
timates77 ( ˆSAj (0),
ˆSBj (0)) for each of the fifteen parameters in the two subchains.
The p-values for the rejection of the null of convergence for all parameters (for all
countries) are all greater than 0.20, strongly suggesting that convergence has been
achieved.
2.5.3 Inferences Over Regimes
Upon estimating the Markov-Switching model, one can make inferences about the
credible and incredible regimes. Kim’s [48] “full-information” smoothing algorithm
allows one to compare the inferences about the regimes at each time t using the whole
sample of data up until time T for each country, opposed to the data conditional on
information until time t as in Hamilton’s filtered probabilities. Figures 2.3 - 2.5 dis-
play the smoothed and filtered probabilities of being in the credible and incredible
regimes across countries based on the posterior means78. A fair amount of the coun-
tries predominantly spend their time in the credible regimes and experience few or
no switches to the incredible regime. The next subsections will briefly discuss the
77I use L = 2
√
N lags in the truncated estimator and the Bartlett window for the set of weights
to compute the spectral density estimates.
78I use the Bayesian estimates since the Bayesian estimation strategy is much better at identifying
the transition probability estimates, from which the filtered and smoothed probabilities are derived.
See Section 2.4.2 for more on the concerns of identifying the transition probabilities.
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inferred regimes as well as the historical backdrop along which the inferred regimes
lie for some of the countries. A more involved discussion for every country is an
exhaustive task and is beyond the scope of this paper79.
Industrial Targeters
The inflation-targeting performance of Australia as measured by the inferred regimes
of Figure 2.3 (a.) is largely a good one with the exception of the four-to-six quarter
period centered around 2000:Q4. The credible, high-volatility and incredible regime
probabilities both increase by similar amounts, which indicates that this time period
was marked by an increase in both uncertainty and inflation persistence. Since the
Australian economy has been more closely tied to those of its Asian neighbors in the
past half-century, a possible explanation is that Australia bore some of the (lagged)
brunt of the East Asian financial crises in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand at that
time.
Canada was one of the first countries to adopt an explicit policy for inflation-
targeting and has the distinction of being quite successful in hitting the target over
the past decade and a half. The inferred regimes in Figure 2.3 (b.) seem to bear this
out with two exceptions after an initial period of difficulties in taming inflation due
to the inflationary effects of higher oil prices and changes in Canadian tax policy80.
The first instance occurred during and after the October 1993 election in which the
Liberal Party attacked the Conservative Party’s “single-minded fight against infla-
tion.” A public spotlight on the central bank at this point seemed to have created
79In addition, the reader is most likely better acquainted with the historical record in particular
countries than the author. The interested reader is encouraged to consult with Bernanke et. al. [11],
Bernanke & Woodford [12] and Mishkin [64] for a more detailed discussion of the historical record
in some of the explicit targeting countries.
80See Bernanke et. al. for more on the specifics of the Canadian inflation-targeting experience.
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some instability in the credibility of monetary policy in the year or so after the elec-
tion. The second instance occurred during 2003. It is interesting to note in Figure
2.3 (b.) that the economy clearly transitions from a credible, low-volatility regime to
the incredible regime with little probability assigned to the credible, high-volatility
regime, suggesting that forces other than the supply-side shocks in the form of higher
oil prices were at work at the time.
A very interesting depiction of the inferred regimes is in the case of Iceland in
Figure 2.3 (d.). It seems that the credible, low-volatility regime takes on an increasing
probability (which looks to be slow and smooth) over time after the adoption of an
explicit nominal anchor for inflation in 2001:Q2. One plausible story is that macro-
economic volatility declined over this period due to good luck or structural changes.
The second possibility is that the public in Iceland took a slightly longer time than
in other countries in believing that the central bank was committed to and effective
in hitting the target or staying on target.
Finally, Switzerland and the UK in Figures 2.3 (i.) and 2.3 (j.) have a fairly
uninteresting depiction of the inferred regimes as the economies are always in the
credible, low-volatility regime with a probability very close to one. This is reflective
of an excellent record of staying “on target”81.
Emerging Market Targeters
Despite having one of the poorer experiences in staying on target82, the inferred
regimes in Figure 2.4 (a.) paint a relatively rosy picture for Brazil. After the collapse
of the Brazilian real in 1999, the central bank introduced a nominal target for inflation.
81See Roger & Stone for more on Switzerland and the UK.
82Mishkin [64], Levin, Natalucci & Piger along with Roger & Stone provide an extensive discussion
of Brazil’s inflation-targeting performance.
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It seems that a likely reason for the high assigned probability to the credible, low-
volatility regime throughout the sample is that, despite often missing the target,
economic agents felt that the central bank was more serious in its new commitment
to reigning in inflation than it was in past efforts. The decision to adopt inflation-
targeting was accompanied by a 600 basis point increase in the interbank policy
interest rate. Both actions were strong signals that a significant break from the past
was sought regarding monetary policy (see Mishkin [64]). The noticeable exception to
the picture deals with the events surrounding the 2002 presidential election. One can
recall that this time period saw increasing uncertainty about the system of government
in Brazil under the likely winner in the election, Luiz Ina´cio Lula da Silva, who drew
comparisons with Hugo Cha´vez, the president of its northerly neighbor, Venezuela.
In addition, as in the Australian case discussed in the previous sub-section, possible
spill-overs from the Argentine economic crisis during this time period83 likely affected
the credibility of public officials in Brazil, the central bankers non-withstanding.
Chile in Figure 2.4 (b.) displays a similar picture to that of Brazil, although
a lower (higher) probability is assigned to the credible, low-(high-)volatility regime
throughout the sample. A sudden drop in credibility seems to occur in 2003, during
which uncertainty regarding the passage of free trade agreements with the US and the
European Union, along with uncertainty from the Brazilian political and Argentinean
economic crises, may have exerted an effect on the Chilean economy84.
Finally, Korea and Mexico seem to be the best performers among the Emerging
Market targeters with few or no drops in credibility according to Figures 2.4 (e.) and
2.4 (f.). It seems that Korea established a high level of credibility in targeting inflation
soon after adopting a formal targeting policy in 2001 despite a recent financial crisis in
83The Argentine government defaulted on the public debt in the final weeks of 2001.
84See Mishkin for more on Chile and inflation-targeting.
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East Asia. It is unfortunate that Korea adopted a policy of formal inflation-targeting
after the financial crisis since it would have been interesting to see the effect of the
crisis on the credibility of monetary policy during that time period. However, the
introduction of formal inflation-targeting likely was part of a larger series of financial
and monetary policy reforms installed in the wake of the crisis to mitigate the effects
of or to prevent future crises. In the case of Mexico, the high assigned probability to
the credible, low-volatility regime may be attributed to an increasing association of
Mexico’s economy with that of the US after the passage of NAFTA in the mid-1990s
and that perhaps the crises in several South American countries in the early part of
the 2000s had little effects on Mexico’s economy.
Non-Targeters
Both non-formal targeters spend most of their time exclusively in the credible, low-
volatility regime, as seen in Figures 2.5 (a.) and 2.5 (b.). It seems that the one
clear exception is in the case of the US in the four quarters following 9/11, where
the credible, high-volatility regime is assigned a small positive probability. The fact
that the probability assigned to the incredible regime does not jump substantially is
perhaps testament to the effectiveness of Greenspan’s signal85 to financial markets
that the Fed was ready to do all in its power to restore faith in the financial system.
However, the extent to which the results for both non-targeting economies can be
interpreted in the same manner as the results of the targeting economies depends on
whether inflation dynamics and agent’s expectations for the non-targeters are similar
to those of the explicit targeters.
85The FOMC issued an immediate 50 basis point reduction in the Fed Funds Rate on September
17, 2001.
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2.6 Concluding Remarks
This study provides some support for good policy as a main driver of improved
inflation-targeting performance on the part of the Industrial explicit inflation-targeting
countries. The key empirical findings in this study include the fact that credible
regimes last five times as long as incredible ones for the Emerging Market targeters
and ten times as long for the Industrial targeters. In addition, I find that incredible
regimes are fairly short-lived for both groups of targeters, lasting roughly one quarter.
Despite the differences in records, it would be incorrect to say that inflation-
targeting has not had the same or even more benefits for the Emerging Market tar-
geting economies as it has had for their Industrial counterparts. The Emerging Mar-
ket targeters have distinguished themselves from other Emerging Market countries by
establishing a nominal anchor for economic agents regarding inflation expectations
and, in the process, have achieved many successes not limited to disinflating from
previously very high levels.
Finally, it is important to recall that the past two decades have witnessed an over-
all decline in macroeconomic volatility across both Emerging Market and Industrial
countries. Therefore, it would be instructive to perform this exercise again when there
is more variability in experiences with inflation-targeting among the two groups of
countries. In addition, it would be interesting to see if the Emerging Market targeting
record converges to that of the Industrial countries.
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Table 2.1: Volatilities for OECD and Emerging Market Targeters
σpi σpi∗ σy
OECD 1.51% 1.35% 2.28%
OECD with US and ECB 1.42% 1.30% 2.13%
Emerging Market 2.76% 2.45% 4.17%
Note: The values reported are standard deviations. pi∗ corresponds to inflation indexed to the
target whereas y corresponds to the output gap. See Section 2.4.3 for more information on the data
construction, the countries and time periods included in the analysis.
Table 2.2: Countries Included in the Sample
Country From Until Target Range
Industrial Targeters
Australia 1993:Q2 2007:Q1 2.5%
Canada 1991:Q1 2007:Q2 2%
Finland 1993:Q2 1998:Q4 2%
Iceland 2001:Q2 2007:Q1 2.5%
New Zealand 1990:Q2 2006:Q4 1-4%
Norway 2001:Q2 2007:Q1 2.5%
Spain 1995:Q1 1998:Q4 1.5-3.75%
Sweden 1993:Q1 2007:Q1 2%
Switzerland 2000:Q1 2006:Q4 1%
UK 1992:Q1 2007:Q1 2-2.5%
Emerging Targeters
Brazil 1999:Q1 2006:Q4 3.75-4%
Chile 2000:Q1 2006:Q3 3%
Czech Republic 1999:Q1 2007:Q1 3-6%
Hungary 2001:Q3 2007:Q1 3.5%
Korea 2001:Q1 2006:Q4 3%
Mexico 2001:Q1 2006:Q4 3%
Poland 1999:Q1 2007:Q1 2-7.2%
South Africa 2000:Q2 2006:Q4 4-4.5%
Non-Targeters
ECB 1999:Q1 2007:Q1 1%
US 1996:Q4 2007:Q1 2%
Note: Target Range is the range of values that the inflation target has taken during the inflation-
targeting regime. It is not the size of the target band for those countries that target a band for
inflation.
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Table 2.3: Priors for Parameters
Parameter Distribution Mean Variance
c1 Uniform 0 4/3
c2 Uniform 0 4/3
φ1 Uniform 1/2 1/12
φ2 Uniform 1/2 1/12
ρ1 Uniform 1/2 1/12
ρ2 Uniform 1/2 1/12
σ1 Inv. Gamma 1/2 1*
σ2 Inv. Gamma 2 1*
σ3 Inv. Gamma 2 1*
p11 Beta 1/2 1/8
p12 Beta 1/2 1/8
p21 Beta 1/2 1/8
p22 Beta 1/2 1/8
p31 Beta 1/2 1/8
p32 Beta 1/2 1/8
* The degrees of freedom is reported for the Inverse Gamma function rather than the variance.
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Table 2.4: Maximum Likelihood & Bayesian Estimates: Industrial Targeters
Australia
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 0.0493 (0.366) -0.1526 -0.1545 [-0.2135, -0.0932]
c2 -0.2829 (0.260) -0.3076 -0.3312 [-0.4167, -0.1597]
φ1 0.0004 (0.182) 0.0758 0.0827 [0.0048, 0.1430]
φ2 0.4933 (0.215) 0.3958 0.3804 [0.2611, 0.5198]
ρ1 0.8831 (0.235) 0.7918 0.7910 [0.6790, 0.8806]
ρ2 0.9911 (0.082) 0.8883 0.8854 [0.8374, 0.9549]
σ1 0.5204 (0.247) 0.7224 0.7262 [0.6413, 0.7811]
σ2 1.7271 (0.336) 1.7835 1.7658 [1.7100, 1.8742]
σ3 2.3516 (0.352) 2.3158 2.2849 [2.1591, 2.5277]
p11 0.9595 (0.238) 0.9500 0.9597 [0.8810, 0.9900]
p12 0.0116 (0.154) 0.0121 0.0080 [0.0002, 0.0385]
p21 0.1847 (0.201) 0.1958 0.2072 [0.0490, 0.2641]
p22 0.3388 (0.237) 0.2438 0.2619 [0.1380, 0.3034]
p31 0.2755 (0.210) 0.1254 0.1076 [0.0060, 0.3146]
p32 0.4387 (0.268) 0.6909 0.7004 [0.5987, 0.7494]
log-L -56.4388 -
log-ML - -68.1974
Canada
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 -0.0174 (0.071) -0.0703 -0.0669 [-0.1576, 0.0036]
c2 -0.0048 (0.376) -0.0861 -0.0713 [-0.2215, 0.0404]
φ1 0.2329 (0.052) 0.2177 0.2164 [0.1623, 0.2763]
φ2 0.4214 (0.253) 0.4585 0.4568 [0.3298, 0.5828]
ρ1 0.3255 (0.283) 0.3199 0.3298 [0.2500, 0.3679]
ρ2 0.9408 (0.052) 0.9377 0.9308 [0.8884, 0.9957]
σ1 0.3701 (0.086) 0.3924 0.3871 [0.3415, 0.4683]
σ2 0.8084 (0.321) 0.8315 0.8199 [0.7796, 0.9208]
σ3 0.6347 (0.393) 0.7495 0.7377 [0.6441, 0.8770]
p11 0.9002 (0.111) 0.9000 0.9155 [0.7767, 0.9657]
p12 0.0146 (0.101) 0.0173 0.0094 [0.0002, 0.0620]
p21 0.1826 (0.220) 0.2024 0.2028 [0.1201, 0.2741]
p22 0.6366 (0.189) 0.6759 0.6593 [0.5885, 0.7902]
p31 0.5668 (0.203) 0.5891 0.5848 [0.5401, 0.6660]
p32 0.4109 (0.241) 0.3547 0.3598 [0.2744, 0.4071]
log-L -46.1847 -
log-ML - -54.4157
Note: The Maximum Likelihood standard errors in parentheses are computed using a simulation
procedure. 84
Table 2.5: Maximum Likelihood and Bayesian Estimates: Industrial Targeters
Finland
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 -0.2809 (0.167) -0.3101 -0.3171 [-0.4302, -0.2174]
c2 -0.6006 (0.292) -0.5297 -0.5198 [-0.6040, -0.4612]
φ1 0.0453 (0.031) 0.0483 0.0492 [0.0084, 0.0836]
φ2 0.1044 (0.176) 0.1342 0.1275 [0.0564, 0.2310]
ρ1 0.5669 (0.243) 0.4401 0.4482 [0.3479, 0.5709]
ρ2 0.7896 (0.112) 0.7566 0.7689 [0.6444, 0.8377]
σ1 0.6702 (0.135) 0.6602 0.6670 [0.5446, 0.7305]
σ2 2.1241 (0.319) 2.2268 2.2395 [2.1115, 2.3182]
σ3 1.6432 (0.279) 1.6820 1.6821 [1.6388, 1.7223]
p11 0.9994 (0.248) 0.8824 0.8857 [0.7696, 0.9913]
p12 0.0000 (0.144) 0.0307 0.0197 [0.0004, 0.0937]
p21 0.0518 (0.229) 0.0312 0.0187 [0.0003, 0.0850]
p22 0.3349 (0.166) 0.2237 0.2186 [0.1274, 0.3150]
p31 0.5102 (0.178) 0.4142 0.4152 [0.3120, 0.5234]
p32 0.0178 (0.207) 0.0311 0.0279 [0.0004, 0.0746]
log-L -17.1347 -
log-ML - -22.7470
Iceland
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 0.9577 (0.282) 0.9779 0.9739 [0.9379, 1.0272]
c2 0.4386 (0.418) 0.4630 0.4616 [0.4065, 0.5184]
φ1 0.2189 (0.129) 0.2276 0.2316 [0.1781, 0.2753]
φ2 0.0491 (0.191) 0.0772 0.0527 [0.0023, 0.2494]
ρ1 0.6407 (0.229) 0.6195 0.6205 [0.5485, 0.6830]
ρ2 0.8452 (0.102) 0.8838 0.8873 [0.8166, 0.9543]
σ1 0.8861 (0.315) 1.1791 1.1687 [1.0597, 1.3203]
σ2 1.6186 (0.417) 1.5129 1.5148 [1.4705, 1.5488]
σ3 2.2370 (0.354) 2.2748 2.2783 [2.1878, 2.3541]
p11 0.9933 (0.157) 0.9637 0.9670 [0.9254, 0.9962]
p12 0.0024 (0.249) 0.0084 0.0049 [0.0001, 0.0305]
p21 0.1515 (0.231) 0.0556 0.0350 [0.0007, 0.1657]
p22 0.5495 (0.144) 0.4546 0.4553 [0.3870, 0.5178]
p31 0.3523 (0.217) 0.3490 0.3450 [0.2967, 0.4087]
p32 0.5576 (0.229) 0.5306 0.5304 [0.4908, 0.5721]
log-L -34.3622 -
log-ML - -40.3116
Note: The Maximum Likelihood standard errors in parentheses are computed using a simulation
procedure. 85
Table 2.6: Maximum Likelihood & Bayesian Estimates: Industrial Targeters
New Zealand
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 0.2542 (0.145) 0.3010 0.3104 [0.2329, 0.3669]
c2 -0.0497 (0.329) -0.0185 -0.0024 [-0.1325, 0.0763]
φ1 0.0275 (0.066) 0.0290 0.0286 [0.0050, 0.0562]
φ2 0.3677 (0.195) 0.2234 0.2224 [0.1503, 0.3032]
ρ1 0.5648 (0.277) 0.5606 0.5596 [0.5107, 0.6192]
ρ2 0.9465 (0.076) 0.9646 0.9702 [0.9083, 0.9968]
σ1 0.1400 (0.198) 0.2166 0.2154 [0.1430, 0.2847]
σ2 0.5377 (0.307) 0.6543 0.6693 [0.5480, 0.7270]
σ3 0.9425 (0.227) 1.1328 1.1293 [0.9584, 1.3092]
p11 0.5467 (0.269) 0.5913 0.5994 [0.5297, 0.6349]
p12 0.4503 (0.235) 0.3533 0.3459 [0.2889, 0.4352]
p21 0.0958 (0.184) 0.2580 0.2877 [0.0952, 0.3286]
p22 0.6456 (0.258) 0.6107 0.6154 [0.5460, 0.6646]
p31 0.2453 (0.261) 0.1208 0.1422 [0.0043, 0.2097]
p32 0.1832 (0.171) 0.2778 0.2954 [0.1880, 0.3363]
log-L -55.0036 -
log-ML - -68.0101
Norway
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 -0.6090 (0.270) -0.7111 -0.7218 [-0.7794, -0.5866]
c2 -0.3165 (0.333) -0.2726 -0.2596 [-0.3549, -0.1982]
φ1 0.0427 (0.042) 0.0421 0.0412 [0.0089, 0.0795]
φ2 0.5127 (0.126) 0.3752 0.3683 [0.2800, 0.4914]
ρ1 0.1697 (0.248) 0.2052 0.2196 [0.1007, 0.2941]
ρ2 0.4447 (0.068) 0.4784 0.4719 [0.4267, 0.5482]
σ1 0.4431 (0.212) 0.4455 0.4554 [0.3788, 0.4917]
σ2 2.2424 (0.311) 2.2320 2.2113 [2.1516, 2.3447]
σ3 1.3678 (0.369) 1.3639 1.3635 [1.2238, 1.4820]
p11 0.6831 (0.239) 0.6463 0.6496 [0.5930, 0.7003]
p12 0.1879 (0.212) 0.1388 0.1559 [0.0030, 0.2025]
p21 0.7873 (0.227) 0.7951 0.7844 [0.7179, 0.9268]
p22 0.0510 (0.165) 0.0505 0.0510 [0.0006, 0.1191]
p31 0.7156 (0.193) 0.7496 0.7615 [0.6513, 0.8249]
p32 0.1345 (0.125) 0.1548 0.1636 [0.0456, 0.2248]
log-L -24.8993 -
log-ML - -31.6404
Note: The Maximum Likelihood standard errors in parentheses are computed using a simulation
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Table 2.7: Maximum Likelihood & Bayesian Estimates: Industrial Targeters
Spain
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 0.2565 (0.207) 0.3341 0.3400 [0.2765, 0.3785]
c2 0.3548 (0.337) 0.4280 0.4298 [0.3583, 0.4979]
φ1 0.0168 (0.207) 0.1328 0.1468 [0.0200, 0.2332]
φ2 0.3543 (0.247) 0.2133 0.2139 [0.1232, 0.3115]
ρ1 0.2711 (0.240) 0.2530 0.2452 [0.1738, 0.3587]
ρ2 0.7256 (0.131) 0.7350 0.7606 [0.5922, 0.8808]
σ1 0.4515 (0.183) 0.5376 0.5418 [0.4312, 0.6326]
σ2 1.9671 (0.313) 1.9328 1.9306 [1.8794, 1.9962]
σ3 2.6653 (0.345) 2.7049 2.7034 [2.6533, 2.7544]
p11 0.9953 (0.266) 0.9635 0.9757 [0.8981, 0.9971]
p12 0.0046 (0.177) 0.0187 0.0072 [0.0001, 0.0821]
p21 0.0313 (0.203) 0.0736 0.0664 [0.0019, 0.1523]
p22 0.3818 (0.244) 0.5195 0.5346 [0.3722, 0.6207]
p31 0.3411 (0.249) 0.4185 0.4200 [0.3110, 0.5559]
p32 0.2669 (0.192) 0.3829 0.3820 [0.2562, 0.5108]
log-L -9.4404 -
log-ML - -15.6630
Sweden
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 -0.1165 (0.290) -0.0666 -0.0630 [-0.1544, 0.0011]
c2 -0.1890 (0.247) -0.2187 -0.2120 [-0.2892, -0.1579]
φ1 0.0015 (0.069) 0.0142 0.0120 [0.0011, 0.0363]
φ2 0.2260 (0.028) 0.2876 0.2659 [0.1645, 0.4719]
ρ1 0.8508 (0.201) 0.8227 0.8207 [0.7733, 0.8720]
ρ2 0.8582 (0.072) 0.8782 0.8729 [0.8312, 0.9584]
σ1 0.4452 (0.249) 0.4654 0.4726 [0.3946, 0.5290]
σ2 1.6805 (0.195) 1.7465 1.7122 [1.6344, 1.9065]
σ3 1.2873 (0.379) 1.3457 1.3268 [1.2212, 1.5247]
p11 0.8810 (0.134) 0.8454 0.8457 [0.7744, 0.9209]
p12 0.1180 (0.191) 0.1211 0.1178 [0.0422, 0.2078]
p21 0.6182 (0.191) 0.5957 0.5996 [0.5498, 0.6323]
p22 0.2922 (0.215) 0.3380 0.3423 [0.2707, 0.4093]
p31 0.2748 (0.198) 0.2327 0.2445 [0.1142, 0.2882]
p32 0.3265 (0.242) 0.3414 0.3347 [0.2830, 0.4123]
log-L -46.9320 -
log-ML - -56.7255
Note: The Maximum Likelihood standard errors in parentheses are computed using a simulation
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Table 2.8: Maximum Likelihood & Bayesian Estimates: Industrial Targeters
Switzerland
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 -0.0529 (0.161) -0.0888 -0.0945 [-0.1485, -0.0258]
c2 -0.1608 (0.311) -0.2046 -0.2005 [-0.4283, -0.0753]
φ1 0.1432 (0.115) 0.1182 0.1361 [0.0237, 0.1947]
φ2 0.8529 (0.190) 0.7683 0.7715 [0.6793, 0.8529]
ρ1 0.3592 (0.222) 0.4393 0.4513 [0.3606, 0.4973]
ρ2 0.6372 (0.089) 0.6504 0.6491 [0.5966, 0.7023]
σ1 0.3421 (0.202) 0.3755 0.3834 [0.2642, 0.4765]
σ2 1.5638 (0.277) 1.6122 1.6128 [1.4945, 1.6985]
σ3 3.1551 (0.294) 3.1428 3.1551 [3.0296, 3.2008]
p11 0.9962 (0.262) 0.9451 0.9565 [0.8794, 0.9921]
p12 0.0010 (0.216) 0.0235 0.0195 [0.0004, 0.0632]
p21 0.1430 (0.138) 0.0720 0.0663 [0.0006, 0.1651]
p22 0.0037 (0.231) 0.0567 0.0492 [0.0008, 0.1980]
p31 0.5271 (0.244) 0.5080 0.5158 [0.3755, 0.6029]
p32 0.0282 (0.179) 0.1377 0.1056 [0.0038, 0.3140]
log-L -10.6999 -
log-ML - -15.9093
UK
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 0.0834 (0.189) -0.0222 -0.0227 [-0.1171, 0.0873]
c2 0.4929 (0.321) 0.6505 0.6666 [0.5590, 0.7435]
φ1 0.2445 (0.160) 0.2112 0.1923 [0.1477, 0.3041]
φ2 0.4930 (0.237) 0.6456 0.6556 [0.5281, 0.7341]
ρ1 0.8073 (0.241) 0.9131 0.9447 [0.8110, 0.9850]
ρ2 0.9220 (0.105) 0.9734 0.9778 [0.9228, 0.9984]
σ1 0.4525 (0.192) 0.4789 0.4784 [0.4389, 0.5176]
σ2 1.6668 (0.306) 1.6038 1.5959 [1.5551, 1.6819]
σ3 1.2255 (0.158) 1.0260 0.9902 [0.9265, 1.1833]
p11 0.9995 (0.206) 0.9526 0.9540 [0.9050, 0.9929]
p12 0.0003 (0.258) 0.0152 0.0090 [0.0002, 0.0511]
p21 0.1939 (0.199) 0.2480 0.2514 [0.1595, 0.3265]
p22 0.5496 (0.261) 0.6551 0.6556 [0.5881, 0.7268]
p31 0.6280 (0.200) 0.4659 0.4957 [0.3237, 0.5918]
p32 0.3719 (0.184) 0.1719 0.1686 [0.1176, 0.2471]
log-L -37.7612 -
log-ML - -46.9522
Note: The Maximum Likelihood standard errors in parentheses are computed using a simulation
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Table 2.9: Maximum Likelihood & Bayesian Estimates: Emerging Market Targeters
Brazil
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 1.3593 (0.222) 1.5575 1.5628 [1.4393, 1.6686]
c2 0.6432 (0.388) 0.2026 0.1849 [0.0601, 0.3667]
φ1 0.0144 (0.083) 0.0723 0.0669 [0.0081, 0.1566]
φ2 0.1403 (0.196) 0.1279 0.1287 [0.0128, 0.2394]
ρ1 0.4975 (0.268) 0.3709 0.3674 [0.3205, 0.4302]
ρ2 0.8927 (0.129) 0.9469 0.9555 [0.8766, 0.9959]
σ1 1.1446 (0.403) 1.4857 1.4947 [1.3934, 1.5419]
σ2 2.3558 (0.366) 2.4367 2.4335 [2.3745, 2.4939]
σ3 3.2126 (0.379) 3.3998 3.4237 [3.2796, 3.4935]
p11 0.9310 (0.193) 0.7892 0.7669 [0.6653, 0.9591]
p12 0.0689 (0.208) 0.1777 0.2020 [0.0068, 0.3133]
p21 0.2918 (0.156) 0.3760 0.4187 [0.1900, 0.4661]
p22 0.5077 (0.238) 0.5569 0.5422 [0.4958, 0.6309]
p31 0.3032 (0.194) 0.2199 0.2126 [0.1577, 0.2975]
p32 0.2742 (0.175) 0.0907 0.0982 [0.0102, 0.1512]
log-L -55.3349 -
log-ML - -67.2902
Chile
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 0.1343 (0.273) 0.1526 0.1903 [-0.0262, 0.2317]
c2 0.1049 (0.150) 0.2455 0.2516 [0.1047, 0.3515]
φ1 0.0253 (0.220) 0.0666 0.0578 [0.0057, 0.1688]
φ2 0.3726 (0.061) 0.2260 0.1826 [0.1066, 0.3795]
ρ1 0.5523 (0.232) 0.7157 0.7003 [0.6688, 0.7935]
ρ2 0.8141 (0.179) 0.8290 0.8244 [0.7111, 0.9632]
σ1 0.5168 (0.173) 0.6156 0.6248 [0.4851, 0.7555]
σ2 1.2818 (0.219) 1.1392 1.1434 [1.0476, 1.2354]
σ3 1.3957 (0.250) 1.3201 1.3209 [1.2687, 1.3706]
p11 0.7775 (0.167) 0.4844 0.4808 [0.4088, 0.5706]
p12 0.0891 (0.230) 0.3798 0.4038 [0.2406, 0.4991]
p21 0.2966 (0.112) 0.1673 0.1504 [0.0812, 0.3020]
p22 0.4460 (0.173) 0.5690 0.5758 [0.4725, 0.6391]
p31 0.3998 (0.148) 0.4084 0.4014 [0.3560, 0.4640]
p32 0.3008 (0.216) 0.1198 0.0931 [0.0008, 0.2639]
log-L -24.1161 -
log-ML - -35.8323
Note: The Maximum Likelihood standard errors in parentheses are computed using a simulation
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Table 2.10: Maximum Likelihood & Bayesian Estimates: Emerging Market Targeters
Czech Republic
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 0.0412 (0.213) -0.0394 -0.0368 [-0.1497, 0.0620]
c2 0.1737 (0.289) 0.2264 0.2282 [0.1333, 0.3173]
φ1 0.0399 (0.024) 0.0414 0.0418 [0.0031, 0.0846]
φ2 0.2917 (0.176) 0.3470 0.3424 [0.2453, 0.4686]
ρ1 0.7493 (0.217) 0.6983 0.6873 [0.6390, 0.7865]
ρ2 0.7704 (0.149) 0.8285 0.8261 [0.7601, 0.9104]
σ1 0.6045 (0.226) 0.7172 0.7266 [0.6048, 0.8079]
σ2 1.7803 (0.257) 1.8091 1.8068 [1.7625, 1.8712]
σ3 1.3620 (0.220) 1.4565 1.4594 [1.3822, 1.5204]
p11 0.4770 (0.205) 0.4182 0.4280 [0.3196, 0.4632]
p12 0.1344 (0.218) 0.1942 0.1935 [0.1131, 0.2783]
p21 0.0523 (0.181) 0.0261 0.0244 [0.0004, 0.0632]
p22 0.4369 (0.189) 0.4524 0.4470 [0.4143, 0.5107]
p31 0.7318 (0.228) 0.6715 0.6679 [0.6110, 0.7496]
p32 0.2271 (0.198) 0.2064 0.2100 [0.1493, 0.2595]
log-L -44.4651 -
log-ML - -52.7783
Hungary
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 0.3884 (0.233) 0.3419 0.3472 [0.2691, 0.4058]
c2 0.4219 (0.433) 0.1942 0.1877 [0.1214, 0.2650]
φ1 0.0508 (0.043) 0.0558 0.0592 [0.0100, 0.0964]
φ2 0.1075 (0.139) 0.2278 0.2255 [0.1782, 0.2804]
ρ1 0.6532 (0.242) 0.6783 0.6854 [0.5977, 0.7388]
ρ2 0.7598 (0.170) 0.7610 0.7616 [0.7214, 0.7962]
σ1 0.6619 (0.252) 0.5091 0.5220 [0.4119, 0.5753]
σ2 1.5333 (0.374) 1.7846 1.7838 [1.7114, 1.8412]
σ3 1.5296 (0.274) 1.6982 1.6987 [1.6132, 1.7759]
p11 0.5572 (0.229) 0.3725 0.3718 [0.3150, 0.4416]
p12 0.1705 (0.211) 0.3030 0.2923 [0.2186, 0.4101]
p21 0.3686 (0.189) 0.2821 0.2646 [0.2021, 0.3838]
p22 0.1853 (0.228) 0.2399 0.2341 [0.1346, 0.3493]
p31 0.5605 (0.234) 0.4314 0.4294 [0.3435, 0.5208]
p32 0.0454 (0.204) 0.0661 0.0754 [0.0025, 0.1122]
log-L -30.7018 -
log-ML - -39.5619
Note: The Maximum Likelihood standard errors in parentheses are computed using a simulation
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Table 2.11: Maximum Likelihood & Bayesian Estimates: Emerging Market Targeters
Korea
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 0.0197 (0.128) 0.0124 0.0138 [-0.0911, 0.0901]
c2 0.4005 (0.336) 0.4540 0.4612 [0.3782, 0.5093]
φ1 0.0171 (0.022) 0.0249 0.0238 [0.0022, 0.0522]
φ2 0.5862 (0.217) 0.8363 0.8395 [0.7924, 0.8668]
ρ1 0.5308 (0.214) 0.4156 0.4123 [0.3576, 0.4842]
ρ2 0.5897 (0.176) 0.6063 0.6252 [0.5080, 0.6731]
σ1 0.4805 (0.154) 0.5259 0.5247 [0.4571, 0.6151]
σ2 2.1267 (0.327) 2.3593 2.3447 [2.2947, 2.4620]
σ3 2.4772 (0.208) 2.3847 2.4003 [2.2811, 2.4828]
p11 0.9189 (0.251) 0.8067 0.8067 [0.7565, 0.8587]
p12 0.0771 (0.149) 0.1047 0.1139 [0.0031, 0.1582]
p21 0.1708 (0.241) 0.0830 0.0859 [0.0039, 0.1739]
p22 0.3228 (0.135) 0.0646 0.0464 [0.0010, 0.1669]
p31 0.5207 (0.210) 0.9678 0.9768 [0.9155, 0.9975]
p32 0.0739 (0.220) 0.0108 0.0044 [0.0001, 0.0413]
log-L -18.3308 -
log-ML - -23.1866
Mexico
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 0.5173 (0.254) 0.5186 0.5327 [0.3749, 0.5765]
c2 0.0004 (0.456) 0.0086 0.0028 [-0.0555, 0.0916]
φ1 0.0013 (0.058) 0.0468 0.0430 [0.0048, 0.1057]
φ2 0.5068 (0.201) 0.5415 0.5272 [0.4517, 0.6651]
ρ1 0.6251 (0.227) 0.6538 0.6438 [0.5935, 0.7323]
ρ2 0.9487 (0.188) 0.9236 0.9330 [0.8447, 0.9892]
σ1 0.5426 (0.194) 0.6238 0.6333 [0.5495, 0.6817]
σ2 2.6610 (0.388) 2.6838 2.6799 [2.6129, 2.7746]
σ3 1.6502 (0.270) 1.5598 1.5625 [1.4841, 1.6278]
p11 0.9998 (0.245) 0.9675 0.9697 [0.9296, 0.9948]
p12 0.0001 (0.234) 0.0118 0.0067 [0.0001, 0.0366]
p21 0.6056 (0.243) 0.5181 0.5519 [0.3751, 0.6490]
p22 0.3180 (0.152) 0.2974 0.2886 [0.2238, 0.3832]
p31 0.4040 (0.200) 0.4111 0.4071 [0.2451, 0.5798]
p32 0.4212 (0.277) 0.4462 0.4249 [0.3451, 0.5698]
log-L -15.3135 -
log-ML - -23.2326
Note: The Maximum Likelihood standard errors in parentheses are computed using a simulation
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Table 2.12: Maximum Likelihood & Bayesian Estimates: Emerging Market Targeters
Poland
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 -0.0935 (0.298) 0.0110 0.0069 [-0.0834, 0.1090]
c2 -0.1044 (0.305) -0.0757 -0.0632 [-0.1722, 0.0156]
φ1 0.0232 (0.110) 0.0325 0.0235 [0.0022, 0.0934]
φ2 0.0426 (0.039) 0.1172 0.0896 [0.0430, 0.2457]
ρ1 0.7938 (0.226) 0.8061 0.7978 [0.7566, 0.8868]
ρ2 0.9690 (0.105) 0.8877 0.8978 [0.7991, 0.9755]
σ1 1.0455 (0.244) 0.9433 0.9195 [0.8334, 1.0463]
σ2 1.2610 (0.303) 1.3050 1.3151 [1.2223, 1.3653]
σ3 1.7787 (0.312) 1.6623 1.6363 [1.5393, 1.8097]
p11 0.8176 (0.165) 0.6752 0.6832 [0.5194, 0.8196]
p12 0.0038 (0.234) 0.0286 0.0258 [0.0004, 0.0715]
p21 0.1584 (0.119) 0.0697 0.0692 [0.0025, 0.1561]
p22 0.6002 (0.189) 0.4949 0.5371 [0.3419, 0.6017]
p31 0.0043 (0.255) 0.0129 0.0088 [0.0002, 0.0404]
p32 0.4497 (0.187) 0.4215 0.4280 [0.3414, 0.4887]
log-L -49.4546 -
log-ML - -55.5681
South Africa
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 0.1160 (0.452) -0.3289 -0.3416 [-0.3933, -0.2251]
c2 -0.0015 (0.351) -0.0873 -0.1280 [-0.2088, 0.1018]
φ1 0.3770 (0.221) 0.4186 0.4187 [0.3436, 0.4855]
φ2 0.8011 (0.207) 0.8739 0.8879 [0.8023, 0.9308]
ρ1 0.7314 (0.245) 0.7850 0.7889 [0.7124, 0.8356]
ρ2 0.7830 (0.176) 0.8635 0.8525 [0.8073, 0.9488]
σ1 0.4857 (0.308) 0.8058 0.8130 [0.6311, 0.9440]
σ2 1.5781 (0.295) 1.2334 1.2275 [1.1392, 1.3542]
σ3 1.8139 (0.366) 1.3535 1.3531 [1.2298, 1.4642]
p11 0.6584 (0.176) 0.4068 0.4260 [0.2547, 0.4951]
p12 0.2824 (0.244) 0.0843 0.0880 [0.0039, 0.1551]
p21 0.1818 (0.162) 0.0609 0.0528 [0.0014, 0.1432]
p22 0.6103 (0.254) 0.4985 0.4773 [0.3699, 0.6388]
p31 0.4245 (0.200) 0.3252 0.3135 [0.2379, 0.4247]
p32 0.3191 (0.249) 0.5503 0.5477 [0.4858, 0.6329]
log-L -37.3655 -
log-ML - -46.2422
Note: The Maximum Likelihood standard errors in parentheses are computed using a simulation
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Table 2.13: Maximum Likelihood & Bayesian Estimates: Non-Targeters
ECB
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 0.4500 (0.129) 0.4151 0.4139 [0.3681, 0.4595]
c2 0.0391 (0.301) 0.1160 0.1186 [0.0429, 0.1795]
φ1 0.0567 (0.063) 0.0544 0.0492 [0.0041, 0.1065]
φ2 0.1876 (0.191) 0.1725 0.1916 [0.0584, 0.2632]
ρ1 0.6017 (0.208) 0.5614 0.5642 [0.4829, 0.6243]
ρ2 0.6667 (0.077) 0.7544 0.7501 [0.6688, 0.8390]
σ1 0.3140 (0.066) 0.4713 0.4718 [0.3769, 0.5525]
σ2 1.5402 (0.224) 1.5145 1.5166 [1.4107, 1.6677]
σ3 1.3139 (0.376) 1.2639 1.2456 [1.1965, 1.3722]
p11 0.9987 (0.137) 0.9713 0.9797 [0.9197, 0.9981]
p12 0.0008 (0.118) 0.0087 0.0040 [0.0001, 0.0314]
p21 0.1861 (0.196) 0.0406 0.0299 [0.0004, 0.1154]
p22 0.6508 (0.226) 0.8229 0.8168 [0.6632, 0.9803]
p31 0.6070 (0.213) 0.4921 0.4936 [0.3289, 0.6526]
p32 0.3856 (0.204) 0.2341 0.2308 [0.1656, 0.2990]
log-L -7.7446 -
log-ML - -16.6585
US
Parameter MLE Post. Mean Post Median 90% Interval
c1 0.1232 (0.191) 0.0443 0.0416 [0.0016, 0.0968]
c2 0.2544 (0.391) 0.1470 0.1727 [0.0087, 0.2674]
φ1 0.1147 (0.109) 0.3296 0.3346 [0.2201, 0.4161]
φ2 0.3988 (0.261) 0.2976 0.3144 [0.1727, 0.3626]
ρ1 0.6845 (0.257) 0.6090 0.6078 [0.5826, 0.6407]
ρ2 0.9626 (0.090) 0.8981 0.8919 [0.8207, 0.9872]
σ1 0.4423 (0.133) 0.4883 0.4813 [0.4353, 0.5606]
σ2 1.7387 (0.303) 1.9494 1.9187 [1.8068, 2.1588]
σ3 1.9069 (0.172) 2.2090 2.2179 [2.0380, 2.2959]
p11 0.9942 (0.281) 0.9387 0.9406 [0.8891, 0.9926]
p12 0.0056 (0.152) 0.0169 0.0115 [0.0002, 0.0516]
p21 0.4210 (0.176) 0.0851 0.0527 [0.0005, 0.2155]
p22 0.4245 (0.250) 0.6437 0.6720 [0.5095, 0.7239]
p31 0.5645 (0.257) 0.6093 0.6129 [0.4897, 0.7181]
p32 0.0201 (0.179) 0.0177 0.0132 [0.0003, 0.0499]
log-L -25.2985 -
log-ML - -33.9278
Note: The Maximum Likelihood standard errors in parentheses are computed using a simulation
procedure. 93
Table 2.14: Estimated Duration of Regimes: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Credible
Country Low-Volatility High-Volatility Combined Incredible
Australia 6.7717 1.0867 14.7300 1.0728
Canada 4.3900 1.1017 7.3822 1.1566
Finland 786.7665 1.0011 10440.8212 1.0000
Iceland 34.8049 1.0106 54.9503 1.0185
New Zealand 1.3359 1.3943 2.1473 1.8715
Norway 3.3793 1.1588 6.2953 1.1888
Spain 40.1215 1.0124 79.1995 1.0127
Sweden 5.8030 1.0240 6.7192 1.1748
Switzerland 125.7062 1.0068 846.0605 1.0011
UK 698.3876 1.0004 998.2129 1.0010
All Industrial 170.7467 1.0797 1245.6518 1.1498
Brazil 5.2734 1.0514 7.1062 1.1637
Chile 2.5582 1.2342 4.9732 1.2516
Czech Republic 1.8402 1.4483 4.2767 1.3051
Hungary 2.1444 1.5058 7.6701 1.1499
Korea 5.1553 1.1015 9.8257 1.1133
Mexico 2368.9293 1.0001 3958.4056 1.0002
Poland 1.4725 1.4666 2.7707 1.5647
South Africa 1.7192 1.1808 2.3335 1.7498
All Emerging 298.6366 1.2486 499.6702 1.2720
ECB (1% Target) 220.1615 1.0011 293.1622 1.0034
US (2% Target) 79.6857 1.0029 103.7212 1.0097
Note: Duration is in quarters and is computed as Di = 1/(1 − Ei) where Ei is the ergodic prob-
ability of state i and i=1,2,3. Note that the estimated duration of the combined credible regimes
is Dcredible = 1/(1 − (E1 + E3)) whereas the estimated duration of the incredible regime is simply
Dincredible = 1/(1− E2).
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Table 2.15: Estimated Duration of Regimes: Bayesian Estimates
Credible
Country Low-Volatility High-Volatility Combined Incredible
Australia 4.2181 1.1332 8.3635 1.1358
Canada 4.5225 1.0937 7.3843 1.1566
Finland 4.0233 1.2665 26.2135 1.0397
Iceland 6.2969 1.0798 11.7759 1.0928
New Zealand 1.5294 1.2472 2.1948 1.8370
Norway 3.1723 1.2270 7.6772 1.1498
Spain 7.0428 1.0643 12.2598 1.0888
Sweden 4.2163 1.0689 5.7888 1.2088
Switzerland 8.0317 1.0984 28.6579 1.0362
UK 8.3102 1.0576 15.1829 1.0705
All Industrial 5.1364 1.1337 12.5499 1.1816
Brazil 2.5512 1.1402 3.7176 1.3680
Chile 1.5221 1.3843 2.6359 1.6113
Czech Republic 1.6615 1.5028 3.7413 1.3648
Hungary 1.6148 1.7547 5.2861 1.2333
Korea 4.2886 1.1705 11.4281 1.0959
Mexico 15.4195 1.0310 28.7607 1.0360
Poland 1.1199 1.9358 2.4418 1.6936
South Africa 1.3042 1.5311 2.3817 1.7237
All Emerging 3.6852 1.4313 7.5492 1.3908
ECB (1% Target) 7.1495 1.0439 10.2238 1.1084
US (2% Target) 7.8772 1.0887 22.0056 1.0476
Note: Duration is in quarters and is computed as Di = 1/(1 − Ei) where Ei is the ergodic prob-
ability of state i and i=1,2,3. Note that the estimated duration of the combined credible regimes
is Dcredible = 1/(1 − (E1 + E3)) whereas the estimated duration of the incredible regime is simply
Dincredible = 1/(1− E2).
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Table 2.16: Parameter Means: ML & Bayesian Estimates
Industrial Emerging Market
ML Bayesian ML Bayesian
ρ1 0.544 0.537 0.642 0.641
ρ2 0.810 0.815 0.816 0.831
φ1 0.097 0.112 0.069 0.095
φ2 0.387 0.358 0.356 0.412
σ1 0.472 0.547 0.685 0.778
σ2 1.594 1.614 1.822 1.844
σ3 1.751 1.774 1.903 1.854
Note: The Bayesian parameter means are computed from the posterior means across the two groups
of targeters.
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Figure 2.1: Posterior Distribution of Parameters: United States
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Figure 2.2: Recursive Means of Parameters: United States
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Figure 2.3: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of Regimes: Industrial Targeters
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Figure 2.4: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of Regimes: Emerging Market Tar-
geters
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Figure 2.4: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of Regimes: Emerging Market Tar-
geters
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Note: The solid (dashed) lines correspond to the filtered (smoothed) probabilities.
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Figure 2.5: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of Regimes: Non-Targeters
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Note: The solid (dashed) lines correspond to the filtered (smoothed) probabilities.
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Part III
Is the US an Implicit
Inflation-Targeter?
(co-authored with Scott Schuh)
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Abstract
We take a preliminary empirical step to model inflation outcomes for inflation band-
targeting countries which allows us to isolate the empirical determinants of inflation
escaping from the targeted band. We also use our framework to determine whether
US inflation is consistent with inflation under an explicit targeting regime. Our model
generates the result that US inflation during the last decade is well predicted by a
model of inflation-targeting countries.
Keywords : Inflation-Targeting, Band Targets, Monetary Policy, Central Banks, Limited-
Dependent Variable Estimation
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3.1 Introduction
Two facts about inflation motivate this paper. First, Figure 3.1 shows that core CPI
inflation in the United States – a common benchmark for the Federal Reserve’s infla-
tion performance – has averaged 2.2 percent since 1994, and generally has fluctuated
between 2 percent and 3 percent. A significant deviation occurred during the extraor-
dinary period of 2003-04, the tail end of the so-called “job loss recovery” in which
productivity soared to more than 4 percent, the target federal funds rate hit 1 percent,
and deflation was considered a serious threat. Nevertheless, Figure 3.1 is tempting to
characterize as the outcome of an inflation-targeting regime – notwithstanding clear
and public denials of an inflation-targeting policy by Federal Reserve officials86. And
the debate over whether the Fed should follow an explicit inflation-targeting policy
(see Ip [42]) intensified with the appointment of current Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke,
who has expressed some support for inflation-targeting (for example, Bernanke et al.
[11] and Bernanke & Mishkin [13]). Some observers actually have alleged that the
Fed is an implicit inflation targeter87.
A second inflation fact emerges from Table 3.1, which summarizes the characteris-
tics of inflation-targeting countries. The table shows that inflation-targeting countries
86Former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan, former vice-chairman Roger Ferguson and current vice-
chairman Donald Kohn all have been skeptics of an inflation- targeting policy for the Fed and have
issued repeated denials of the implementation of such a policy. On the topic of a targeting policy for
the Federal Reserve, Greenspan [37] states, “For all these conceptual uncertainties and measurement
problems, a specific numerical inflation target would represent an unhelpful and false precision.”
Kohn [54] states that the Federal Reserve is not an inflation targeter either in an explicit or implicit
sense. Ferguson [26] does not believe that an explicit numerical inflation target would give added
benefits to countries such as the US that have already established a low and stable inflation climate.
87For example, Mark Gertler [32], in response to Ball and Sheridan [5], argues that there are
not many differences between targeting and non-targeting countries and that the Fed is an implicit
targeter. Marvin Goodfriend [36] thinks that former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan was an implicit
targeter for five reasons, including statements Greenspan made to Congress in 1989 and the fact that
core PCE inflation has ranged from 1 percent to 2 percent since the mid 1990s. Greg Mankiw [62]
also gives some reasons why the US is a “covert inflation targeter.”
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are more likely to adopt an inflation target band than an inflation target point. Only
two countries, Finland and Norway, have a target point but no target band; con-
versely, nearly half of the inflation-targeting countries adopted a band but no target
within the band. Moreover, the table reveals a wide range of specification details
associated with applied inflation-targeting. The level of the inflation target and the
dimensions of the inflation target band vary across countries. In some cases, the spec-
ifications of inflation-targeting vary across time within a country. Inflation-targeting
countries that adopt both a target and a band in all cases adopt symmetric bands
around the target, but none of the countries provide a clear and explicit rule for how
actual inflation outcomes should be evaluated relative to the target versus relative to
the band.
An extensive literature exists with models in which the monetary authority at-
tempt to control inflation to achieve a single outcome, or inflation target (pi∗) (We will
refer to this case as IT, or inflation-targeting.). Models with IT policies usually in-
clude quadratic and symmetric loss functions for inflation in the monetary authority’s
objective, and hence produce well-behaved (i.e., linear and continuous) decision rules.
As a cutting-edge example, Ireland [45] estimates a time-varying inflation target using
a fully-specified, structural, DSGE model88.
In practice, however, the tendency of inflation-targeting countries to adopt a band
(either instead of, or in addition to, a target) significantly complicates the theoretical
task of modeling inflation-targeting. As Orphanides and Wieland [70] demonstrate,
models in which the monetary authority attempts to keep inflation within a target
band introduces nonlinearities and nonconvexities into the model (We will refer to
this case as IBT, or inflation-band targeting.). In particular, IBT models predict that
88See Woodford [103] and the references therein for a treatment of standard inflation-targeting
behavior in fully-specified, structural, DSGE models.
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inflation outcomes are characterized by the existence of at least three distinct states –
actual inflation above, in, or below its target band – in which the underlying decision
rules may be quite different for each state. IBT models typically must be solved
numerically, rather than analytically; to our knowledge, econometric applications of
IBT models do not exist.
In this paper, we use a nonlinear, limited-dependent econometric model to evalu-
ate the determinants of inflation in IT countries, and to evaluate the question whether
the United States may have been an implict IBT country. Our model, which captures
the general intuition of the model in Orphanides and Wieland [70], is a standard
multinomial (three-state) logit applied to a longitudinal panel of IBT countries. This
reduced-form econometric model approximates the decision rules for inflation in each
state, and allows us to test for differences in the state-specific rules observed in the
reduced-form parameters.
Because the model is only a reduced-form approximation of the true nonlinear
structural model, which is too complex to fully specify, we include a wide variety of
explanatory variables. We include domestic variables standard in IT models (out-
put and nominal interest rates), domestic variables that might appear in more fully
specified models (productivity, time-varying real interest rates, unemployment, and
oil prices), and international variables (exchange rate) likely important for an inter-
national panel of data.
We find that, in addition to the usual suspects driving inflation behavior, an
important determinant of inflation escaping from the target band is medium-term
fluctuations in trend productivity growth. We also find that when using the longi-
tudinal panel of IBT countries in an out-of-sample prediction exercise, US inflation
behavior is well predicted by our reduced form model of IBT countries. Our study
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is organized as follows: Section 3.2 contains a discussion of the theoretical founda-
tions of IT and IBT models of inflation-targeting. Section 3.3 details applied work
on inflation-targeting in addition to presenting our econometric model of IBT coun-
tries. Section 3.4 contains the results from the estimation exercise and is followed by
the out-of-sample prediction exercise for the US in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Foundations
3.2.1 Inflation Point Targeting
In theory, IT is about targeting a point for inflation. Most macroeconomic IT models
assume a linear specification for the policymaker’s loss for inflation relative to the
point target. The simple instrument rule of Taylor [96] incorporated into the con-
text of fully structural New-Keynesian models assumes that the policymaker sets its
instrument in response to deviations of inflation from the point target, pi∗:
rt = φrrt−1 + (1− φr)
[
(1 + φpi)(pit − pi∗) + φyyt
]
(3.1)
In the case of deriving a central bank targeting rule from a micro-founded structure a´
la Svensson [93], the policymaker’s per-period loss function is quadratic with respect
to inflation deviating from a point target:
lt = ω(pit − pi∗)2 + (1− ω)y2t (3.2)
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Both specifications in Equations (3.1) and (3.2) assume a symmetric loss to the poli-
cymaker should inflation not hit the point target regardless of whether inflation over
or undershot the target. This may not always be a reasonable assumption when the
central bank is pursuing expansionary policy and the nominal interest rate is close to
the zero nominal bound. The preceding example lends support to making a case for
a state-dependence in policy actions as a function of where inflation is in the target
band-space. Fully structural models incorporating simple instrument or targeting
rules do not account for this possible state-dependence in policy.
There are other modeling issues that arise when considering inflation-targeting
in practice. As discussed in the previous section, Table 3.1 shows that virtually
all the inflation-targeting countries are targeting a band rather than a point. Most
theoretical IT models approximate this fact by assuming the point target is simply
the midpoint of the target band bounds: pi∗ = (piH+piL)/2. This assumes that there is
a difference between inflation being at the midpoint of the band compared to a small
epsilon difference above or below that midpoint. In addition, some countries don’t
even explicitly specify the upper and lower bounds89. To try to reconcile IT models
with practice, it becomes clearer that a fully structural model of inflation-targeting
needs to account for the effects that a band rather than a point target induce on
macroeconomic agents.
3.2.2 Inflation Band Targeting
In practice, more emphasis may be placed on hitting a band opposed to a point target
due to imperfect instrument control on the part of the central bank and measurement
89Some countries such as Australia have chosen to introduce the upper and lower band bounds
explicitly as the target band bounds whereas others such as Sweden obtain them implicitly by
specifying a point target directly and an acceptable range around that target for inflation.
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error in inflation. In addition, an unusually high amount of interest rate variability
may be needed to ensure the target being hit every period. Both reasons offer expla-
nations for why most countries in Table 3.1 focus on targeting a band rather than a
point for inflation.
When the point target becomes a band, which differs in size and levels across
targeting countries, there is reason to believe that the presence of an explicit target
band introduces non-convexities and non-linearities in the expectations of economic
agents and the actions of the Central Bank that are not fully captured in the speci-
fications for inflation about its point target as seen in Equations (3.1) and (3.2). To
cite a few examples, Bernanke et al. [11] mention the case of the Bank of Canada
not pursuing a policy that drove inflation closer to the center of the band once it
was safely within the band bounds. Bernanke & Mishkin [13] also document the
inclination of inflation-targeting central banks’ to primarily focus on one of the two
objectives90 (“put out fires”) when it is not under control.
To try to understand inflation behavior in an IBT regime, it may be instructive
to look at the exchange rate band targeting literature. Krugman [56] shows that, due
to the economic agents’ expectation that the monetary authority will intervene to
keep the exchange rate within the band, exchange rate movements within the band in
a fixed exchange rate regime will be different than in the same bandwidth area under
a floating exchange rate regime91. Transposing the discussion to inflation-targeting,
it is reasonable to expect that the expectations on the part of economic agents will
impact inflation differently than when there is no targeting regime. This results in
perhaps less volatile inflation than the economic fundamentals that typically drive
90The two central bank objectives being the inflation gap and the output gap.
91Krugman’s view is that essentially it is incorrect to think that the exchange rate will freely float
within the band and then is targeted by the central bank when coming close to the edges of the
band.
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inflation in non-targeting regimes92.
Concerning the actions of explicit IBT central banks, consider the case of the
Bank of England. If inflation misses the target in excess of 1%, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer is guaranteed by law a letter from the Governor of the Bank of England
explaining the reasons for the miss and how inflation will be brought under control
in future periods. In the case of New Zealand, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand can actually be dismissed if missing the target93.
3.2.3 A Theoretical IBT Model
Taking direction from Svensson’s [94] belief that inflation-targeting central banks
should not be exempt from the optimizing micro-foundations that are imposed on
economic agents94, we turn to a model proposed by Orphanides & Wieland [70] of an
optimizing central bank to obtain a solution describing the behavior of inflation in
an IBT regime. The model explores state-dependencies in central bank responses to
inflation in targeting regimes where there is a target band for inflation. The problem
92However, there are differences between inflation and exchange rates. Central bank actions affect
the exchange rate almost instantaneously whereas there is a lag in policy on inflation due to pass-
through issues and price stickiness. Svensson [92] also cites model uncertainty and supply and
demand shocks as additional factors that lead to the imperfect control of inflation for the central
bank. Thus, another difference that results is that agents may not be able to judge the performance
of the central bank for a couple of periods due to policy having a lagged effect on inflation. If
one ignores these differences between exchange rate and inflation-targeting, you could combine the
exchange rate with the assumption of purchasing-power-parity (PPP) to produces prices in levels.
However, targeting inflation is still different from targeting the price level since inflation-targeting is
forward-looking since it deals with with growth in prices whereas price-level targeting is backward-
looking since it deals with levels of prices. See Carlstrom & Fuerst [17] for a discussion.
93See Bernanke et al. and Bernanke & Woodford [12] for more.
94Svensson writes: “Macroeconomics long ago stopped modeling private economic agents as follow-
ing mechanical rules for consumption, saving, production, and investment decisions; instead, they
are now normally modeled as optimizing agents that achieve first-order conditions, Euler conditions.
It is long overdue to acknowledge that modern central banks are, at least when it comes to the in-
flation targeters, optimizing to at least the same extent as private economic agents; therefore their
behavior can be better modeled with the help of targeting rules than with simple instrument rules.”
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is recursive and thus, employs a Bellman Equation approach with three states (st =
above, in, or below the inflation target band). The setup is as follows: the central bank
chooses, as its instrument, the nominal interest rate (Rt) to minimize a loss function
which is state-dependent (i.e. based on where inflation is in the targeted band space)
subject to aggregate demand and Phillips Curve constraints95. The central bank’s
problem is:
V (pit, yt, st) = min
Rt
{
lt(st) + βEV (pit+1, yt+1, st+1)
}
(3.3)
subject to:
pit+1 = pit + αyt+1 + et+1 (3.4)
yt+1 = ρyt − ξ(Rt − pit − r∗) + ut+1 (3.5)
where the per-period loss is state-dependent and specified as:
lt(st) = ω(st)(pit − pi∗(st))2 + (1− ω(st))y2t (3.6)
and where:
pi∗(st) =

piL if st = BELOW
pit if st = IN
piH if st = ABOV E
95We should note that the specification below is a slightly modified version of one of Orphanides
& Wieland’s setups as a particular smoothing parameter c→ 0. However, we are still assuming c is
a small, but positive number so that a numerical solution can be found to the problem. In the case
that c=0, a solution is not possible since the value function is not differentiable at the band bounds.
See Appendix 3.7.2 for the complete and non-limiting model.
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st =

BELOW if pit < piL
IN if piL < pit < piH
ABOV E if pit > piH
pit+1 is inflation, pi
∗(st) is the state-dependent inflation target, piH and piL are the
upper and lower target band bounds, et+1 and ut+1 are cost and preference shocks,
r∗, ρ, ξ, α, ω(st), β are parameters, Rt is the nominal interest rate and yt+1 is the
output gap. Note that the relative response of the central bank to the two objectives
is governed by ω(st), which is state-dependent
96. Thinking about state-dependent
responses in central bank behavior brings us closer to isolating key features that a
fully-structual IBT model should include.
Equations (3.4) and (3.5) govern the evolution of the economy. Therefore, the
problem is to choose the nominal interest rate (Rt) to minimize the Bellman Equation
in (3.3) subject to the Phillips Curve specification in (3.4) and the aggregate demand
specification in (3.5). Note that the central bank faces no costs from inflation while
inflation is in the band (i.e. st = IN) since pi
∗(st = IN) = pit. Figure 3.3 compares a
standard quadratic loss function with that of Orphanides & Wieland’s zone-quadratic
loss function in Equation (3.3) with a target band of 2%97.
The recursive setup in Equations (3.3) through (3.6) cannot be solved analyti-
cally. One needs to resort to numerical methods to solve for the behavior of inflation98.
A main result from their setup is that inaction zones for inflation are displayed. More
specifically, the central bank will resort to targeting the output gap while inflation is
96This state-dependency is not present in Orphanides & Wieland’s specification due to an already
computationally intensive setup. Orphanides & Wieland have ω(st) = w ∀ st.
97See Appendix 3.7 for a more detailed discussion of the Orphanides & Wieland approach.
98The interested reader is referred to the Orphanides & Wieland paper.
115
safely within the confines of the targeted band and let inflation vary. Equivalently,
inflation should be uncorrelated with the output gap when safely within the band
bounds. The derived target band or zone where inflation is allowed to fluctuate is
reduced in cases of increased uncertainty via price and/or demand shocks. Figure
3.4 displays optimal policy in the standard linear quadratic and linear zone-quadratic
models with and without uncertainty. Note how the band of inaction for inflation
shrinks when uncertainty in the form of cost-push shocks (i.e. et+1 in the Phillips
Curve Equation (3.4)) is introduced. Orphanides & Wieland’s band of inaction pre-
diction will serve as a testable result for our econometric model.
The specification in Equations (3.3) through (3.6) enters in the hard vs. soft
inflation band bound debate99 on the hard band bounds side. The loss function
in Equation (3.3) is symmetric in inflation and output gap objectives. Mishkin &
Westelius [65] posit that the main cost of missing the target band for inflation is
the “embarrassment effect” and therefore, there is no indication that the cost should
be asymmetric. Surico [91] estimates a theoretical model for the US that allows for
asymmetries in Central Bank preferences. He finds no evidence that the Fed behaved
asymmetrically in either inflation or output gap objectives post-Volcker.
3.3 Empirical Exercise
We introduce a reduced-form model that is approximately consistent with a structural
model of IBT. The econometric model deals with non-linearities in a simple and crude
way via a limited-dependent variable approach that discretizes inflation based on
where it is in the band-space (above, in, or below the band). Given the fact that
99See Mishkin & Westelius [65] and Svensson [95] for more.
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a sizable degree of heterogeneity exists in many dimensions across band-targeting
countries, we consider variables not in the benchmark model such as exchange rates,
productivity differences, the current account balance, and the effects of oil prices to
explain inflation dynamics.
3.3.1 Applied Work on Inflation-Targeting
Are IT or IBT countries really different from nontargeters in terms of either the
agents’ expectations or central bank actions that cause inflation to behave differently
in the two regimes? There is a large empirical literature that addresses this very
issue100.
Ball & Sheridan [5] have a widely-cited paper that compares the economic per-
formance101 of targeting vs. non-targeting countries. Ball & Sheridan perform a
comparison between targeting and non-targeting OECD countries and find that there
is no considerable difference in economic performance between the two groups once
controlling for mean reversion (since the targeters had worse economic performance
before the implementation of inflation-targeting). For some measures, such as in-
flation and output growth, performance was roughly equal. For average inflation,
reversion to the mean explains away differences between targeting and non-targeting
countries.
Benati [8] along with Levin, Natalucci & Piger [58] evaluate the extent to which
the introduction of inflation-targeting influenced expectation formation and inflation
dynamics. They find that in targeting regimes, expectations of inflation are not
100In spite of the debate, it is somewhat telling that no inflation-targeting country has abandoned
the framework.
101Economic performance in Ball & Sheridan is defined as the behavior of inflation, output and
interest rates.
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correlated with past values of inflation and that inflation exhibits less persistence
relative to comparable non-targeting regimes. The rationale Levin, Natalucci & Piger
give is that in a targeting regime, agents will form expectations of inflation based on
the target whereas in a non-targeting regime, agents form expectations based on past
values of inflation. Levin, Natalucci & Piger also find that targeting countries do not
experience higher output volatility but have higher inflation volatility compared to
non-targeting countries.
Roger & Stone [77] present many stylized facts from inflation-targeting regimes
such as how often inflation targets are missed or deviations from the center of the
band for disinflating vs. stabilized inflation (or Emerging Market vs. Industrialized)
countries. They find that large exchange rate fluctuations (either through direct or
indirect channels) were the cause of many of the largest misses from target. We add to
their results in searching for other empirical determinants of inflation escaping from
the band. Roger & Stone postulate that the largest misses from target often reflect
the direct and indirect impact of exchange rate shocks. They believe there are two
links between the exchange rate and domestic inflation: (i.) via pass-through effects
from the exchange rate to domestic inflation. (ii.) via a financial system channel
when external shocks increase financial vulnerability. Therefore, maintaining a good
degree of financial stability before implementing inflation-targeting is important for
the success of inflation-targeting.
Gerlach [31] has probability model of adoption of an explicit targeting regime
based on some macro and social-political variables. Gerlach finds that a low de-
gree of central bank independence, a less open economy, fewer goods and commodi-
ties exports and being a non-EU country increases the probability of adoption of
inflation-targeting. Johnson [46] estimates the effects of inflation-targeting on ex-
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pected inflation. He compares a panel of targeting vs. non-targeting countries and
finds that both sets experience disinflation.
3.3.2 Econometric Model
Orphanides & Wieland’s IBT model suggests that only the output gap, demand
shocks (via their effect on output gap) and price shocks should matter in affecting
inflation. When inflation is in the band, the output gap should not exert an effect
on inflation. Outside the band, the output gap should affect inflation in a symmetric
fashion, regardless of whether inflation is above or below the target band. The state-
dependent behavior for inflation lends its way to motivating the econometric model
in (3.7) that discretizes inflation and takes a limited-dependent variable approach
to capture state-dependencies and non-linearities in inflation outcomes in inflation-
targeting regimes. The dependent variable is an indicator of whether inflation is
above, in, or below the targeted band. The model specification and an explanation
of the independent variables are below.
Bandit =
L∑
j=0
γ ∗Xi,t−j + it (3.7)
Bandit ∈ {−1, 0, 1} denotes whether inflation is below, in, or above the targeted band
for country i at time period t102. We estimate (3.7) using an ordered logit regression
where γ is a vector of parameters to be estimated and X is a vector containing macro
aggregates which is further defined below in Equation (3.8)103.
102Since our model is specified at a quarterly frequency, Bandit is a measure of whether the central
bank is on target rather than whether it has missed its formal target since most inflation-targeting
central banks are evaluated once a year with respect to their inflation performance.
103Note that the number of lags “L” varies according to the variable in question.
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X = {GDP, TPROD, CPROD, UNEMP, MON, INT, CURR, EXRATE, OIL}
(3.8)
where:
• GDP = Real GDP Growth annualized over the past four quarters. Contempo-
raneous value is included.
• TPROD = Trend Productivity Growth annualized over the past four quarters.
Contemporaneous value is included104.
• CPROD = Cyclical Productivity Growth annualized over the past four quarters.
Contemporaneous value is included.
• UNEMP = Unemployment Rate Gap105 (Actual Unemployment minus the
NAIRU). Lagged value is included.
• MON = Monetary Policy Proxy (Trend Productivity Growth minus the Real
Short-Term Interest Rate). Contemporaneous value is included. Note that a
negative (positive) value corresponds to a tighter (looser) monetary policy.
• INT = Nominal Interest Rate (One and two lagged periods are included.)
• CURR = Current Account Balance in % of GDP (One year lag is included.)
104Due to data limitations, our labor productivity measure is output per employee rather than the
more common output per hour measure. Trend and Cyclical Productivity Growth measures were
constructed by running labor productivity growth through a Hodrick-Prescott filter.
105The output gap (or other marginal cost measures) could not be computed for all countries due
to lack of potential output estimates for all countries, therefore the unemployment gap is used as a
similar measure of the business cycle performance. For the Industrial countries, we used estimates
obtained from Haver Analytics. For the Emerging Market countries, we estimated the NAIRU using
a Phillips Curve specification with four lags of inflation.
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• EXRATE = Log of Nominal Exchange Rate (defined in foreign currency units
per US dollar). The first differenced value is included.
• OIL = Log of Nominal spot price of one barrel of West Texas intermediate oil
in foreign currency units. Contemporaneous and lagged (8 quarters) values of
oil are included. We use long lags for oil due to slow pass-through effects of oil
on consumer prices.
We use the unemployment gap as our measure of the output gap. Oil, exchange
rate, and productivity growth variables should be interpreted as supply shocks to
our model. Since we include GDP and productivity growth, we obtain growth in
hours worked implicitly. A monetary policy measure is included to determine if an
excessively tight or loose policy preference on the part of the central bank has an effect
on inflation behavior. We add the nominal interest rate to determine how inflation
behavior is affected by the level of interest rates.
Discretization of inflation in (3.7) allows us a fair amount of flexibility in mod-
eling inflation behavior across targeting regimes over that of a continuous model of
inflation. Discretization allows us to combine differences in inflation targets and
bandwidths across countries into one variable106. In addition, since it may be a rea-
sonable assumption that different targeting central banks may place different weights
on inflation and output gap objectives and their response may be based on where
inflation is in the band-space, any heterogeneity in country specific parameters makes
it unlikely that one can aggregate a continuous model of inflation across countries for
106For example, an equal difference in inflation minus its target for two countries may correspond
to different inflation outcomes depending on the size of the band for each country: one country
may be safely within their wide band, whereas the other country may overshoot its narrow band.
The natural question to ask next is why not instead construct a variable that expresses the percent
deviation of inflation from the target or from the band bounds? Once again, it is not clear to us
that a very accurate hit is substantially different from a less accurate hit. We concede that a really
bad miss, however, is probably different from a close miss.
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inflation-targeting regimes. In our state-dependent approach, we will be able to more
clearly identify the empirical determinants of inflation hitting or escaping the band
across countries with different central bank preferences and target bands.
Because the model is estimated using a panel of data from inflation-targeting
countries, it implicitly restricts the coefficients to be the same across all countries.
Of course, this restriction would be grossly incorrect if we were trying to estimate a
structural model of inflation for each country. However, by modeling the probability
of inflation escaping from its target band, we are hoping that this restriction is less
counterfactual and will allow us to discover which macroeconomic variables are most
important for explaining deviations of inflation from target bands.
3.3.3 Data
As of today, roughly twenty countries that vary in size and level of development
can be classified as explicit inflation-targeters. Table 3.1 presents a comprehensive
account of the countries that are explicit inflation targeters and includes such in-
formation as the date of adoption and whether an inflation band or point is being
targeted. Inflation-targeting was adopted primarily by several Industrial countries’
central banks in the early 1990s (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK), whereas
Emerging Market countries largely adopted inflation-targeting in the late 1990s and
early 2000s. The rationale for the introduction of targeting varied across countries
and included providing a pathway for disinflation from unacceptably high levels, insti-
tutionalizing disinflationary gains that had been made and setting up a new nominal
anchor after the abolishment of a fixed exchange rate regime.
Seven OECD inflation-targeting countries with a target band are included in the
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panel: Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and the UK 107.
Six Emerging Market inflation-targeting countries are included in the panel: Brazil,
Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and South Korea108. We also have data
on the European Union and Switzerland, which Roger & Stone believe are quasi
inflation- targeters109. Data availability dictated the inclusion of countries 110. Adop-
tion periods of an explicit inflation-targeting regime vary across countries and thus the
panel is unbalanced. The data is compiled at a quarterly frequency and ranges from
1990:Q2 to 2008:Q2; the data was gathered from Haver Analytics and LABORSTA.
See Appendix 3.8 for more on the original data series used for each country as well
as a description of the data construction and the seasonal adjustments required for
some of the raw data series. Industrial countries hit the target band roughly sixty
percent of the time while Emerging Market countries hit their target band roughly
forty percent of the time as seen in Table 3.2111. This is consistent with the results
from Roger & Stone. For more specific information concerning the years and coun-
tries included in the analysis, consult Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2 depicts
inflation and the target bands for the Industrial and Emerging Market band targeters
included in our sample112.
107We have data on Finland and Norway, but since they have only a point target and not a band,
they are not included in the panel.
108We also have data on Mexico and South Africa, but due to the inability of finding reliable
quarterly data for employment (Mexico) and the unemployment rate (South Africa), these countries
are not included in our panel.
109The ECB has an explicit 2% inflation ceiling as a condition of the Maastricht Treaty but does
not officially consider itself an inflation-targeter since it also designates money growth as one of its
objectives. See Bernanke [9].
110The only remaining explicit inflation-targeting countries that are left out are: Columbia, Israel,
Mexico, Philippines, Peru, South Africa, and Thailand.
111See footnote 102.
112Note that Spain is included as a separate country from 1995-1998 and joins the Euro Area’s
targeting regime beginning in 1999. The same holds for Finland although Finland is not included
since it does not have a target band.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Ordered Logit Regressions
Table 3.3 gives the results of the ordered logit regressions for the Industrial, Emerging
Market and all inflation-targeting countries in our sample in terms of the odds-ratios.
Odds-ratio estimates offer a parsimonious indication of independent variables’ effect
on the dependent variable in limited-dependent variable models. An odds-ratio of
greater (less) than one corresponds to given a unit increase in the right-hand-side
variable in question, there is a greater (smaller) odds that the the dependent variable
will be in the higher ordinal position compared to the lower ordinal position given
that all the other right-hand-side variables are held constant. As an example, let’s
take a look at the first column of Table 3.3. For a one unit increase in GDP Growth,
the odds of inflation being above the band versus in the band or below the band are
roughly 1.45 times greater, given the other variables are held constant in the model.
Likewise, for a one unit increase in GDP Growth, the odds of being in the combined
above the band and in the band positions versus below the band position are 1.45 times
greater, given the other variables are held constant. Note that for all three columns
(All, Industrial, and Emerging Market Countries), we see the same sign113 on the
odds-ratio estimates for most of the independent variables, which is an indication of
a systematic relation between our independent and dependent variables. For example,
across all three columns, higher GDP growth corresponds to inflationary pressures
whereas increased trend and cyclical productivity growth correspond to deflationary
pressures. Medium-term changes in productivity are favorable supply shocks that help
firms hold down prices. Firms boost productivity during economic slowdowns, which
113“Sign” loosely used to mean less than/equal to/greater than one.
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are also times when inflation is falling. It is unclear whether cyclical productivity
has any direct pricing implications and is not as large in its deflationary pressures as
trend productivity. For all the countries, a bigger unemployment gap corresponds to
deflationary pressures, which is the usual Phillips Curve effect114. The first-differenced
value of the exchange rate displays seemingly insignificant effects. See Section 3.4.4
for a further discussion of the exchange rate in our model. When the real interest rate
is below the trend productivity growth rate and thus the monetary policy measure is
more positive, policy is presumed to be accommodative and contributing to increased
inflationary pressures. For the Industrial countries, a larger (positive) current account
balance corresponds to deflationary pressures, perhaps reflecting the fact that a large
current account deficit for some countries has contributed to inflationary pressures.
The Emerging Market countries display no positive or negative effect on the dependent
variable from the current account balance. The price of oil, in theory, affects inflation
with about a one or two year lag. However, the insignificance of the coefficients likely
reflect the indirect effects of oil on growth rather than a direct price effect.
Marginal Effects
Tables 3.4 to 3.6 give the marginal effect or elasticity estimates for the three samples
for each position in the band space. These results provide us with an improvement
over the odds-ratio estimates in Table 3.3 since it allows us to see how a percent
increase in the independent variable in question affects the dependent variable for
each band position. As an example, in Table 3.4, a more accommodative monetary
policy corresponds to inflationary pressures when inflation is above the band but
deflationary pressures when it is in and below the band.
114However, this result seems to be driven by the Emerging Market countries, as the Industrial
countries display an odds-ratio of greater than one.
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A salient result from our analysis is that there are insignificant effects from all
of the independent variables when inflation is in the band in Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6.
This inaction inside the band is consistent with Orphanides & Wieland’s theory for
an inaction zone for inflation.
Another notable result is seen in the three sets of tables displaying the marginal
effects. Almost equal and opposite coefficient estimates are seen for the above the
band and below the band positions. The data, therefore, does not suggest introducing
asymmetries in inflation behavior for the Industrial countries, which is in line with
the results of Surico for the US. One concern here is that the extent of the symmetry
seen is conditional on the ability of the countries to stay in the band. To test this
idea, we split up the Industrial countries into two groups based on performance in
hitting the target band and re-estimated the model separately for each group115. The
group who had better success in hitting the band still displayed symmetry in the
elasticity estimates whereas the other group did not. Therefore, the symmetry in the
Industrial countries is largely being driven by the more successful central banks in
being on target.
3.4.2 Potential Endogeneity of Regressors
One concern is that we have endogenous regressors. Since we are in a limited-
dependent variable framework, the simple two-stage, instrumental variables proce-
dure will not be applicable. We need to take the Rivers & Vuong [75] two-stage,
conditional maximum-likelihood (2SCML) approach described as follows. Consider
the two equation system below in (3.9) and (3.10) where piit is inflation, yit is a vector
115The more successful group is comprised of the UK, Canada, Spain and New Zealand, whereas
the rest of the Industrial countries in Table 3.2 round out the other group.
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of endogenous regressors, xit is a vector of exogenous regressors and zit is a vector of
determinants of the endogenous variables in question.
piit = α1yit + α2xit + vit (3.9)
yit = β1piit + β2zit + ηit (3.10)
In the first stage of 2SCML, one estimates Equation (3.10) by OLS and obtains
the residual estimates (ηˆit) from the regression. Lagged values of the endogenous
variables suffice for constructing zit
116. Since we are not in a continuous dependent
variable framework and are instead estimating discretized inflation, the second stage
consists of estimating Equation (3.11) by ordered logit where we insert the residual
estimates from the first stage as independent variables to be estimated.
Bandit = γ0ηˆit + γ1yit + γ2xit + uit (3.11)
Recall that Bandit is band position that is dependent on inflation and takes on one
of three discrete values:
Bandit =

−1 if piit < piL
0 if piL < piit < piH
1 if piit > piH
116We use 4 lags. One concern brought to our attention is that since the NAIRU is estimated using
lags of inflation, the unemployment gap may not be properly instrumented for. In this case, we
used four more lags for the unemployment gap in instrumentation and found that our results are
invariant to this issue.
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This process allows us to obtain consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates
for γ1 and γ2. Tables 3.7 to 3.10 give the results from the second stage of the 2SCML
approach. Taking a look at the odds-ratio estimates in Table 3.7, we get encouraging
results: with the exception of the GDP growth regressor in the case of the Emerging
Market countries, none of the significant estimates in Table 3.3 flip signs from being
significantly above (below) one to being significantly below (above) one. Our main
result of medium-term fluctuations in trend productivity growth as an important de-
terminant of inflation escaping from the target band remains robust when examining
the consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates in the 2SCML method.
One nice feature of the 2SCML approach is that we can test the exogeneity of
yit by running the likelihood-ratio test. For example, in examining each independent
variable separately for all the countries in the sample, trend productivity, the mone-
tary policy proxy and the price of oil are endogenous at the 5% level or better (results
not shown).
We also test the validity of the instruments used. Examining the first stage regres-
sion results, we find that the instruments are both individually and jointly significant,
which satisfies the first condition of valid instruments (i.e. they are well correlated
with the endogenous regressors in question). Testing that the second condition of a
valid instrument is satisfied (the instrument is not correlated with the error term)
is a bit more complicated in the two-stage, limited-dependent variable framework.
Since no formal test of overidentifying restrictions exists in this setup, a common
approach is to treat the second stage (limited-dependent variable) equation as if it
were linear and obtain the Sargan statistic from the 2SLS regression. However, since
the dependent variable in the second stage is inflation discretized based on where it
is in the band space, we need to construct a continuous variable that is a function
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of both inflation and the target band. We naturally choose the percent deviation of
inflation from the center of the band for the continuous dependent variable. For all
three samples (Industrial, Emerging Market and All Inflation Targeting Countries),
we find that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorre-
lated with the error term of the ordered logit regression. Therefore, we conclude that
the instruments are valid ones.
3.4.3 Heteroskedastic Errors and Simultaneity Bias
Our specification up to this point assumes homoskedasticity in the error term. One
way to check the validity of this assumption is to run the analysis with ordered probit
instead of ordered logit. If logit and probit regressions give similar estimates, it is
an indication that heteroskedasticity is not an issue. This extends to the ordered
logit/probit realm. We obtain encouraging results in that our estimates are very
similar for ordered probit and ordered logit regressions (results not shown).
We also test for simultaneity bias by lagging the independent variables one period
and estimating the model. Our analysis is robust to this potential bias.
3.4.4 Exchange Rates
We obtain no significant effect from the exchange rate in our model. Perhaps the
exchange rate is affecting inflation outcomes through indirect channels. Roger &
Stone mention that the exchange rate indirectly impacts inflation through a financial
vulnerability channel. Reinhart & Rogoff [73] have an influential study about why
the official IMF categorizations of exchange rate regimes are and have been incor-
rect. They employ a dataset of market-determined parallel exchange rates for each
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country in their analysis (153 total countries) from 1946-2001 and reclassify coun-
tries’ exchange rate regimes according to an algorithm. For our purposes, according
to Reinhart & Rogoff, most of the countries in our analysis are not free-floaters as
the IMF specifies, but instead are either managed floaters or on a de-facto peg. This
could be the reason behind the insignificance of the exchange rate coefficient esti-
mates. In addition, exchange rates have big effects on import prices but less so on
consumer goods due to non-competitive markets in the provision of distribution ser-
vices. Therefore, CPI measures of inflation should be impacted less directly by the
exchange rate. Finally, more open economies should be impacted to a greater ex-
tent by exchange rate shocks. Levin, Natalucci & Piger mention that the two sets of
inflation-targeting countries in their analysis (Emerging Market targeting countries
which can be seen as small, open economies and Industrial targeting countries which
can be seen as large, closed economies) may display different inflation dynamics.
3.5 Prediction Exercise
In this section, we take the estimated coefficients from the limited-dependent vari-
able regressions for the Industrial countries and perform an out-of-sample fit for US
inflation. We calculate the probabilities that the level of US inflation was above, in,
and below an imposed inflation target band based on macroeconomic characteristics
of the US. Then we compare the actual inflation band results of the US with the
predicted inflation band results by looking at the linear correlations between the pre-
dicted inflation target band position and the actual position. We also provide two
standard measures of rank correlation (Spearman’s ρ and Kendall’s τ) between the
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actual and predicted band positions since they are ordinal in nature117.
Since the US is not an explicit inflation-targeter and does not have a predefined
target band, we impose an inflation target band in an admittedly ad-hoc way based
on readings of FOMC minutes. A 1.5%-2.5% band for Core CPI inflation (CPI-
U excluding food and energy) is used for the US after 1996:4. This is consistent
with the inflation target of 2% informally discussed at the July 2-3, 1996 FOMC
meetings118 119. See Figure 3.5 for US inflation with the constructed bands based on
FOMC minutes.
The results from the prediction exercise indicate that actual US inflation per-
formance is pretty well correlated with the predicted inflation performance based on
the estimates from the inflation-targeting countries in the econometric model. Fig-
ure 3.6 shows the results for Core CPI and CPI inflation. Table 3.11 has the linear
and rank correlations along with the percent correctly predicted values for both band
construction scenarios. Note that both rank correlation measures are constructed to
be on the [-1,1] interval, with values closer to 1 (-1) indicating increasing (decreasing)
agreement in the rankings between the actual and predicted band positions. We can
see that using Core or Total CPI gives a better fit in different cases depending on
which correlation measure is examined.
117The below the band position for the inflation outcome is an ordinal level beneath the in the band
position, which in turn is ordinally beneath the above the band position.
118What is unclear from the FOMC transcript is which inflation measure was being considered for
targeting. Several of the regional Bank Presidents and Board Governors seem to have assumed that
Governor Janet Yellen was referring to Core CPI during her discussion on the matter (This is the
reason why we use Core CPI). A discussion of the faults and merits of different inflation measures
then occurred.
119However, there is disagreement to whether a target exists at all. Greg Ip of the Wall Street
Journal [43] writes: “...eight of the FOMC’s current 18 members have advocated that range (1% to
2%) or something close to it. But 1% to 2% may not be the preferred target. Gary Stern, president of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, says, ‘There seems to be something of a public perception
that that’s a semiofficial range, and from my perspective there’s nothing remotely official about it.’
”
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
This study constructs a reduced form econometric model of IBT countries to identify
the empirical determinants of inflation escaping from a band target. We find that, in
addition to common drivers of inflation behavior such as GDP growth and measures
of marginal costs (i.e. the output or unemployment gap), medium-term fluctuations
in trend productivity growth plays an important role in driving inflation from the
target band. We further use this setup to find that US inflation behavior is well
predicted by the empirical model in an out-of-sample prediction exercise. Our study is
a preliminary applied examination of inflation behavior in explicit inflation-targeting
regimes under the assumption that a band rather than a point is being targeted.
Since most explicit inflation-targeting countries target a band rather than a point for
inflation in practice, we feel that a further exploration of inflation behavior in IBT
countries may prove to be a fruitful area of research.
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3.7 Orphanides & Wieland Appendix
Orphanides & Wieland examine three setups, two of which give rise to inflation band
targeting. In the final two setups described below, the only way to solve the problems
are through numerical methods.
3.7.1 Quadratic Preferences with Linear Constraints
This section is the baseline case that describes inflation point targeting. The central
bank’s problem is:
V (pit) = min
yˆt+1
{
lt+1 + βV (pit+1)
}
(3.12)
subject to:
pit+1 = pit + αyt+1 + et+1 (3.13)
yt+1 = ρyt − ξ(Rt − pit − r∗) + ut+1 (3.14)
where:
lt+1 = ω(pit+1 − pi∗)2 + (1− ω)y2t+1 (3.15)
pi∗ = piH+piL
2
is the middle of the target band and the intended output gap yˆt+1 is
defined as follows:
yˆt+1 = yt+1 − ut+1
The solution to this problem is:
yˆt+1 = µ(pit − pi∗)
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where µ is a function of the parameters of the model. Solving for intended (and
actual) inflation, we get:
pˆit+1 = (1 + αµ)pit − αµpi∗
pit+1 = (1 + αµ)pit − αµpi∗ − et+1
If the weight on inflation in the objective function equals one (ω = 1: no weight on
output gap), then:
pˆit+1 = pi
∗
and:
pit+1 = pi
∗ − et+1
Otherwise, intended inflation slowly converges to the target over time.
3.7.2 Zone-Quadratic Preferences
In the next section of their paper, Orphanides & Wieland examine a case with zone-
quadratic preferences (i.e. quadratic in the zone function specified below) that gives
rise to inflation band targeting. The setup is the same but the loss function now looks
like this120:
lt+1 = ωZ(pit+1, piH , piL, c)
2 + (1− ω)y2t+1
where:
Z(pit+1, piH , piL, c) = pit+1−
(
piH + piL
2
)
−1
2
√
c+ (pit+1 − piL)2+1
2
√
c+ (−pit+1 + piH)2
120We have changed their model slightly to incorporate the band bounds rather than using the
bandwidth as Orphanides & Wieland do.
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and c is a smoothness parameter set to a small positive number (c=0.1 for example).
As c→ 0, Z becomes the piecewise linear function below:
Z(pit+1, piH , piL, 0) =

pit+1 − piL if pit+1 < piL
0 if piL < pit+1 < piH
pit+1 − piH if pit+1 > piH
Since the objective function is not differentiable at the band bounds, a closed-
form solution for inflation is not possible. Orphanides & Wieland solve for inflation
using numerical methods and obtain for bands of inaction121 for the inflation gap
(pit − pi∗) with respect to the intended output gap (yˆt+1) in all cases sans the one
where ω = 1, which indicates that the central bank only cares about inflation.
3.7.3 Quadratic Preferences & Nonlinear Phillips Curve
In the next section of their paper, Orphanides & Wieland solve a problem with the
same quadratic loss function in Equation (3.15) but subject to a nonlinear, state-
dependent Phillips Curve:
pit+1 = pit + αZ(yt+1, piH , piL) + et+1 (3.16)
Therefore, the problem is to maximize the Bellman Equation in Equation (3.12)
s.t. (3.14), (3.15) and (3.16). Once again, the solution is solved only by numerical
methods due to the nonlinear constraint, despite having a quadratic loss function.
121Bands of inaction meaning that inflation minus its target are allowed to fluctuate as long as
they are within the acceptable band specified.
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The results are similar to the previous section with non-quadratic preferences.
136
3.8 Data Appendix
Australia
Variable Description Source Code
Real GDP SA, Mil.Chn.05-06.A$ C193GDPC@OECDMEI
Nominal GDP SA, Mil.A$ C193GDP@OECDMEI
Employment Civilian Employment (SA, Thous) C193EC@OECDMEI
Unemployment Standardized Unemployment Rate (SA, %) C193URS@OECDMEI
Consumer Price Index All Items (NSA, 2000=100) C193CZN@OECDMEI
Nom. Interest Rate 3-Month Bank Accepted Bills (AVG, %) N193RI3@G10
Curr. Account Balance SA, Mil.A$ C193ZBC@OECDMEI
Nom. Exchange Rate Average (A$/US$) C193FXDA@OECDMEI
Canada
Variable Description Source Code
Real GDP SAAR, Mil.Chn.02.C$ C156GDPC@OECDMEI
Nominal GDP SAAR, Mil.C$ C156GDP@OECDMEI
Employment Civilian Employment (SA, Thous) C156EC@OECDMEI
Unemployment Standardized Unemployment Rate (SA, %) C156URS@OECDMEI
Consumer Price Index All Items (NSA, 2000=100) C156CZN@OECDMEI
Nom. Interest Rate 3-Month Treasury Bill Yield (AVG, %) N156RG3M@G10
Curr. Account Balance SA, Mil.C$ C156ZBC@OECDMEI
Nom. Exchange Rate Average (C$/US$) C156FXDA@OECDMEI
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Iceland
Variable Description Source Code
Real GDP SA, Mil.Chn.2000.Kroner C176GDPC@OECDMEI
Nominal GDP SA, Mil.Kronur C176GDP@OECDMEI
Employment Employed (SA, Persons) F176ELE@G10
Unemployment Unemployment Rate (SA, %) C176URG@OECDMEI
Consumer Price Index All Items (NSA, 2000=100) C176CZN@OECDMEI
Nom. Interest Rate 90-Day Treasury Bills Rate (% per annum) C176FRUO@OECDMEI
Curr. Account Balance SA, Mil.Kronur C176ZBC@OECDMEI
Nom. Exchange Rate Average (Kronur/US$) C176FXDA@OECDMEI
New Zealand
Variable Description Source Code
Real GDP SA, Mil.Chn.95-96.NZ$ C196GDPC@OECDMEI
Nominal GDP SA, Mil.NZ$ C196GDP@OECDMEI
Employment Civilian Employment (SA, Thous) C196EC@OECDMEI
Unemployment Standardized Unemployment Rate (SA, %) C196URS@OECDMEI
Consumer Price Index All Items (NSA, 2000=100) C196CZN@OECDMEI
Nom. Interest Rate 90-Day Bank Bill Rate (% per annum) C196FRCB@OECDMEI
Curr. Account Balance SA, Mil.NZ$ C196ZBC@OECDMEI
Nom. Exchange Rate Average (NZ$/US$) C196FXDA@OECDMEI
Spain
Variable Description Source Code
Real GDP SA, Bil.Chn.2000.Euros C184GDPC@OECDMEI
Nominal GDP SA, Bil.Euros C184GDP@OECDMEI
Employment Civilian Employment (SA, Thous) C184EC@OECDMEI
Unemployment Standardized Unemployment Rate (SA, %) C184URS@OECDMEI
Consumer Price Index All Items (NSA, 2000=100) C184CZN@OECDMEI
Nom. Interest Rate 86-96 Day Interbank Rate (% per annum) C184FRIO@OECDMEI
Curr. Account Balance SA, Mil.Euros C184ZBC@OECDMEI
Nom. Exchange Rate Spot (EOP, US$/Euros) C184FXDS@OECDMEI
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Sweden
Variable Description Source Code
Real GDP SA, Mil.Chn.2000 Kroner C144GDPC@OECDMEI
Nominal GDP SA, Mil.Euros C144GDP@OECDMEI
Employment Civilian Employment (SA, Thous) C144EC@OECDMEI
Unemployment Standardized Unemployment Rate (SA, %) C144URS@OECDMEI
Consumer Price Index All Items (NSA, 2000=100) C144CZN@OECDMEI
Nom. Interest Rate 3-Month Treasury Discount Notes C144FRTB@OECDMEI
(% per annum)
Curr. Account Balance SA, Bil.Kroner C144ZBC@OECDMEI
Nom. Exchange Rate Average (Kroner/US$) C144FXDA@OECDMEI
UK
Variable Description Source Code
Real GDP SA, Mil.Chn.2003.Pounds C112GDPC@OECDMEI
Nominal GDP SA, Mil.Pounds C112GDP@OECDMEI
Employment Employment: Aged 16 and Over (SA, Thous) S112ELEQ@G10
Unemployment Standardized Unemployment Rate (SA, %) C112URS@OECDMEI
Consumer Price Index All Items (NSA, 2000=100) C112CZN@OECDMEI
Nom. Interest Rate 90-Day Treasury Bills Rate (% per annum) C112FRIO@OECDMEI
Curr. Account Balance Balance as % of GDP (SA, %) S112BCPG@G10
Nom. Exchange Rate Average (Pound/US$) C112FXDA@OECDMEI
US
Variable Description Source Code
Real GDP SAAR, Bil.Chn.2000$ GDPH@USECON
Nominal GDP SAAR, Bil.US$ C111GDP@OECDMEI
Employment Civilian Employment: LE@USECON
Sixteen Years & Over (SA, Thousands)
Unemployment Standardized Unemployment Rate (SA, %) C111URS@OECDMEI
Consumer Price Index CPI-U: All Items (SA, 1982-84=100) PCU@USECON
C-CPI-U: All Items Less Food and Energy PCCULFEN@USECON
(NSA, Dec-99=100)
Nom. Interest Rate 3-Month Treasury Bill Market Bid N111RG3M@G10
Yield at Constant Maturity (%)
Curr. Account Balance Balance as a % of GDP (SAAR, %) BPBCAG@USECON
Oil Spot Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate PZTEXP@USECON
[Prior’82=Posted Price] ($/Barrel)
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Brazil
Variable Description Source Code
Nominal GDP Mil.Reais (NSA) C223GDP@IFS
Employment Employed Persons aged 10 years and over B1@LABORSTA
6 metropolitan areas (Thous, NSA)
Unemployment Unemployment Rate (%, NSA) C223WR@IFS
Consumer Price Index Consumer Prices (2000=1000000) C223PCC@IFS
Nom. Interest Rate TBill Rate: Letras do Tesouro Nacional C223IT@IFS
31-days or longer (%)
Curr. Account Balance Mil.US$ C223BPCU@IFS
Nom. Exchange Rate Market or Par (Average, Reais/US$) C223ECMA@IFS
Note: Real GDP growth is constructed by using Nominal GDP growth minus the inflation rate.
Employment data obtained from LABORSTA at http://laborsta.ilo.org/.
Chile
Variable Description Source Code
Nominal GDP Bil.Pesos (NSA) C228GDP@IFS
Employment Persons aged 15 years and over B1@LABORSTA
Civilian labour force employed, (Thous, NSA)
Unemployment Unemployment Rate (%, NSA) C228WR@IFS
Consumer Price Index 2000=100, NSA C228PC@IFS
Nom. Interest Rate 30-89 Day Deposit Rate, Weighted Average (%) C228IDEP@IFS
Curr. Account Balance Mil.US$ C228BPCU@IFS
Nom. Exchange Rate Market or Par (Average, Pesos/US$) C228ECMA@IFS
Note: Real GDP growth is constructed by using Nominal GDP growth minus the inflation rate.
Employment data obtained from LABORSTA at http://laborsta.ilo.org/.
Czech Republic
Variable Description Source Code
Real GDP SA, Mil.Chn.2000.Koruny C935GDPC@OECDMEI
Nominal GDP Bil.Koruny, NSA C935GDP@IFS
Employment Civilian Employment (NSA, 2000=100) C935ECIN@OECDMEI
Unemployment Standardized Unemployment Rate (SA, %) C935URS@OECDMEI
Consumer Price Index All Items (NSA, 2000=100) C935CZN@OECDMEI
Nom. Interest Rate 3-Month PRIBOR: Prague Interbank C935FRIO@OECDMEI
Offer Rate (% p.a.)
Curr. Account Balance SA, Mil.Koruny C935ZBC@OECDMEI
Nom. Exchange Rate Average (Koruny/US$) C935FXDA@OECDMEI
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Hungary
Variable Description Source Code
Real GDP SA/WDA, Mil.Chn.2000.Forints C944GDPC@OECDMEI
Nominal GDP Bil.Forint (NSA) C944GDP@IFS
Employment Civilian Employment (NSA, 2000=100) C944ECIN@OECDMEI
Unemployment Standardized Unemployment Rate (SA, %) C944URS@OECDMEI
Consumer Price Index All Items (NSA, 2000=100) C944CZN@OECDMEI
Nom. Interest Rate 90-day Treasury Bill Rate (% per annum) C944FRIL@OECDMEI
Curr. Account Balance SA, Bil.Forint C944ZBC@OECDMEI
Nom. Exchange Rate Average (Forint/US$) C944FXDA@OECDMEI
Mexico
Variable Description Source Code
Real GDP Index (2000=100, NSA) C273GDPI@IFS
Nominal GDP Bil.New Pesos (SAAR) C273GDP@IFS
Employment
Unemployment Unemployment Rate (SA, %) C273UR@OECDMEI
Consumer Price Index All Items C273CZN@OECDMEI
NSA, 2000=100
Nom. Interest Rate 3-Month Treasury Bill: CETES C273FRIO@OECDMEI
(% per annum)
Curr. Account Balance SA, Mil.US$ C273XBD@OECDMEI
Nom. Exchange Rate Average (Peso/US$) C273FXDA@OECDMEI
Note: Need Employment data–may not be able to include Mexico in study.
Poland
Variable Description Source Code
Real GDP SA, Mil.Chn.2000.Zlotys C964GDPC@OECDMEI
Nominal GDP Mil.Zlotys (NSA) C964GDP@IFS
Employment Civilian Employment (NSA, 2000=100) C964ECIN@OECDMEI
Unemployment Standardized Unemployment Rate (SA, %) C964URS@OECDMEI
Consumer Price Index All Items (NSA, 2000=100) C964CZN@OECDMEI
Nom. Interest Rate 13-Week Treasury Bill Auction Rate C964IT@IFS
Wted Avg (%)
Curr. Account Balance SA, Mil.US$ C964XBD@OECDMEI
Nom. Exchange Rate Average (Zloty/US$) C964FXDA@OECDMEI
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South Africa
Variable Description Source Code
Real GDP Mil.2000.Rand, SAAR C199GDPC@IFS
Nominal GDP Mil.Rand, SAAR C199GDP@IFS
Employment Number Employed (Thous, NSA) C199WE@IFS
Unemployment
Consumer Price Index 2000=100, NSA C199PC@IFS
Nom. Interest Rate 91-Day Treasury Bill Tender Rate (%) C199IT@IFS
Curr. Account Balance Mil.US$ C199BPCU@IFS
Nom. Exchange Rate Market or Par (Average, Rand/US$) C199ECMA@IFS
Note: Unemployment Rate data stops after 1998. Inflation-targeting starts in 2000 in South Africa–
therefore may not be able to include South Africa in study.
South Korea
Variable Description Source Code
Real GDP Index (SA, 2000=100) C542GDPI@OECDMEI
Nominal GDP Bil.Won, NSA C542GDP@IFS
Employment Civilian Employment (SA, Thousands) C542EC@OECDMEI
Unemployment Standardised Unemployment Rate (SA, %) C542URS@OECDMEI
Consumer Price Index All Items (NSA, 2000=100) C542CZN@OECDMEI
Nom. Interest Rate 3-months CDs (% per annum) C542FRCD@OECDMEI
Curr. Account Balance SA, Mil.US$ C542XBD@OECDMEI
Nom. Exchange Rate Average (Won/US$) C542FXDA@OECDMEI
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Data Construction
Regression Variable How Constructed
Real Gross Domestic realgdpgrowth = 100*(realgdp-L4.realgdp)/L4.realgdp
Product Growth
Trend Productivity productivity = realgdp/(1000*employment)
Growth logproductivity = ln(productivity)
hprescott logproductivity
run log productivity through H-P filter to produce
trend and cyclical components
tlogproductivity = logproductivity-clogproductivity
trendprodgrowth = 100*(tlogproductivity-L4.tlogproductivity)
Cyclical Productivity cyclicalprodgrowth = 100*(clogproductivity-L4.clogproductivity)
Growth
Unemployment Rate Gap avginf = ((inf + L.inf + L2.inf + L3.inf)/4)
where avginf is a four-quarter average inflation rate
regress D.avginf L.unemprate
where the command is regress y x
nairu = -(b[cons]/b[L.unemprate])
where nairu is the natural rate of unemployment
where unemprate is the unemployment rate
where b[cons] is the estimated intercept of regression
where b[L.unemprate] is the estimated coefficient
on the unemployment rate
unempgap = unemprate - nairu
Lunempgap = L.unempgap (Lag unempgap one period)
Monetary Policy Proxy realshortintrate = int - ((inf + L.inf + L2.inf + L3.inf)/4)
where realshortintrate is the real short term interest rate
constructed by taking the nominal interest rate
minus the four-quarter average inflation rate
mon = trendprodgrowth - realshortintrate
where monetarypolicy is trend productivity minus the
real short term interest rate
Nominal Interest Rate Lag nominalintrate one and two periods
Curr. Account Balance currentaccountpercent = 100*(currentaccountbalance/nominalgdp)
(in % of GDP) where currentaccountpercent is the current account balance
in % of nominal gdp
L4currentaccountpercent = L4.currentaccountpercent
Exchange Rate logexchangerate = ln(exchangerate)
where exchangerate is the nominal exchange rate in FCU/US$
Dlogexchangerate = logexchangerate-L.logexchangerate
where Dlogexchangerate is the first differenced exchange rate
Oil oilpriceinfcu = ln(oil*exchangerate)
where oil is in US $ and oilpriceinfcu is in FCU/US$
Note: Text in bold are the regression variables used. FCU is short for foreign currency units
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3.8.1 Seasonal Adjustment
Some of the raw data series used and described in the previous section are not season-
ally adjusted (NSA) at the source. In this situation, I remove the additive quarterly
seasonal factors122. Thanks to Kit Baum [7] for guidance on performing this adjust-
ment. Here is an example for the employment variable using STATA:
1. forvalues i=1/3 {
2. gen qseas‘i’=(quarter(dofq(time))==‘i’)
3. }
4. gen employmentNSA = employment
5. drop employment
6. regress employmentNSA qseas*
7. predict double employment, residual
8. egen meanvalue=mean(employmentNSA)
9. replace employment = employment + meanvalue
The lines of code in 1. to 3. create seasonal dummy variables for the first three
quarters of the year. Line 6. regresses the NSA employment variable on all three
quarterly dummy variables to remove the seasonal fixed effects and Line 7. recovers
the residuals from the regression. Finally, lines 8. and 9. add on the mean of the
original series to create the seasonally adjusted series: employment.
122The main exception being the Consumer Price Index. This series is not seasonally adjusted.
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Table 3.1: Inflation-Targeting Countries
Country Adoption Date End Date Target Measure Target Point (%) Target Band (%)
Australia Apr. 1993 CPI None 2-3
Canada Feb. 1991 CPI 2.0 1-3
Euro Area Jan. 1999 HICP None 0-2
Finland Feb. 1993 Dec. 1998 CPI 2.0 by 1995 None
Iceland Mar. 2001 Headline CPI 2.5 (from 2003) +/-1.5
Japan Mar. 2006 CPI None 0-2
New Zealand Mar. 1990 CPI None Path from
3-5 (1990) to
0-2 (1992-96)
0-3 (1997-2001)
1-3 (from 2002)
Norway Mar. 2001 CPI 2.5 None
Spain Jan. 1995 Dec. 1998 CPI None 3.5-4 (early 1996)
0-3 (to 1997)
Sweden Jan. 1993 CPI 2.0 (from 1995) +/-1
Switzerland Jan. 2000 CPI None 0-2
UK Oct. 1992 RPIX (1992-2003) None (1992-95) 1-4 (1992-96)
CPI (from 2004) 2.5 (1996-2004) +/-1 (from 1996)
2.0 (from 2004)
Brazil Jun. 1999 CPIA (Broad) 4.0 (2003) +/-2 (1999-2002)
3.75 (2004) +/-2.5 (from 2003)
Chile Sep. 1999 CPI 3.0 2-4
Columbia Sep. 1999 CPI 5.5 (2003) 5-6 (2003)
3.0 long term
Czech Republic Jan. 1998 CPI Declining Path +/-1
from 4.5 (1998)
to 2.0 (2005)
Hungary Jun. 2001 CPI 3.5 (2003-04) +/-1
2.0 long term
Israel Jun. 1997 CPI None 1-3 (from 2003)
Mexico Jan. 2001 CPI Ceiling (2001-02)
3.0 (from 2003) +/-1 (2003)
Peru Jan. 2002 CPI 2.5 +/-1
Philippines Jan. 2002 CPI (Ann. Ave.) None 4-5 (2004)
Poland Oct. 1998 CPI Under 4 by 2003 Varying (1999-2002)
(1999-2002) +/-1 (from 2002)
3.0 (2003)
2.5 (2004)
South Africa Feb. 2000 CPIX Ann Ave. None 3-6 (2004-05)
(2000-03) revised from 3-5
CPIX (from 2004)
South Korea Jan. 2001 CPI None 2.5-3.5 (from 2004)
Thailand May 2000 Underlying Index None 0-3.5
Source: Modified from Roger & Stone.
Notes: The Industrial and Emerging Market targeters are grouped in the top and bottom panels.
The Euro Area, Japan and Switzerland are not full-fledged inflation targeters, but rather they pursue
other policy goals in addition to price stability.
Countries in bold are in our sample.
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Table 3.2: Location of Actual Inflation in Inflation Band-Targeting Countries (Fre-
quency in % of sample period)
Below Band In Band Above Band
Australia 33 33 34
Canada 10 79 11
Iceland 0 45 55
New Zealand 8 63 29
Spain 6 69 25
Sweden 39 50 11
UK 29 67 5
Industrial Countries - Average 20 58 21
Brazil 0 42 58
Chile 12 68 21
Czech Republic 50 39 11
Hungary 0 29 71
Poland 42 26 32
South Korea 27 47 27
Emerging Market Countries - Average 23 42 35
All Inflation Targeting Countries - Average 21 53 26
US (assumed Core CPI target) 22 59 19
US (assumed CPI target) 11 47 42
Note: Rows may not add to 100 due to rounding error.
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Table 3.3: Ordered Logit Regressions: Odds-Ratios
All Countries Industrial Emerging Market
(1) (2) (3)
GDP Growth 1.446∗∗∗ 1.424∗∗∗ 1.360∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.17) (0.155)
Trend Prod. Growth 0.278∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.034) (0.113)
Cyclical Prod. Growth 0.614∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.069) (0.1)
L.Unemployment Gap 0.944∗∗∗ 1.090∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.062) (0.07)
Monetary Policy Proxy 2.020∗∗∗ 3.520∗∗∗ 1.444∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.569) (0.197)
L.Nominal Interest Rate 4.723∗∗∗ 10.362∗∗∗ 2.209∗∗∗
(0.978) (3.383) (0.644)
L2.Nominal Interest Rate 0.472∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.083) (0.169)
L4.Current Account Percent 1.000∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.062) (0.0001)
D.Exchange Rate 0.037 0.005 0.003
(0.103) (0.019) (0.013)
Oil Price 1.241 0.423 48.382
(1.203) (0.549) (87.420)
L.Oil Price 2.346 5.110 0.194
(3.510) (10.402) (0.497)
L2.Oil Price 3.170 4.130 5.110
(4.814) (8.447) (13.161)
L3.Oil Price 0.842 2.004 0.114
(1.207) (3.925) (0.281)
L4.Oil Price 0.083 0.009 0.766
(0.114) (0.018) (1.745)
L5.Oil Price 1.391 4.294 0.848
(1.938) (8.118) (2.011)
L6.Oil Price 2.914 5.111 0.618
(4.054) (9.540) (1.505)
L7.Oil Price 0.678 0.566 2.708
(0.927) (1.047) (6.576)
L8.Oil Price 0.594 0.638 0.18
(0.536) (0.804) (0.288)
Obs. 508 350 158
Pseudo R-Squared 0.268 0.376 0.257
Log-Likelihood -368.593 -205.846 -125.200
χ2 Statistic 269.602 248.331 86.428
*** / ** / * corresponds to significance at the 1% / 5 % / 10% level. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses.
Odds-Ratios reported, which can be less than/equal to/greater than one, correspond to a nega-
tive/no/positive relation between independent and dependent variables.
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Table 3.4: Ordered Logit Regressions: Marginal Effects (All Countries)
Below In Above
(1) (2) (3)
GDP Growth -.042∗∗∗ 0.001 0.041∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
Trend Prod. Growth 0.145∗∗∗ -.004 -.141∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.021) (0.019)
Cyclical Prod. Growth 0.055∗∗∗ -.002 -.054∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.008) (0.01)
L.Unemployment Gap 0.007∗ -.0002 -.006∗
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Monetary Policy Proxy -.080∗∗∗ 0.002 0.078∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
L.Nominal Interest Rate -.176∗∗∗ 0.005 0.171∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
L2.Nominal Interest Rate 0.085∗∗∗ -.002 -.083∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.012) (0.02)
L4.Current Account Percent 0.00004∗∗ -1.07e-06 -.00004∗∗
(0.00002) (5.52e-06) (0.00002)
D.Exchange Rate 0.374 -.010 -.364
(0.317) (0.055) (0.309)
Oil Price -.025 0.0007 0.024
(0.11) (0.005) (0.107)
L.Oil Price -.097 0.003 0.094
(0.17) (0.015) (0.165)
L2.Oil Price -.131 0.004 0.127
(0.173) (0.02) (0.168)
L3.Oil Price 0.02 -.0005 -.019
(0.163) (0.005) (0.158)
L4.Oil Price 0.283∗ -.008 -.275∗
(0.156) (0.041) (0.154)
L5.Oil Price -.037 0.001 0.036
(0.158) (0.007) (0.154)
L6.Oil Price -.121 0.003 0.118
(0.158) (0.018) (0.154)
L7.Oil Price 0.044 -.001 -.043
(0.155) (0.008) (0.151)
L8.Oil Price 0.059 -.002 -.058
(0.103) (0.009) (0.1)
Obs. 508
Pseudo R-Squared 0.268
Log-Likelihood -368.593
χ2 Statistic 269.602
*** / ** / * corresponds to significance at the 1% / 5 % / 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses.148
Table 3.5: Ordered Logit Regressions: Marginal Effects (Industrial Countries)
Below In Above
(1) (2) (3)
GDP Growth -.024∗∗∗ 0.001 0.023∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.005) (0.008)
Trend Prod. Growth 0.142∗∗∗ -.008 -.134∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.031) (0.025)
Cyclical Prod. Growth 0.05∗∗∗ -.003 -.047∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
L.Unemployment Gap -.006 0.0003 0.006
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Monetary Policy Proxy -.086∗∗∗ 0.005 0.081∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.019) (0.016)
L.Nominal Interest Rate -.160∗∗∗ 0.009 0.151∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.035) (0.031)
L2.Nominal Interest Rate 0.079∗∗∗ -.005 -.075∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.017) (0.021)
L4.Current Account Percent 0.012∗∗ -.0007 -.011∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
D.Exchange Rate 0.366 -.021 -.344
(0.282) (0.081) (0.266)
Oil Price 0.059 -.003 -.055
(0.089) (0.014) (0.084)
L.Oil Price -.112 0.006 0.105
(0.139) (0.026) (0.131)
L2.Oil Price -.097 0.006 0.091
(0.141) (0.023) (0.133)
L3.Oil Price -.048 0.003 0.045
(0.134) (0.013) (0.126)
L4.Oil Price 0.319∗∗ -.019 -.301∗∗
(0.137) (0.07) (0.13)
L5.Oil Price -.100 0.006 0.094
(0.13) (0.023) (0.123)
L6.Oil Price -.112 0.006 0.105
(0.128) (0.025) (0.121)
L7.Oil Price 0.039 -.002 -.037
(0.127) (0.011) (0.119)
L8.Oil Price 0.031 -.002 -.029
(0.086) (0.008) (0.081)
Obs. 350
Pseudo R-Squared 0.376
Log-Likelihood -205.846
χ2 Statistic 248.331
*** / ** / * corresponds to significance at the 1% / 5 % / 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses.149
Table 3.6: Ordered Logit Regressions: Marginal Effects (Emerging Market Countries)
Below In Above
(1) (2) (3)
GDP Growth -.048∗∗ 0.002 0.046∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.011) (0.017)
Trend Prod. Growth 0.095∗∗∗ -.003 -.092∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.022) (0.032)
Cyclical Prod. Growth 0.064∗∗∗ -.002 -.061∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.015) (0.022)
L.Unemployment Gap 0.015 -.0005 -.014
(0.012) (0.003) (0.011)
Monetary Policy Proxy -.057∗∗∗ 0.002 0.055∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.013) (0.021)
L.Nominal Interest Rate -.123∗∗∗ 0.004 0.118∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.028) (0.046)
L2.Nominal Interest Rate 0.05 -.002 -.048
(0.036) (0.011) (0.036)
L4.Current Account Percent 0.00006∗∗∗ -2.18e-06 -.00006∗∗
(0.00002) (1.00e-05) (0.00003)
D.Exchange Rate 0.923 -.032 -.891
(0.753) (0.209) (0.737)
Oil Price -.600∗∗ 0.021 0.58∗∗
(0.287) (0.137) (0.274)
L.Oil Price 0.254 -.009 -.245
(0.398) (0.06) (0.382)
L2.Oil Price -.252 0.009 0.244
(0.401) (0.06) (0.383)
L3.Oil Price 0.336 -.012 -.325
(0.386) (0.079) (0.365)
L4.Oil Price 0.041 -.001 -.040
(0.352) (0.015) (0.341)
L5.Oil Price 0.026 -.0009 -.025
(0.367) (0.014) (0.354)
L6.Oil Price 0.074 -.003 -.072
(0.377) (0.022) (0.363)
L7.Oil Price -.154 0.005 0.149
(0.377) (0.038) (0.362)
L8.Oil Price 0.265 -.009 -.256
(0.249) (0.061) (0.239)
Obs. 158
Pseudo R-Squared 0.257
Log-Likelihood -125.200
χ2 Statistic 86.428
*** / ** / * corresponds to significance at the 1% / 5 % / 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses.150
Table 3.7: 2SCML Results: Odds-Ratios
All Countries Industrial Emerging Market
(1) (2) (3)
GDP Growth 2.416∗∗∗ 1.381∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗
(0.443) (0.479) (0.256)
Trend Prod. Growth 0.165∗ 0.039∗∗ 42.610
(0.088) (0.016) (57.153)
Cyclical Prod. Growth 0.251∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗ 0.232∗
(0.085) (0.21) (0.124)
L.Unemployment Gap 0.968∗∗∗ 1.198∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.097) (0.099)
Monetary Policy Proxy 2.539∗∗ 6.317∗∗∗ 0.028
(1.208) (1.547) (0.031)
L.Nominal Interest Rate 2.127 90.425 0.0001
(7.178) (139.385) (0.0004)
L2.Nominal Interest Rate 1.350 0.055 857.191
(4.130) (0.081) (1802.533)
L4.Current Account Percent 1.000∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.08) (0.0004)
D.Exchange Rate 0.025 16.336 3.90e-23
(0.252) (125.694) (6.83e-22)
Oil Price 0.812 1.053 1.19e-06
(1.773) (1.869) (6.78e-06)
L.Oil Price 23.089 0.537 2.22e+09
(138.910) (1.385) (1.47e+10)
L2.Oil Price 1.589 4.767 1.14e+08
(2.710) (10.932) (6.97e+08)
L3.Oil Price 0.354 3.474 8.38e-06
(0.864) (7.935) (0.00003)
L4.Oil Price 0.027 0.006 0.00007
(0.048) (0.013) (0.0002)
L5.Oil Price 1.131 3.798 63.885
(1.852) (8.138) (185.257)
L6.Oil Price 6.160 4.542 0.025
(9.899) (9.912) (0.082)
L7.Oil Price 2.440 0.369 4.74e+08
(6.557) (0.781) (2.63e+09)
L8.Oil Price 0.18 3.474 5.73e-12
(0.641) (7.272) (3.65e-11)
Obs. 476 333 143
Pseudo R-Squared 0.324 0.445 0.382
Log-Likelihood -320.181 -176.694 -93.790
χ2 Statistic 306.791 283.044 115.921
*** / ** / * corresponds to significance at the 1% / 5 % / 10% level.
Odds-Ratios reported, which can be less than/equal to/greater than one, correspond to a nega-
tive/no/positive relation between independent and dependent variables.
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Table 3.8: 2SCML Results: Marginal Effects (All Countries)
Below In Above
(1) (2) (3)
GDP Growth -.093∗∗∗ 0.008 0.084∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.015) (0.019)
Trend Prod. Growth 0.19∗∗∗ -.017 -.172∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.03) (0.053)
Cyclical Prod. Growth 0.145∗∗∗ -.013 -.132∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.023) (0.034)
L.Unemployment Gap 0.003 -.0003 -.003
(0.019) (0.002) (0.017)
Monetary Policy Proxy -.098∗ 0.009 0.089∗
(0.051) (0.016) (0.046)
L.Nominal Interest Rate -.079 0.007 0.072
(0.355) (0.034) (0.323)
L2.Nominal Interest Rate -.032 0.003 0.029
(0.322) (0.03) (0.292)
L4.Current Account Percent 0.00004 -3.95e-06 -.00004
(0.00003) (7.04e-06) (0.00003)
D.Exchange Rate 0.387 -.035 -.352
(1.054) (0.113) (0.959)
Oil Price 0.022 -.002 -.020
(0.229) (0.021) (0.209)
L.Oil Price -.330 0.03 0.3
(0.632) (0.077) (0.575)
L2.Oil Price -.049 0.004 0.044
(0.179) (0.018) (0.163)
L3.Oil Price 0.109 -.010 -.099
(0.257) (0.029) (0.233)
L4.Oil Price 0.379∗∗ -.034 -.345∗∗
(0.187) (0.061) (0.173)
L5.Oil Price -.013 0.001 0.012
(0.172) (0.016) (0.157)
L6.Oil Price -.191 0.017 0.174
(0.169) (0.033) (0.154)
L7.Oil Price -.094 0.008 0.085
(0.282) (0.03) (0.257)
L8.Oil Price 0.18 -.016 -.164
(0.374) (0.044) (0.34)
Obs. 476
Pseudo R-Squared 0.324
Log-Likelihood -320.181
χ2 Statistic 306.791
*** / ** / * corresponds to significance at the 1% / 5 % / 10% level.52
Table 3.9: 2SCML Results: Marginal Effects (Industrial Countries)
Below In Above
(1) (2) (3)
GDP Growth -.017 0.00003 0.017
(0.019) (0.004) (0.019)
Trend Prod. Growth 0.175∗∗∗ -.0003 -.174∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.044) (0.036)
Cyclical Prod. Growth 0.038 -.00007 -.038
(0.023) (0.01) (0.023)
L.Unemployment Gap -.010∗∗ 0.00002 0.01∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Monetary Policy Proxy -.099∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.099∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.025) (0.023)
L.Nominal Interest Rate -.243∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.242∗∗
(0.092) (0.062) (0.096)
L2.Nominal Interest Rate 0.157∗ -.0003 -.157∗
(0.085) (0.04) (0.086)
L4.Current Account Percent 0.01∗ -.00002 -.010∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
D.Exchange Rate -.151 0.0003 0.15
(0.415) (0.038) (0.415)
Oil Price -.003 4.90e-06 0.003
(0.096) (0.0007) (0.096)
L.Oil Price 0.034 -.00006 -.033
(0.139) (0.009) (0.139)
L2.Oil Price -.084 0.0001 0.084
(0.125) (0.021) (0.125)
L3.Oil Price -.067 0.0001 0.067
(0.124) (0.017) (0.123)
L4.Oil Price 0.273∗∗ -.0005 -.272∗∗
(0.123) (0.069) (0.125)
L5.Oil Price -.072 0.0001 0.072
(0.116) (0.018) (0.116)
L6.Oil Price -.082 0.0001 0.081
(0.118) (0.021) (0.118)
L7.Oil Price 0.054 -.00009 -.054
(0.114) (0.014) (0.114)
L8.Oil Price -.067 0.0001 0.067
(0.114) (0.017) (0.114)
Obs. 333
Pseudo R-Squared 0.445
Log-Likelihood -176.694
χ2 Statistic 283.044
*** / ** / * corresponds to significance at the 1% / 5 % / 10% level.53
Table 3.10: 2SCML Results: Marginal Effects (Emerging Market Countries)
Below In Above
(1) (2) (3)
GDP Growth 0.075 -.004 -.071
(0.056) (0.025) (0.057)
Trend Prod. Growth -.449∗∗∗ 0.025 0.425∗∗
(0.162) (0.15) (0.177)
Cyclical Prod. Growth 0.175∗∗ -.010 -.165∗∗
(0.071) (0.059) (0.065)
L.Unemployment Gap 0.162∗∗∗ -.009 -.153∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.054) (0.053)
Monetary Policy Proxy 0.429∗∗∗ -.023 -.405∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.143) (0.15)
L.Nominal Interest Rate 1.070∗∗∗ -.059 -1.012∗∗∗
(0.356) (0.357) (0.382)
L2.Nominal Interest Rate -.809∗∗∗ 0.044 0.765∗∗∗
(0.263) (0.27) (0.282)
L4.Current Account Percent 0.0002∗∗∗ -1.00e-05 -.0002∗∗∗
(0.00004) (0.00006) (0.00006)
D.Exchange Rate 6.181∗∗∗ -.338 -5.843∗∗
(2.135) (2.058) (2.331)
Oil Price 1.634∗∗ -.089 -1.545∗∗
(0.684) (0.544) (0.729)
L.Oil Price -2.578∗∗∗ 0.141 2.437∗∗∗
(0.82) (0.859) (0.896)
L2.Oil Price -2.222∗∗∗ 0.122 2.101∗∗∗
(0.781) (0.743) (0.8)
L3.Oil Price 1.400∗∗∗ -.077 -1.324∗∗∗
(0.523) (0.47) (0.505)
L4.Oil Price 1.152∗∗∗ -.063 -1.089∗∗∗
(0.398) (0.385) (0.418)
L5.Oil Price -.498 0.027 0.471
(0.354) (0.167) (0.342)
L6.Oil Price 0.441 -.024 -.417
(0.401) (0.149) (0.383)
L7.Oil Price -2.393∗∗∗ 0.131 2.262∗∗∗
(0.72) (0.799) (0.773)
L8.Oil Price 3.101∗∗∗ -.170 -2.931∗∗∗
(0.829) (1.035) (0.922)
Obs. 143
Pseudo R-Squared 0.382
Log-Likelihood -93.790
χ2 Statistic 115.921
*** / ** / * corresponds to significance at the 1% / 5 % / 10% level.54
Table 3.11: Linear & Rank Correlations of Predicted and Actual Band Positions
Core CPI CPI
Below Band 0.135 0.231
In Band 0.342 0.327
Above Band 0.636 0.592
% Correctly Predicted 63.5% 59.5%
Spearman’s ρ 0.328 0.425
Kendall’s τ 0.314 0.405
Notes: The two columns use the constructed band as seen in Figure 3.5 for the US. % Correctly
Predicted was calculated by comparing the predicted band position against the actual band position
in each period. The predicted band position was calculated based on the estimated cutoff values
for the limited-dependent variable regressions. Finally, note that the two rank correlation measures
(Spearman’s ρ and Kendall’s τ) are constructed to be on the [-1,1] interval, with values closer to 1
(-1) indicating increasing (decreasing) agreement in the rankings between the actual and predicted
band positions.
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Figure 3.1: US Inflation (CPI and Core CPI)
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
990q1
1990q1
4 3
1994q3
9
1999q1
003
2003q3
8
2008q1
TIME
TIME
CPI-U Inflation
CPI-U Inflation
ore CPI-U Inflation
Core CPI-U Inflation
Source: Haver Analytics
156
Figure 3.2: (a.) OECD Countries’ Inflation with Actual Bands
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Figure 3.2: (b.) Emerging Market Countries’ Inflation with Actual Bands
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Note: Mexico and South Africa are not included in our panel due to data availability issues.
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Figure 3.3: Quadratic and Zone-Quadratic Loss Functions
Source: Orphanides & Wieland (ECB WP 008, 1999)
Note: The solid line is the standard quadratic loss function whereas the dashed line is the
zone-quadratic loss function with a target band of 2%.
Figure 3.4: Optimal Policy in the Linear Quadratic and Linear Zone-Quadratic Mod-
els with and without Uncertainty
Source: Orphanides & Wieland (EER, 2000)
Note: The solid 45 degree line is optimal policy in the linear-quadratic setup whereas optimal
policy in the zone-quadratic loss function with a target band of 2% is depicted with the dashed line
in the case of perfect certainty and the bold solid line in the case of uncertainty. Note how the
band of inaction for inflation shrinks when uncertainty is introduced.
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Figure 3.5: US Inflation (Core CPI and Total CPI) with Constructed Bands
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Figure 3.6: Predicted US Inflation (CPI and Core CPI)
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